DOCTRINE & Method
We have often emphasized the fact that, if the ultimate goal of all initiation is essentially one, it is nonetheless necessary that the paths enabling it to be reached be many in order to conform to the diversity of individual conditions; for one must not consider only the point of arrival, which is always the same, but also the point of departure, which differs according to the individual. Moreover, it goes without saying that these many ways become more unified in the measure that they approach the goal, and that even before this is reached there is a point after which individual differences can no longer intervene in any way; and it is no less evident that their multiplicity, which in no way affects the unity of the goal, could no longer affect the fundamental unity of the doctrine which is really nothing other than that of truth itself.
These notions are entirely current in all Eastern civilizations; thus in Arab countries it has become a proverbial expression to say that 'each shaykh has his tartqah', meaning that there are many ways to do the same thing and to obtain the same result. To the multiplicity of turuq in Islamic initiation exactly correspond the paths of Yoga in the Hindu tradition, which are sometimes spoken of as so many distinct Yogas although this use of the plural is completely improper if the word be taken in its strict sense, which designates the goal itself. It is only justified by the usual extension of the same denomination to the methods or procedures that are used to attain this goal; and in all rigor it would be more correct to say that there is only one Yoga but many märgas or paths leading to its realization.
Among certain Westerners we have noted a truly strange misunderstanding in this regard: from the multiplicity of paths they try to conclude the non-existence of a single and invariable doctrine, or even of any doctrine at all, in Yoga; they thus confuse, as unlikely as this might seem, the question of doctrine and the question of method, which are things belonging to entirely different orders. Moreover, if one adheres to exactness of expression, one should not speak of 'a doctrine of Yoga' but of traditional Hindu doctrine, of which Yoga represents an aspect; and as for methods of realizing Yoga, these belong only to the 'technical' applications which arise from a doctrine and are themselves also traditional precisely because they are established on the basis of the doctrine and are ordered in conformity to it, their aim being, in the final analysis, the achieving of pure Knowledge. It is very clear that a doctrine, to be truly what it should be, must include in its very unity different aspects or points of view (darshanas), and that within each of these points of view it must be susceptible of indefinitely varied applications. To imagine that this is something contrary to its unity and its essential invariability one must, let us say it clearly, lack the least idea of what a traditional doctrine really is. Moreover, in an analogous way, is not the indefinite multiplicity of contingent things also contained entirely in the unity of their Principle, and this without the immutability of the Principle being in any way affected?
It is not enough simply to point out an error or misunderstanding such as the one involved here; it is more instructive to seek out an explanation for it, and so we must ask what in the Western mentality could correspond to the negation of the existence of something like traditional Hindu doctrine. Indeed, it is better to take this error in its most general and most extreme form, for it is only thus that it is possible to discover its very root; the more particular and attenuated forms that it sometimes takes on will then be explained a fortiori, and besides, they really do hardly anything more than conceal the radical 'negation' we have just described, although no doubt unconsciously in many cases. Indeed, to deny the unity and invariability of a doctrine is in the final analysis to deny its most essential and most fundamental characteristics, those without which it no longer merits the name; it is in truth to deny the very
existence of the doctrine as such, even if those who do so do not realize it.
First of all, insofar as it claims to be based on the diversity of methods, as we have just said, this negation obviously proceeds from an incapacity to go beyond outer appearances and perceive the unity underneath their multiplicity; in this respect it is of the same kind as the negation of the fundamental and principial unity of all traditions because of the existence of different traditional forms, which in reality are nothing but so many expressions in which the one and only tradition clothes itself in order to adapt itself to different conditions of time and place, just as the different methods of realization in each traditional form are only so many means it employs to make itself accessible to the diversity of individuals. However, this is only the most superficial aspect of the question. In order to go to the heart of things it must be said that this same negation also shows that, when speaking of doctrine as we are doing here, certain people completely misunderstand what is really involved. Indeed, if they did not divert the word from its normal meaning they could not dispute that it applies to a case like that of the Hindu tradition and that it is even only in such a case, that is, in the case of a traditional doctrine, that it possesses all the fullness of its meaning. Now, if this misunderstanding exists, it is because most present-day Westerners cannot conceive of a doctrine otherwise than under either of two particular forms, of very unequal quality moreover, since one is exclusively profane while the other has a truly traditional character, though both are specifically Western. These two forms are the philosophical system and religious dogma.
