Western Illusions
Rudyard Kipling once wrote these words:
East is East, and West is West, And never the twain shall meet.
It is true, however, that he goes on to modify this statement, admitting that the difference disappears 'when two strong men stand face to face that have come from the ends of the earth'; but even this modification is not really very satisfactory, for it is most unlikely that he had in mind 'strength' of a spiritual order. However that may be, it usually happens that the first verse is quoted by itself, as if all that had stuck in the reader's mind was the idea of the unbridgeable difference which the verse expresses; no doubt this idea represents the opinion held by most Europeans, and it seems to betray in them the dismay of the conqueror who has to admit that those whom he believes he has conquered carry within them something over which he can never have any hold. But whatever feeling may have given rise to such an opinion, what interests us especially is to know whether it is true, or how far it is true; indeed, on considering the present state of things, there are many signs that seem to bear out this opinion; but nonetheless, if we shared it entirely, if we thought that no closer relations are possible, and that none ever will be, we should not have undertaken the writing of this book.
We realize, perhaps more than anyone else, the whole distance that separates East and West, especially the modern West; furthermore, in our Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines, we insisted on the differences so much that some may have thought us inclined to exaggerate. We are, however, convinced that we said
nothing that was not rigorously exact, and at the same time we considered in our conclusion whether and how there might be a reestablishment of intellectual relations, which, despite its apparent remoteness, seems to us nonetheless possible. Therefore, if we protested against the attempts of certain Westerners to see likenesses where there are none, it was because illusions of such a nature are not the least obstacle to a proper understanding between East and West; a start based on a false conception often leads in a direction opposite to the one intended. The refusal to see things as they are and to admit certain differences-at present they cannot be too much stressed-involves a complete failure to understand the Eastern mentality, and simply makes the misunderstandings more serious and more permanent, whereas the first efforts should go toward dispelling them. So long as Westerners imagine that there only exists a single type of humanity, that there is only one 'civilization', at different stages of development, no mutual understanding will be possible. The truth is that there are many civilizations, developing along very different lines, and that, among these, that of the modern West is strangely exceptional, as some of its characteristics show. One should never speak absolutely of superiority or inferiority without making it quite clear from what point of view the things to be compared are being considered, even supposing that they are comparable. There is no civilization which is superior to the others from every point of view, because man cannot be equally active at the same time in every direction, and because there are some ways of development which seem actually incompatible with one another. One thing however may be maintained, and this is that there is a certain hierarchy to be observed, and that things of the intellectual order, for example, are worth more than those of the material; if this is so, a civilization which shows itself inferior from the former point of view, in spite of being undeniably superior from the latter, will remain on the whole at a disadvantage, whatever may be the outward appearances; and so it is with Western civilization when compared with those of the East. We are well aware that this way of thinking shocks the great majority of Westerners, because it goes against all their prejudices; but apart from any question of superiority, let them at least admit that the things which in their eyes are of
the greatest importance do not necessarily interest all men to the same extent, that some may even consider them utterly negligible, and that there are other ways of showing intelligence than by making machines. It would be at least something if the Europeans came to understand this and behaved accordingly; their relations with the rest of mankind would then be somewhat changed, to the great benefit of the whole world.
But that is only the outermost side of the question: if the people of the West admitted that other civilizations are not necessarily to be altogether despised simply for differing from theirs, there would be nothing further to prevent them from studying these civilizations as they ought to be studied, that is, without the determination to disparage them and without preconceived hostility; and then perhaps a few of them would not be slow to realize, by means of this study, how much they themselves lack, above all from the purely intellectual point of view. Of course, we are supposing that these few would have attained, in some degree at least, the true understanding of the spirit of the different civilizations, and to do this something other is required than efforts of mere scholarship; everyone, no doubt, is not fitted for such an understanding, but if some are, as is after all probable, that alone may lead sooner or later to inestimable results.
