Conclusion
After what has already been said, we might almost do without a conclusion that seems fairly obvious and that would scarcely give us scope for anything more than a repetition, in a more or less summary form, of one or two considerations which we have already treated at length with enough stress to bring out all their importance. We think in fact that we have shown as clearly and explicitly as possible what are the chief prejudices that keep the West of today so remote from the East; and if they do so, it is because they are opposed to true intellectuality, which the East has kept in its fullness, while the West has gone so far as to lose all notion of it, having no longer even the vaguest and most muddled glimmering of it. Those who have understood this will have inevitably grasped as well how 'accidental', in all the various senses of this word, is the divergence that separates the West from the East; the bringing of these two portions of mankind together and the return of the West to a normal civilization are really just one and the same thing, and that is indeed the chief point of their being brought together, as perhaps in the more or less remote future they may be according to the considerations we have put forward. What we call a normal civilization is one that is based on principles, in the true sense of this word, one where everything is arranged in hierarchy to conform to these principles, so that everything in it is seen as the application and extension of a doctrine whose essence is purely intellectual and metaphysical: this is what we mean also when we speak of a traditional civilization. It must not be believed, moreover, that tradition can cramp thought in the slightest, unless it be maintained that to stop it from going astray amounts to limiting it, which we cannot admit; is it permissible to say that the shutting out of error is a limitation of the truth? To reject impossibilities, which are a mere nothing, is not to place restrictions on the total and universal possibility, which is necessarily infinite; it follows that error is a mere negation,
a 'privation' in the Aristotelian sense of the word; it has, insofar as it is error (for it may contain fragments of truth that have not been understood), nothing positive, and that is why it may be excluded without laying oneself in the least open to the charge of having a systematic mind. Tradition, on the other hand, admits all the aspects of the truth; it does not set itself against any legitimate adaptation; it allows those who understand it conceptions not only of an immensity that none of the dreams of the most 'daring' philosophers can approach, but also conceptions of a most undreamlike solidity and validity; in short, it opens up possibilities to the intelligence, which, like truth itself, are unlimited.
All this results immediately from the characteristics of metaphysical knowledge, which is indeed the only altogether unlimited knowledge, being of the universal order; and we think it would be as well to revert here to the question, which we have already treated elsewhere, of the relations between metaphysics and logic.[1] Logic, which refers to the conditions that specially belong to human understanding, is something contingent; it is of the individual and rational order, and what are called its principles are only principles in a relative sense; we mean that they can only be, like those of mathematics or of any other particular science, the application and specification, in a fixed domain, of the veritable principles. Thus metaphysics necessarily dominates logic as it dominates all the rest; not to recognize this is to turn upside down the hierarchic relations that are inherent in the nature of things; but, however evident this may appear to us, we have been unable to help noticing that most of our contemporaries find cause for astonishment at it. They are totally ignorant about what is of the metaphysical and 'supra-individual' order; they only know things that belong to the rational order, including the 'pseudo-metaphysics' of the modern philosophers and, in this rational order, logic does actually hold the highest rank, all the rest being subordinate to it. But true metaphysics cannot be dependent on logic any more than on any other science whatsoever; the mistake of those who think that it can comes from their failure to conceive of knowledge apart from the domain of
reason, and from their not having the least suspicion of what pure intellectual knowledge is. This we have already said; and we have also taken care to point out that there is a distinction to be made between the conception of metaphysical truths, which, in itself, is beyond the reach of all individual limitation, and the formulated exposition of them, which, insofar as it is possible, can only be a sort of transposition down to the plane of discourse and reason. If, then, this exposition takes the form of reasoning, and appears logical and even dialectic, it is because, given the way in which human language is constituted, it would be impossible to say anything without such a form; but that is only an outward thing, which does not in the least affect the truths in question, since they are essentially higher than reason. On the other hand, there are two very different ways of considering logic: there is the Western way, which consists in treating it philosophically, and in striving to tie it down to some systematic conception; and there is the Eastern way, that is, logic constituted as a 'traditional science' and bound up with the metaphysical principles, which moreover give it, like every other science, an incomparably greater bearing. It may be, of course, that the results seem practically the same in many cases, but the difference between the two points of view remains quite undiminished; it is no more possible to contest this than it would be to conclude, owing to outward likenesses between the actions of various individuals, that they were carried out with the same intentions. And here is what we have been leading up to: logic is not, in itself, anything especially 'philosophical', since it exists also where there is none of that very particular mode of thought which may be termed philosophy; if metaphysical truths can, up to a certain point-and always excepting what is inexpressible in them -be clothed in logical form, it is traditional logic, and not philosophical logic, that may serve this purpose; and how could it be otherwise, when philosophy has reached the point of being unable to subsist if it does not deny true metaphysics?
