26 Against Quietism
Although we have often spoken already of the profound differences that separate mysticism from everything of an initiatic and esoteric order, we do not believe it unprofitable to return to a particular point relating to this question, as we have noticed that a widespread error persists which concerns the application of the word 'quietism' to certain Eastern doctrines. That this is already an error results from the fact that these doctrines have nothing to do with mysticism, whereas the very word 'quietism' was specifically coined to designate a form of mysticism, of a type moreover that can be called 'aberrant', and of which the principal characteristic is to push to an extreme the passivity that in one degree or another inheres in mysticism as such. Now on the one hand words of this sort must not be extended to what does not pertain to the domain of mysticism, for they then become just as improper as philosophical labels applied outside of philosophy; and on the other hand, passivity, even within the limits considered 'normal' as it were from the mystical point of view-and all the more in its 'Quietist' exag-geration-is altogether foreign to the doctrines in question. To tell the truth, we suspect that the imputation of 'quietism', like that of 'pantheism', is for some very often only a pretext for dismissing or disparaging a doctrine without taking the trouble to examine it more profoundly and really seeking to understand it. More generally, this is the case with all the 'pejorative' epithets they use without rhyme or reason to describe very different doctrines, reproaching them for 'falling' into this or that, an habitual expression in such
cases and one that is very significant in this respect; but as we have noted on other occasions, every error necessarily occurs for some reason, so that in spite of everything, it is still well to examine things a bit more closely.
There is no doubt that quietism in the proper sense of the word enjoys a bad reputation in the West, and first and foremost in the religious milieu; this is quite natural after all since the variety of mysticism so designated has been expressly declared heterodox, and justly so by reason of the numerous grave dangers it presents from various points of view, and which basically are only those of passivity itself raised to its highest pitch and put into practice 'integrally'that is, without any attenuation of the consequences it entails in all orders. Thus there is no reason to be surprised if those for whom insults take the place of arguments, and who unfortunately are only too numerous, use quietism (as well as pantheism) as a sort of 'bogey', if we may so put it, to turn away those who might be influenced by what they themselves fear, a fear due merely to their inability to understand these things. But it is even more curious that the 'lay' mentality of the moderns readily turns this same accusation of quietism against religion itself, extending it improperly not only to all mystics-including the most orthodox among them-but also to monks of the contemplative orders, who moreover in their eyes are all classed together as 'mystics', although this may not necessarily be the case in reality; there are even some who push the confusion further still, going so far as to identify mysticism and religion, purely and simply.
This is easily explained by the prejudices generally endemic to the modern Western mentality; this latter, turned exclusively toward outward action, has come little by little not only to ignore on its own account all that relates to contemplation, but even to feel a true hatred toward it, wherever it is found. These prejudices are so widespread that many people who consider themselves religious, but who are still very much affected by this anti-traditional mentality, are apt to declare that they make a great distinction between the contemplative orders and those that occupy themselves with social action; for the latter they naturally have nothing but praise, but on the other hand are all too willing to agree with their adversaries in
demanding that the former be suppressed on the pretext that they are no longer adapted to the conditions of an age of 'progress' like our own! And we should add in passing that even today such a distinction would be impossible in the Christian churches of the East, where no reason for wanting to become a monk can be conceived other than the desire to give oneself to contemplation, and where the contemplative life moreover, far from being foolishly accused of 'uselessness' and 'idleness', is on the contrary unanimously regarded as the superior form of activity that it truly is.
In this connection it must be said that in Western languages there is something rather awkward which, in a way, can contribute to certain confusions: this is the use of the words 'action' and 'activity', which, while obviously sharing a common root, have neither the same meaning nor the same scope. 'Action' is always meant as an outward activity that strictly speaking belongs to the corporeal order alone, and it is precisely this that distinguishes it from and in a way opposes it to contemplation, although here as elsewhere the point of view of opposition is necessarily illusory, as we have explained elsewhere, it being really a question of complementarity. 'Activity' on the other hand has a much more general meaning and applies equally in all domains and at all levels of existence: thus, to take the simplest example, one speaks of mental activity, but even with all the imprecision of current language one would hardly speak of mental action; and, in a higher order, one could just as well speak of spiritual activity, which is what contemplation is effectively (to be distinguished of course from simple meditation, which is only one means for achieving it and still pertains to the domain of the individual mentality). But there is more: if one considers the complementarity of 'active' and 'passive' in conjunction with 'act' and 'potency' taken in the Aristotelian sense, it is easy to see that what is most active is thereby also what is nearest the purely spiritual order, whereas it is passivity that predominates in the corporeal order. The consequence of this, which is paradoxical only in appearance, is that activity is all the greater and more real as it is exercised in a domain the more remote from that of action. Unfortunately, most moderns hardly seem to understand this point of view, and this results in such singular misunderstandings as that of certain orientalists who
do not hesitate to qualify Purusha as 'passive', where the Hindu tradition is concerned, or T'ien, where the Far-Eastern tradition is concerned-that is, precisely what is on the contrary in each case the active principle of universal manifestation!