We have already alluded to the part that an intellectual elite might play, once it had been formed in the Western world, where it would act as a leaven to move forward, and to direct along the most favorable lines, a mental transformation which, wanted or not, will one day or another become inevitable. Besides, some people are already beginning to feel more or less confusedly that things cannot go on forever as they are now and even speak, as of something possible, of a bankruptcy of Western civilization, which no one would have dared to do a few years ago; but the real causes that may bring about this bankruptcy seem for the most part to escape them still. As these causes are, at the same time, precisely those that prevent any understanding between East and West, there is a double benefit to be had from knowing them: work in preparation for this understanding is at the same time an effort to divert the catastrophes which threaten the West through its own fault; these two ends are much more closely connected than might be supposed. It is not
then a task of useless and purely negative criticism to show up, as we intend to do again, the errors and illusions of the West; we are prompted by something far deeper than mere criticism, and we bring with us no intention to 'satirize', which moreover would ill suit our character; if there are some who believe that they have detected anything of the sort in us, they are strangely mistaken. Personally, we would much rather not have to devote ourselves to this task, which is on the whole a thankless one: we would rather be able to rest content in the exposition of certain truths, without ever having to bother ourselves about false interpretations, which, as if out of sheer willfulness, only complicate and confuse matters; but we cannot ignore these contingencics, because, if we do not start by clearing the ground, there is a risk that all we can say will never be understood. Besides, even where we seem to be only clearing away mistakes or replying to objections, we can take the opportunity of bringing to light things that have a really positive significance; and for example, by showing why certain attempts to bring East and West closer have failed, shall we not already be hinting, by contrast, at the conditions in which a similar undertaking might succeed? We bope therefore that our intentions will not be misunderstood, and if we take no pains to cloak the difficulties and obstacles, if on the contrary we insist on them, it is simply that before they can be smoothed away or surmounted, they must be known. We cannot stop at minor considerations and wonder what will be pleasing to some or displeasing to others; the question that we are considering is too serious, even if it be only discussed in what we may call its outward aspects, that is, in what does not concern the order of pure intellect.
Indeed, we do not intend to expound doctrine here, and what we shall say will come, in general, within the scope of more people than did those points of view which we treated in our Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines. But even that was in no way written for a few 'specialists': if some have been deceived in this respect by its title, it is because these questions are as a rule the monopoly of scholars, who study them in a way that might well put others off and that is, in our eyes, devoid of real interest. Our attitude is quite another one: we are essentially concerned, not with scholarship, but
with understanding, which is totally different: it is not among the 'specialists' that there is most chance of coming upon the possibilities of a wide and deep understanding, far from it; and, except for some very rare exceptions, it is not they who should be relied on for forming this elite that we have spoken of. Perhaps there are some who are offended that we should attack scholarship, or rather the abuses of it and the dangers it presents, although we have carefully abstained from anything which might seem like a polemic; but one of our motives is precisely that this scholarship, with its peculiar methods, seems to turn away from certain things those very persons who would be most capable of understanding them. Many people seeing the Hindu doctrines mentioned, and thinking at once of the works of one or two orientalists, say to themselves: 'This is not for us'; but some of these are certainly very wrong in thinking so and, perhaps without much effort, they might acquire knowledge, which these very orientalists lack, and always will lack: scholarship is one thing, real knowledge is another, and although not always incompatible, they do not necessarily go together. Assuredly, if scholarship consented to keep to the rank of auxiliary, which it should normally hold, we would have nothing more to reproach it with, since by so doing it would cease to be dangerous and might even be of some use: within these limits, then, we would willingly acknowledge its relative value. There are some cases where the 'historical method' is legitimate, but the mistake which we have protested against consists in believing that it may be applied everywhere, and in wishing to get from it something that it cannot really give. We think we have shown elsewhere, [1] without being in any way inconsistent, that, when necessary, we are just as capable as anyone else of applying this method, and this should be enough to show that we have no prejudice. Each question should be treated according to the method which suits it naturally; it is a singular phenomenon, this confusing of the different orders and different domains with which the West of today never ceases to regale us. In a word, it is necessary to know how to put each thing in its place, and we have never said otherwise: but in so doing one is forced to realize that, despite the manias for
equality that possess some of our contemporaries, there are things that can only be secondary and subordinate in comparison with others; and this is why scholarship, even where it is valid, can never be anything but a means, and not an end in itself.