It should be seen from this explanation how we regard logic: if we use a certain dialectic, without which it would be impossible for us to speak of anything at all, it cannot be brought up against us as a contradiction, since there is certainly no philosophizing in it so far as we are concerned. Moreover, even when we are especially
engaged in refuting the conceptions of the philosophers, one may be sure that we always know how to keep the distances required by the difference in the points of view: we do not place ourselves on the same footing, as do those who criticize or fight one philosophy in the name of another philosophy; we say what we say because the traditional doctrines have enabled us to understand the absurdity or inanity of certain theories, and, whatever the imperfections that we inevitably bring with us to the task (and that should only be imputed to ourselves), the character of these doctrines is such that it forbids us all compromise. What we have in common with the philosophers can only be dialectic; but that is nothing more, as we use it, than an instrument at the service of principles which they have no knowledge of, so that even this likeness is quite outward and superficial, as is the one that may sometimes be noted between the results of modern science and those of the traditional sciences. Also, we cannot be said to be borrowing the methods of the philosophers, for these methods, as far as they are valid, are not their own, but represent simply something that is the common possession of all men, even of those men who are most far removed from the philosophical point of view; philosophical logic is merely a dwindling of traditional logic, and the latter has precedence over the former. If we insist here on this distinction which seems to us essential, it is not for our personal satisfaction, but because it is important to maintain the transcendent character of pure metaphysics, and because all that proceeds from it, even secondarily and in a contingent order, partakes of this character in a sense, thereby becoming something quite different from the merely profane knowledge of the Western world. What characterizes one kind of knowledge and sets it apart from the others is not only its object, but also the way this object is looked at; and that is why some questions which, by their nature, might have a certain metaphysical bearing, lose it altogether when they are incorporated into a philosophical system. But the distinction between metaphysics and philosophy, which is nonetheless fundamental, and which should never be forgotten by anyone who wishes to understand something about the doctrines of the East (since without it there can be no escape from the danger of false assimilations), is so unfamiliar to Westerners that most of them
never succeed in grasping it: thus it is that we were surprised to see it stated here and there that we had spoken of 'Hindu philosophy', when we had precisely set ourselves to show that what exists in India is quite different from philosophy! Perhaps what we have just said about logic will suffer the same fate, and we should be no more surprised than before to be credited, in certain circles, with 'philosophizing' against philosophy, whereas what we are really doing is nonetheless something quite different. If we were expounding, for instance, a mathematical theory, and if someone cared to call it 'physics', we should certainly have no means of stopping him, but all those who understand the meaning of words would know just what to think of it; although the notions in question here are less current, the mistakes that we are trying to prevent can quite well be compared with the above example. If some people are tempted to express certain criticisms based on similar confusions, we warn them that these criticisms would fall wide of their mark, and if we can thus spare them some errors we shall be very glad; but we can do no more, for it is not in our power, nor in anyone's, to give understanding to those who have not the means of it in themselves. If then these ill-founded criticisms are nonetheless forthcoming, we have the right to take no account of them at all: but on the contrary, if we see that we have not yet drawn certain distinctions clearly enough, we will revert to them until the uncertainty be no longer possible, or at least until it can no longer be attributed to anything but incurable blindness or evident bad faith.