These few considerations allow one to understand how moderns are tempted to see 'quietism', or what they believe they can call by this name, in every doctrine that puts contemplation above action, that is, in the final analysis, every traditional doctrine without exception. Moreover, they seem to believe that in a way this is equivalent to despising action and even to denying it any proper value, even in its own contingent order, which is completely false since it is really only a matter of putting each thing in the place that normally belongs to it; to recognize that a thing occupies the lowest degree in a hierarchy does not in any way amount to denying its legitimacy, for it too is a necessary element in the whole of which it forms a part. We do not really know why it has become a habit to attack Hindu doctrine in particular on this point, since in this respect it does not differ in any way from other traditions, Eastern or Western; furthermore, on various occasions we have sufficiently explained how the Hindu tradition envisages action and need not dwell on it further here. Let us only point out how absurd it is to speak as some do of 'quietism' in reference to yoga, especially when one thinks of the prodigious activity that must be deployed in all domains to reach its goal (which in reality is yoga itself in its strict sense, the preparatory means being so designated only by extension); moreover this involves properly initiatic methods, of which activity is an essential characteristic. In order to forestall any possible objection let us add that if the interpretations of certain contemporary Hindus seem to lend themselves to the charge of 'quietism', this is because they are not in any way qualified to speak of these things, since, having received a Western education, they are almost as ignorant concerning their own tradition as are Westerners themselves.
But if the orientalists are in accord in reproaching Hinduism for despising action, they generally feel compelled to relate Taoism even more expressly to 'quietism'. This is because of the role played therein by 'non-action' (wu-wei), the real meaning of which they in
no way understand, and which some of them make a synonym of 'inactivity', 'passivity', or even 'inertia' (it is because the active principle of manifestation is 'non-acting' that they maintain it is passive, as we said above). Nevertheless, there are those who have recognized that this is an error, but since they have no clearer understanding of what is involved and likewise confuse action and activity, they object to translating wu-wei as 'non-action' and replace the term by vague and insignificant circumlocutions that diminish the importance of the doctrine and leave nothing of its profounder and specifically initiatic meaning intact. In reality, the translation 'non-action' is the only acceptable one, but because of the usual incomprehension it is worthwhile to explain how this is to be understood. Not only is this 'non-action' not inactivity, but, following what we said above, it is on the contrary the supreme activity because it is as far removed as possible from the domain of outward action and is completely free of all the limitations imposed upon the latter by its own nature; if 'non-action' were not by very definition beyond all oppositions, it could be said that in a way it is the extreme opposite of the goal that quietism assigns to spiritual development.
It goes without saying that for the one who has reached it, 'nonaction', or its equivalent in the initiatic part of other traditions, implies a perfect detachment with respect to outward action-as also with respect to all other contingent things, moreover-and this is because such a one lies at the very center of the 'cosmic wheel', whereas contingent things belong only to the circumference. If quietism for its part professes an indifference that in certain respects seems to resemble such detachment, this is assuredly for altogether different reasons. Just as similar phenomena can arise from very diverse causes, so ways of acting (or, in certain cases, abstaining from action) that are outwardly the same may proceed from the most varied motives, although for those who limit themselves to appearances, this can naturally give rise to many false assimilations. In this regard there are indeed certain facts, strange in the eyes of the profane, that can be invoked by them in support of the erroneous connection they wish to establish between quietism and traditions of an initiatic order; but this raises other questions interesting enough in themselves to merit dedicating the next chapter to them.