Having said often enough that traditional truth can never be expressed in a systematic form, we need not dwell on it again. Furthermore, the apparent unity of a system, which results merely from its more or less narrow limitations, is strictly only a parody of true doctrinal unity. In addition, every philosophy is no more than an individual construction which, as such, attaches to no transcendent principle and consequently lacks any authority. It is therefore not a doctrine in the true sense of the word, and we would say that it is rather a pseudo-doctrine, understanding by this that, although it claims to be one, its claim is wholly unjustified. Naturally, modern
Westerners think quite differently about this, and they are truly at a loss where they find none of their accustomed pseudo-doctrinal frameworks; but since they will not or cannot admit this, they distort it by striving all the same to force everything into these frameworks, or, if they cannot succeed at this, they simply declare that what is involved is not doctrine, by one of those reversals of the normal order to which they are accustomed. Besides, since they confuse the intellectual with the rational, they also confuse doctrine with mere 'speculation', and, since traditional doctrine is something completely different from the former, they cannot understand what it is. Philosophy will certainly not inform them that theoretical knowledge, being indirect and imperfect, has in itself only a 'preparatory' value, in the sense of furnishing instruction on how not to go astray in pursuit of realization, realization being the only way to obtain effective knowledge, the existence and very possibility of which they do not even suspect. Thus, when we say as we did above that the goal to be attained is pure Knowledge, how could they know what we mean?
On the other hand, we have taken great care to specify throughout our works that the orthodoxy of traditional Hindu doctrine must never be conceived in a religious mode. This necessarily implies that it can never be expressed in dogmatic form, which is inapplicable outside the strictly religious point of view. But in fact, Westerners do not generally know any other form of traditional truths except this one, which is why they inevitably think of dogmatic formulas when the subject of doctrinal orthodoxy is raised. They know at least what a dogma is, which is certainly not to say that they understand what it means; but they know the outer appearance under which it presents itself and every idea they still have of tradition is limited to this. The anti-traditional spirit, which is that of the modern West, enters into a fury at the mere idea of dogma, because, in its ignorance of all the other forms it can take, this is how tradition appears to them. The West would never have come to its present state of decay and confusion had it remained faithful to its dogmas, for to adapt to its particular mental conditions tradition was obliged to take on this special aspect, at least in its exoteric part. This last restriction is indispensable, for it must be
well understood that in the esoteric and initiatic order there never could have been any question of dogma, even in the West; but these are things the very memory of which is too completely lost by modern Westerners to provide terms of comparison that might help them understand what other traditional forms might be. On the other hand, if dogma does not exist everywhere, this is because even in the exoteric order it would not have the same raison d'être as in the West. There are people who in order not to 'divagate', in the etymological sense of the word, need to be kept under strict supervision, while there are others who have no such need; dogma is necessary for the first and not for the second, just as, to take another example of a slightly different kind, the forbidding of images is necessary only for people who naturally tend toward a kind of anthropomorphism; and doubtless one could easily show that dogma is bound up with the special traditional organizational form represented by the constitution of a 'church', which is also something specifically Western.
This is not the place to dwell longer on these last points, but we can say the following in conclusion. When it is complete, traditional doctrine by its very essence has truly unlimited possibilities; it is therefore vast enough to include within its orthodoxy all aspects of the truth, but it can never include anything other than this, and this is precisely what is signified by the word orthodoxy, which excludes only error, but excludes it absolutely. Easterners, and more generally all peoples with a traditional civilization, have always ignored what modern Westerners dignify with the name of 'tolerance', which is really nothing but indifference to truth, that is to say something that can only be conceived where intellectuality is wholly absent. Is not the fact that Westerners vaunt this 'tolerance' as a virtue a very striking measure of the debasement to which the denial of tradition has led them?