The same applies to the means by which the West could approach the East by returning to true intellectuality: we believe that the reflections we have put forward here may dispel many confusions about this as also about our view of the eventual state of the Western world, in case the possibilities that we have in mind should come one day to be realized. However, we obviously cannot claim to foresee all possible misunderstandings; if any really important ones come to light, we shall always do our utmost to dispel them also, and we shall do so all the more gladly because it may give us an excellent opportunity of expressing our thoughts more precisely on certain points. In any case, we shall never let ourselves be turned aside from the course that is mapped out for us by all that we have
understood thanks to the traditional doctrines of the East. We address ourselves to those who are able and willing to understand in their turn, wherever they may be and wherever they may come from, but not to those who are liable to be stopped by the most insignificant or illusory obstacle, who have a rooted fear of certain things or of certain words, or who would believe themselves lost if they happened to overstep certain conventional and arbitrary limitations. We do not see, in point of fact, what advantage the intellectual elite could draw from the collaboration of these timorous and fretful creatures; he that is not capable of looking every truth in the face, he that does not feel the force of penetrating into the 'great solitude', according to the expression sanctioned by the Far-Eastern tradition (and which has its equivalent in India), could not go very far in the metaphysical work that we have spoken of, and that all the rest strictly depends on. There seems to be, among certain people, a sort of preconceived determination not to understand; but we do not believe that those whose intellectual possibilities are truly farreaching will be subject to these idle terrors, for they are well enough balanced to have, almost instinctively, the assurance that they will never run the risk of giving way to any mental dizziness. It is true that this assurance is not fully justified so long as they have not attained to a certain degree of actual development, but the mere fact of possessing it, without even being very clearly aware of it, gives them already a considerable advantage. We are not referring here to those who have a more or less excessive confidence in themselves; those we are speaking of, even if they are not yet aware of it, really put their trust in something much higher than their individuality, since they have a kind of presentiment of these higher states which are to be totally and definitely won by pure metaphysical knowledge. As to the others, who dare go neither too high nor too low, the fact is that they cannot see further than certain barriers, beyond which they can no longer even distinguish the higher from the lower, the true from the false, the possible from the impossible; imagining that the truth must be of the same dimensions as themselves and that it is tied down to an average level, they are at their ease in the 'pigeon-holes' of the philosophic outlook, and, even when they have assimilated certain partial truths, they can never use
them to enlarge indefinitely their own understanding. Whether it be due to their own nature, or only to the education that they have received, the limitation of their 'intellectual horizon' has become incurable, so that their bias, if that is their trouble, is truly involuntary, even if they are not altogether unaware of it. Among such people, some are certainly the victims of environment, and their case is indeed the most regrettable; their faculties, which might have had the opportunity of being developed in a normal civilization, have on the contrary been atrophied and repressed to the point of annihilation; and, modern education being what it is, one comes to the conclusion that those who know nothing are the ones who are more likely to have kept intact their intellectual possibilities. Compared with the mental deformations that are the ordinary effect of false learning, ignorance pure and simple really seems to us a lesser evil; and although we put knowledge above everything, this is by no means a paradox on our part nor a piece of inconsequence, for the only knowledge truly worthy of the name in our eyes is utterly different from that which is cultivated by the modern Westerners. And let no one reproach us, on this point or on any others, for having an attitude that is too uncompromising; this attitude is forced on us by the purity of the doctrine, by what we have called 'orthodoxy' in the intellectual sense; and, being moreover exempt from all prejudice, it can never lead us into injustice with regard to anything at all. We admit the whole truth, whatever aspect it shows itself under; but, being neither a skeptic nor an eclectic, we cannot admit anything apart from the truth.
We are well aware that our point of view is not one that is usually taken up in the West, and that, in consequence, it may be rather difficult to understand all at once; but it goes without saying that we ask no one to adopt it without examination. Our object is merely to urge to reflection those who are still capable of it; each of them will understand what he can, and, however little this may be, it will always be something; besides, we are very inclined to think that there will be some who will go further. There are no reasons, when all is said and done, why what we have done ourselves should not be done by others also; with the Western mentality as it is, these others will doubtless be no more than exceptions, but it only needs such
exceptions to be found, even a few, to justify what we have foreseen and to give the possibilities that we are pointing out a chance of being realized sooner or later. Besides, all that we shall do or say will amount to giving those who come afterward advantages that we ourselves were not given; here, as everywhere else, it is the beginning of the work that is the most painful, and the more unfavorable the conditions, the greater must be the effort toward achievement. The fact that belief in 'civilization' should be more or less shaken in people who until lately would not have dared to dispute it, and that 'scientism' should be undergoing a decline in certain circles, may possibly help us a little, since there is, in consequence, a kind of uncertainty that lets minds embark upon different channels without so much resistance; but that is all we can say about it, and the new tendencies that we have so far noticed are in no way more encouraging than those that they are trying to supplant. From our point of view there is not the slightest difference in value between rationalism and intuitionism, positivism and pragmatism, materialism and spiritualism, 'scientism' and 'moralism'; nothing is gained in passing from one to the other, and no one who is not completely detached from all of them can be said to have taken even the first step in the domain of true intellectuality. We are bent on stating this expressly, just as we are on repeating once again that no study of the Eastern doctrines undertaken 'from the outside' will help in the least toward the end we have in view; what actually will help has quite a different bearing and belongs to a far deeper order of things.
