FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'SELF' AND 'EGO'
In order to understand thoroughly the teaching of the Vedānta as it pertains to the human being, it is essential to define from the start, as clearly as possible, the fundamental distinction between the 'Self' [Soi], which is the very principle of the being, and the individual 'ego' [moi]. It is hardly necessary to explain that the use of the term 'Self' does not imply on our part any identity of view with certain schools that may have used this word, but that, under an Eastern terminology, generally misunderstood, have never set forth any but purely Western views, highly fantastic at that; we are alluding here not only to Theosophism, but also to certain pseudo-oriental schools which have entirely distorted the Vedānta under the pretext of adapting it to the Western mentality. The misuse which may have been made of a word does not, in our opinion, provide adequate grounds for declining to employ it, except where it is possible to replace it by another word equally well suited to express the same meaning, which is not in the case in this instance; besides, too great a strictness on this score would undoubtedly leave very few terms indeed at one's disposal, especially as there exist hardly any which at one time or another have not been misapplied by some philosopher. The only words which we intend to reject are those invented deliberately to express views which have nothing in common with what we are expounding: such, for example, are the names of the different kinds of philosophical systems; such, also, are
the terms which belong specifically to the vocabulary of the occultists and other 'neo-spiritualists'; as for terms which the last-named have merely borrowed from earlier doctrines which they habitually and shamelessly plagiarize without understanding anything about them, obviously we need have no scruples about employing such words, while at the same time restoring the meaning which normally belongs to them.
In place of the terms 'Self' and 'ego', we may also use those of 'personality' and 'individuality', with one reservation however for the 'Self', as we shall explain later on, may denote something over and above the personality. The Theosophists, who seem to have taken a delight in confusing their terminology, interpret the personality and the individuality in a sense which is the exact opposite of that in which they should rightly be understood; it is the first which they identify with the 'ego', and the second with the 'Self.' Previously, on the contrary, even in the West, whenever any distinction has been made between these two terms, the personality has always been regarded as superior to the individuality, and that is why we say that this is their normal relationship, which there is every reason to retain. Scholastic philosophy, in particular, has not overlooked this distinction, but it does not seem to have grasped its full metaphysical significance, nor to have extracted the most profound consequences which follow from it; this is moreover what often occurs, even on occasions where Scholasticism shows the most remarkable similarity with certain portions of the Eastern doctrines. In any case, the personality, metaphysically speaking, has nothing in common with what modern philosophers so often call the 'human person', which is, in fact, nothing but the individuality pure and simple; besides, it is this alone and not the personality which can strictly be called human. In a general way, it appears that Westerners, even when they attempt to carry their views further than those of the majority, mistake for the personality what is actually but the superior part of the individuality, or a simple extension of it: [1] in these
circumstances everything of the purely metaphysical order necessarily remains outside their comprehension.
The 'Self' is the transcendent and permanent principle of which the manifested being, the human being, for example, is only a transient and contingent modification, a modification which, moreover, can in no way affect the principle, as will be explained more fully in what follows. The 'Self', as such, is never individualized and cannot become so, for since it must always be considered under the aspect of the eternity and immutability which are the necessary attributes of pure Being, it is obviously not susceptible of any particularization, which would cause it to be 'other than itself'. Immutable in its own nature, it merely develops the indefinite possibilities which it contains within itself, by a relative passing from potency to act through an indefinite series of degrees. Its essential permanence is not thereby affected, precisely because this process is only relative, and because this development is, strictly speaking, not a development at all, except when looked at from the point of view of manifestation, outside of which there can be no question of succession, but only of perfect simultaneity, so that even what is virtual under one aspect, is found nevertheless to be realized in the 'eternal present'. As regards manifestation, it may be said that the 'Self' develops its manifold possibilities, indefinite in their multitude, through a multiplicity of modalities of realization, amounting, for the integral being, to so many different states, of which states one alone, limited by the special conditions of existence which define it, constitutes the portion or rather the particular determination of that being which is called human individuality. The 'Self' is thus the principle by which all the states of the being exist, each in its own domain; and this must be understood not only of the manifested states of which we have just been speaking, whether individual like the human state or supra-individual, but also-although the word
'exist' then becomes inappropriate-of the unmanifested state, comprising all the possibilities which are not susceptible of any manifestation, as well as the possibilities of manifestation themselves in principial mode; but the 'Self' derives its being from itself alone, and neither has nor can have, in the perfect and indivisible unity of its nature, any principle which is external to it. [2]
The 'Self', considered in this manner in relation to a being, is properly speaking the personality; it is true that one might restrict the use of this latter word to the 'Self' as principle of the manifested states, just as the 'Divine Personality', Ishvara, is the Principle of universal Manifestation; but one can also extend it analogically to the 'Self' as principle of all the states of the being, both manifested and unmanifested. The personality is an immediate determination, primordial and non-particularized, of the principle which in Sanskrit is called Ātmā or Paramātmā, and which, in default of a better term, we may call the 'Universal Spirit', on the clear understanding, however, that in this use of the word 'spirit' nothing is implied which might recall Western philosophical conceptions, and, in particular, that it is not turned into a correlative of 'matter', as the modern mind is inclined to do, being subject in this respect, even though unconsciously, to the influence of Cartesian dualism. [3] And let it be repeated once more in this connection that genuine metaphysics lies quite outside all the oppositions of which that existing between 'spiritualism' and 'materialism' affords us the type, and that it is in no way required to concern itself with the more or less
special and often quite artificial questions to which such oppositions give rise.