These few explanations seemed to us necessary for several reasons: firstly, we are anxious to say what we think as plainly as possible, and to put an end to any misunderstanding which may arise, as it almost inevitably will, despite our precautions. While admitting in general the clarity of our expositions, people have sometimes attributed to us intentions that we have never had; we shall have here the opportunity of dispelling some uncertainties and of making clear some points about which we may not previously have been explicit enough. Furthermore, the diversity of the subjects that we treat is not opposed to the unity of the conception which presides over them, and we are anxious to affirm expressly this unity, which might escape the notice of those who consider things too superficially. These subjects are indeed so closely connected that, with regard to many of the points we shall touch on here, we should have referred, to make things still clearer, to the complementary information found in our other works; but we have only done so where it seemed absolutely necessary, and for the rest we shall confine ourselves to this general indication, given once and for all, so that the reader may not be wearied by too many references. We should also take this opportunity to say that, where we do not think it suitable to express our thoughts in a strictly doctrinal form, we nonetheless draw constant inspiration from the doctrines whose truth we have understood: it is the study of the Eastern doctrines which has made us see what the West lacks and the falsity of many ideas that are current in the modern world; it is in this study, and there alone, that we have found, as we have already had occasion to state elsewhere, things of which the West has never offered us the slightest equivalent.
We do not in the least pretend to exhaust, in this work any more than in our others, all the questions which may come under consideration: we can hardly be blamed for not putting everything in a single book, which moreover we should be quite unable to do. As for what is merely touched on here, we might take it up again and explain it more fully elsewhere, if circumstances allow; if not, it may
at least suggest trains of thought to others, who will benefit enormously in letting them take the place of those developments which we ourselves have been unable to supply. There are some things which are sometimes interesting to note incidentally, even where it is not possible for the moment to treat them at length, and we have often thought it better not to pass them by without at least some reference; but, knowing the mentality of certain people, we feel bound to remark that there is no extraordinary significance to be seen in such a proceeding. We know only too well the import of the socalled 'mysteries' that, in our epoch, have been so much exploited and that are only mysterious because those who speak of them are foremost in understanding nothing about them; there is no true mystery except what is by its very nature inexpressible. We would not however maintain that all truths are always equally ripe for telling, and that there are no cases in which it is not more opportune to keep up a certain reserve and no things which it would be more dangerous than salutary to make public; but this only applies to certain orders of knowledge, on the whole fairly limited, and moreover, if occasionally we come to allude to things of this kind, [2] we do not fail to say so formally, without ever hiding behind any of those chimerical interdictions which the writers of certain schools set up on every occasion, either to provoke their readers' curiosity or simply to cloak their own difficulties. Such tricks are altogether foreign to us, no less so than purely literary fictions; our sole intention is to state the truth, as far as we know it and such as we know it. We cannot say all we think, because that would take us often too far from our subject, and also because thought always goes beyond the limits of the expression in which it is to be enclosed; but we never say anything which we do not really think. That is why we cannot allow our intentions to be falsified and ourselves to be interpreted as saying something other than what we do say, or our words to be turned upside down in search of some entirely imaginary thought hidden
beneath them. On the other hand, we shall be always grateful to those who will call our attention to points which they feel should be explained more fully and clearly, and we shall strive to give them subsequent satisfaction; but we beg them to wait until we are able to do so, and not to jump to conclusions from insufficient evidence, and above all we ask them to refrain from holding any doctrine responsible for the imperfections and gaps in our treatise.