THE POSTHUMOUS EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN BEING
So far we have been considering the constitution of the human being, as well as its different states, on the assumption that it subsists as a compound of the various elements that go to make up its nature, that is to say during the continuance of its individual life. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that the states which properly belong to the individual as such, that is to say not only the gross or corporeal state, as is obvious, but also the subtle state (provided, of course, that only the extra-corporeal modalities of the integral human state are included in it and not the other individual states of the being), are strictly and essentially states of the living man. This does not necessarily involve admitting that the subtle state comes to an end at the precise moment of bodily death and simply as a result thereof; on the contrary, we shall see later on that a passage of the being into the subtle form takes place at that moment; but this passage is only a transitory phase in the reabsorption of the individual faculties from the manifested into the unmanifested, a phase the existence of which is quite naturally accounted for by the intermediate position occupied by the subtle state. It is, however, true that it may be necessary to envisage, in a particular sense and in certain cases at least, a prolongation and even an indefinite prolongation of the human individuality, which must needs be referred to the subtle, that is to say to the extra-corporeal modalities of that individuality; but such a prolongation is in no wise identical with the subtle state as it existed during earthly life. It must in fact be clearly understood
that under the single heading of 'subtle state' we are obliged to include extremely varied and complex modalities, even though we confine our viewpoint to the realm of purely human possibilities only; it is for this reason that we have taken care from the very beginning to point out that the term 'subtle state' should always be understood relatively to the corporeal state, taken as a starting-point and term of comparison; it thereby acquires a precise meaning solely by contrast to the latter state which, for its part, appears sufficiently well defined by the fact that it is the state in which we find ourselves at the present moment. Furthermore, it will have been observed that, among the five envelopes of the 'Self', three are regarded as contributing to make up the subtle form (whereas one only corresponds to each of the other two conditioned states of Ātmā, in the one case because it really is only one particular and determinate modality of the individual, and in the other case because it is an essentially unified and 'non-distinguished' state); and this is a further clear proof of the complexity of the state in which the 'Self' uses this form as its vehicle, and this complexity must always be borne in mind if one is to follow the description of the different aspects from which it can be envisaged.
We have now to turn to the question of what is commonly called the 'posthumous evolution' of the human being, that is to say to the consideration of the consequences for that being of death or-to explain more precisely what we mean by that term-of the dissolution of the compound which we have been discussing and which constitutes its actual individuality. It should be observed moreover that when this dissolution has taken place there is strictly speaking no longer any human being left, since it is essentially this compound which constitutes the individual man; the sole case where it is still possible to call the being in a certain sense human arises when, after bodily death, it remains in one of those prolongations of the individuality to which we have already alluded; in that case, although the individuality is no longer complete from the standpoint of manifestation (since the corporeal state is henceforth lacking, the possibilities corresponding to it having completed the whole cycle of their development), nevertheless certain of its psychic or subtle elements subsist without being dissociated. In all
other cases the being cannot any longer be called human since it has passed out of the state to which that term applies and into another state, either individual or otherwise; thus the being which was formerly human has ceased to be so in order to become something else, in the same way that, through birth it became human by passing from some other state into the state which we at present occupy. Besides, if birth and death are understood in their widest sense, that is to say as changes of state, it becomes at once apparent that they are modifications which correspond analogically to one another, being the beginning and the end of a cycle of individual existence; and indeed, if one were to place oneself outside the special viewpoint of a given state in order to observe the interconnection of the different states with one another, it would be seen that they constitute strictly equivalent phenomena, death to one state being at the same time birth into another. In other words, the same modification is either death or birth according to the state or cycle of existence in relation to which it is considered, since it marks the exact point common to both states or the transition from one to the other; and what is here true for different states is also true, on a different plane, for the various modalities of a given state, where those modalities are regarded as constituting, in the development of their respective possibilities, so many secondary cycles which are integrated in the totality of a more comprehensive cycle. [1] Finally, it is particularly important to add that 'specification', according to the sense in which we have already used the expression (that is to say in the sense of attachment to a definite species such as the human species, which imposes certain general conditions upon a being, thus constituting its specific nature) is valid only within a given state and cannot be applied outside it. This must obviously be true, since the species is in no wise a transcendent principle in relation to this individual state, but pertains exclusively to the same domain, being itself subject to the limiting conditions which define that domain.