Ātmā permeates all things, which are, as it were, its accidental modifications, and according to Rāmānuja's expression, 'constitute in some sort its body [this word being taken here in a purely analogical sense], be they moreover of an intelligent or non-intelligent nature,' that is, according to Western conceptions, 'spiritual' as well as 'material', for that distinction, implying merely a diversity of conditions in manifestation, makes no sort of difference in respect of the unconditioned and unmanifested Principle. This, in fact, is the 'Supreme Self' (the literal rendering of Paramātmā) of all that exists, under whatever mode, and it abides ever 'the same' through the indefinite multiplicity of the degrees of Existence, understood in the universal sense, as well as beyond Existence, that is, in principial non-manifestation.
The 'Self', in relation to any being whatsoever, is in reality identical with Ātmā, since it is essentially beyond all distinction and all particularization; and that is why, in Sanskrit, the same word ātman, in cases other than the nominative, replaces the reflexive pronoun 'itself'. The 'Self' is not therefore really distinct from Ātmā, except when one considers it particularly and 'distinctively' in relation to a being, or, more accurately, in relation to a certain definite state of that being, such as the human state, and insofar as one considers it from this special and limited point of view alone. In this case, moreover, the 'Self' does not really become distinct from Ātmā in any way, since as we said above, it cannot be 'other than itself', and obviously cannot be affected by the point of view from which we regard it, any more than by any other contingency. What should be noted is that to the extent that we make this distinction, we are departing from the direct consideration of the 'Self' in order to consider its reflection in human individuality or in some other state of the being, for, needless to say, when confronted with the 'Self', all states of manifestation are strictly equivalent and can be regarded in the same way; but just now it is the human individuality which more particularly concerns us. The reflection in question determines what may be called the center of this individuality; but if isolated from its principle, that is, from the 'Self', it can only enjoy
a purely illusory existence, for it is from that principle that it derives all its reality, and it effectually possesses this reality only through participation in the nature of the 'Self', that is, insofar as it is identified therewith by universalization.
The personality, let us insist once more, belongs essentially to the order of principles in the strictest sense of the word, that is, to the universal order; it cannot therefore be considered from any point of view except that of pure metaphysics, which has precisely the Universal for its domain. The pseudo-metaphysicians of the West are in the habit of confusing with the Universal things which, in reality, pertain to the individual order; or rather, as they have no conception at all of the Universal, that to which they fallaciously apply this name is usually the **general**, which is properly speaking but a mere extension of the individual. Some carry the confusion still further; the 'empiricist' philosophers, who cannot even conceive the general, identify it with the **collective**, which by right belongs to the **particular** order only; and by means of these successive degradations they end by reducing all things to the level of **sensory knowledge**, which many indeed regard as the only kind of knowledge possible, because their mental horizon does not extend beyond this domain and because they wish to impose on everybody else the limitations which are but the effect of their own incapacity, whether inborn or acquired through a particular form of education.
To forestall any misunderstandings of the kind just described and in order to avoid tedious repetition, we will here, once and for all, provide the following table, which sets forth the essential distinctions in this connection, and to which we ask our readers to refer whenever necessary:
**Universal**
**Individual** {
**General**
**Collective**
**Particular** (Sensory Knowledge)
}
1. Leon Daudet in certain of his works (L'Heredo and Le Monde des Images) has distinguished in the human being between what he calls 'self' (soi) and 'ego' (moi);
2. It is our intention to set forth more completely in other works the metaphysical theory of the being's multiple states; here we need only touch on those aspects of that theory that are indispensable to an understanding of the constitution of the human being. [Guénon later published a separate work on this theory, entitled The Multiple States of the Being. See also The Symbolism of the Cross. Ed.]
3. In theology, when it is declared that 'God is pure spirit' it is reasonable to suppose that this statement must likewise not be taken in the sense of 'spirit' as opposed to 'matter', that is to say according to the sense in which the two terms have no meaning except in reference to one another; to understand it in this way would amount to accepting a kind of 'demiurgic' conception, more or less akin to the theories attributed to the Manicheans. It is nonetheless true to say that such an expression is of a kind that readily lends itself to false interpretations, leading to the substitution of 'a being' for pure Being.
4. This asymmetry can be made more intelligible by applying to it a well established observation of ordinary logic; whenever an attribution or quality of any kind is considered, all possible things are automatically divided into two groups, namely, on the one hand, things endowed with this quality, and on the other hand, things devoid of it; but while the first named group is found to be thus positively defined and determined, the second, which is only characterized in a wholly negative manner, is in no wise limited thereby and is in reality indefinite. Thus, there is neither symmetry nor any common measure between the two groups, which do not really constitute a twofold division, since their distinction holds good merely from the special point of view of a certain quality taken as a starting-point; the second group possesses no homogeneity and may include things having nothing in common with one another, which however does not rob this division of its validity under the original terms of reference. Now it is precisely in this manner that the manifested can be distinguished from the unmanifested; so also, within the manifested, a similar distinction can be made between the formal and the formless and lastly, within the realm of form itself, between the corporeal and incorporeal.