Finally, we will call to the notice of those who eventually gainsay us that if we are fully at our ease in judging quite independently the sciences and philosophies of the West, it is because we are conscious of owing nothing to them; what we are intellectually we owe to the East alone, so that we have behind us nothing that might cramp us in the least. If we have studied philosophy, we did so at a time when our ideas had been completely and definitely fixed on all that is essential, which is probably the only means of not incurring any bad influence from this study; and what we saw then merely confirmed very exactly all that we had been used to thinking with regard to philosophy. We knew that there was no intellectual benefit to be expected from it; and in fact the only help
that we did get from it was to be made more aware of the precautions necessary for avoiding confusions, and of the inconveniences that arise from the use of certain terms that are liable to produce uncertainties. These are things that the Easterners are sometimes not enough on their guard against, and there are, in this order, many difficulties of expression which we should not have suspected without having had occasion to examine closely the special language of modern philosophy, with all its incoherences and all its useless subtleties. But this help is merely of service in the work of exposition, because it allows us to anticipate many mistakes of interpretation that are too easily made by those who are used to Western thought and to none other, although at the same time we are forced to introduce complications that have nothing essential in them; for us personally there is not the least advantage in it, since we get no real knowledge from it. If we say this, it is not in order to cite ourselves as an example, but to bring evidence which those who do not in any way share our way of thinking must at least admit as sincere; and if we insist more particularly on our absolute independence with regard to all that is Western, it is because that may help also toward a better understanding of our real intentions. We hold that we have the right to denounce error wherever it is, if we think it timely to do so; but there are disputes that we will not be mixed up in at any price, and we feel that it is not for us to take the side of this or that Western conception; as for what may happen to be of interest in some of these conceptions, we are quite ready to admit it with full impartiality, but we have never found anything in them of any value except a very small fragment of what we already knew from other sources, and wherever the same things were looked at in different ways, it was always the Western points of view that suffered by comparison. It is only after long reflection that we decided to write such a book as this, and we have said why we thought it necessary to do so before dwelling on the doctrine itself, the interest of which may then be brought home to people who for want of preparation would otherwise not have paid enough attention to it, and who nonetheless may be perfectly capable of understanding it.
In being brought nearer to the East, the West has everything to gain; if the East has also some interest in this, it is not an interest of the same order, nor even of an importance that is comparable, and it would not be enough to justify the least concession with regard to what is essential; besides, nothing can be set above the rights which belong to truth. To show the West its faults, its errors, and its shortcomings, is not to evince hostility toward it, but quite the contrary, since it is the only means of curing the evil that it suffers from, and that it may perish of if it does not pull itself together in time. The task is an arduous one certainly, and not without unpleasantness; but that matters little to anyone convinced that it is necessary; we ask no more than that one or two should understand that it is really so. Moreover, no one who has understood this can remain at a standstill, just as no one who has assimilated certain truths can lose sight of them or refuse to accept all the consequences of them; there are obligations which are inherent in all true knowledge, and compared with them all outward ties seem vain and laughable; these obligations, for the very reason that they are purely inward, are the only ones that can never be shaken off. No one can yield to discouragement who has the power of truth on his side, even if he has no other weapon for overcoming the most dreadful obstacles, for this power is such that in the end nothing can prevail against it. The only ones to doubt this are those who do not know that all the partial and transitory disequilibriums go necessarily to make up the great total equilibrium of the Universe.