For this reason the being that has passed into a different state is no longer human, since it no longer belongs in any way to the human species. [2]
The expression 'posthumous evolution' calls for certain reservations, since it is only too liable to give rise to a number of ambiguities. In the first place, death being conceived as the dissolution of the human compound, the word 'evolution' clearly cannot be understood here in the sense of an individual development, since we are concerned on the contrary with a reabsorption of the individuality into the unmanifested state; [3] this would amount rather to an 'involution' from the particular point of view of the individual. Indeed, etymologically these terms 'evolution' and 'involution' signify nothing more nor less than 'development' and 'envelopment'; [4] but we are well aware that in modern language the word 'evolution' has acquired quite a different meaning, which has almost converted it into a synonym for 'progress'. We have already had ample opportunities for expressing our views upon these quite recent ideals of 'progress' and 'evolution', which, by expanding themselves beyond all measure, have had the effect of completely corrupting the present-day Western mentality; it would be pointless to repeat ourselves here. We will merely recall that 'progress' can only validly be spoken of in quite a relative sense, care always being taken to define in what respect it is used and within what limits; reduced to these proportions, it no longer retains anything in common with that
absolute 'progress' which began to be spoken of toward the end of the eighteenth century and which our contemporaries are pleased to adorn with the name of 'evolution', an expression that has a more 'scientific' ring to their ears. Eastern thought, like ancient thought in the West, could not admit this notion of 'progress', except in the relative sense that we have just given to it, that is to say as an idea of secondary importance, quite limited in scope and devoid of any metaphysical significance, since it belongs to that category of ideas which can only be applied to possibilities of a particular order and is not transposable outside certain limits. The 'devolutionary' point of view does not admit of universalization and it is not possible to conceive of the real being as something which 'evolves' between two definite points or which 'progresses', even indefinitely, in a fixed direction; such conceptions are devoid of meaning and show complete ignorance of the most elementary metaphysical principles. At the most one might speak in a particular sense of the 'evolution' of the being, in order to convey the idea of a passage to a higher state; but even then it would be necessary to make a reservation preserving the full relativity of the term since, as concerns the being regarded in itself and in its totality, there can never be any question either of 'evolution' or of 'involution' in any sense whatever, its essential identity being in no wise altered by particular and contingent modifications of any sort, which can only affect one or another of its conditioned states.
A further reservation should be made with regard to the use of the word 'posthumous': it is only from the particular point of view of human individuality and insofar as it is conditioned by time that one can speak of what is produced 'after death' and likewise of what took place 'before birth', so long at least as it is intended to preserve for the words 'before' and 'after' the chronological meaning which they normally convey. In themselves the states in question, if they exist outside the realm of human individuality, are in no wise temporal states and consequently cannot be situated chronologically; this is true, moreover, even of those states which include among their conditions some other mode of duration, that is to say of succession, once it is no longer temporal succession that is in question. As for the unmanifested state, it goes without saying that it lies quite
outside all succession, so that the notions of anteriority and posteriority, even taken in the widest possible sense, cannot be applied to it in any way whatsoever. In this respect it may be remarked that, even during its lifetime, the being loses the notion of time when its consciousness has quit the individual realm, as occurs in deep sleep and in ecstatic trance; so long as it remains in either of these states, which are truly unmanifested, time no longer exists for it.
Mention must still be made of the case where the posthumous state takes the form of a simple prolongation of the human individuality: this prolongation, it is true, may be situated in 'perpetuity', that is to say in temporal indefinitude, or in other words in a mode of succession which still belongs to time (since we are not concerned with a state subject to conditions other than our own); but the time in question no longer has anything in common with the time in which bodily existence is carried on. Furthermore, such a state is not among those which are of particular interest from the metaphysical point of view since, on the contrary, from that point of view it is the possibility of passing beyond individual conditions which must always be borne in mind rather than the possibility of remaining in them indefinitely; if we feel obliged, however, to refer to that state, it is chiefly for the sake of taking into account all possible cases and also because, as will be apparent later, this prolongation of human existence preserves for the being the possibility of obtaining 'Deliverance' without passing through other individual states. However that may be, leaving aside this last case, the following may be said: if nonhuman states are spoken of as situated 'before birth' or 'after death', this is primarily because they appear so in relation to human individuality; but it is also most important to realize that it is not the individuality which enters these states or which passes through them successively, since they are states which lie outside its sphere and which do not concern it as an individuality. Furthermore, there is a sense in which the notions of anteriority and posteriority may be applied quite independently of the point of view of succession, temporal or otherwise; we are referring to that order, at the same time logical and ontological, in which the various states are interconnected and determine one another; thus, if one state is the consequence of another, it may be said to be posterior to
it. In such a manner of speaking use is being made of the temporal symbolism which serves to express the entire theory of cycles, although, metaphysically, it must always be remembered that there is perfect simultaneity between all the states, the point of view of actual succession being applicable only within a particular given state.
The foregoing remarks have been made with a view to forestalling any tendencies to attribute to the expression 'posthumous evolution' (where it is thought advisable to use it in the absence of a more adequate term and in order to conform to certain habits of expression) an importance and a significance which it does not and could not really possess. We will now proceed to study those processes to which it relates, an understanding of which springs most immediately from all the foregoing considerations. The exposition which follows is taken from the Brahma-Sūtras [5] and from their traditional commentary (and by that we especially have in mind the commentary of Shankarāchārya), but we must point out that it is not a literal translation; here and there we shall find it necessary to summarize the commentary [6] and also to comment upon it in its turn, without which the summary would remain practically incomprehensible, as in fact very often happens where the interpretation of Eastern texts is concerned. [7]