AUTHORITY AND HIERARCHY
Throughout the various ages of history, and even well before what are conventionally known as historical times, we find [1] clues of a frequent opposition between the representatives of two powers, one spiritual and the other temporal. This opposition can be discerned despite the special forms sometimes assumed by these two powers in adapting to different circumstances of time and place. This does not mean however that the opposition and the struggles it engenders are 'as old as the world', as this much-abused expression would imply. Such would be a manifest exaggeration, for all traditions teach that in order for this opposition to arise humanity had to reach a phase quite distant from the pure primordial spirituality. Besides, these two powers did not originally exist as separate functions exercised by different individuals. On the contrary, they were two indivisible aspects of the common principle from which they both proceeded, linked indissolubly in the unity of a synthesis that was at once superior and anterior to their distinction. Hindu doctrine expresses exactly this when it teaches that in the beginning there was only one caste. The name Hamsa given to this single primordial caste indicates spirituality of a very high
degree which, though quite exceptional today, was originally common to all men, and possessed by them as it were spontaneously. [2] This high degree of spirituality lies beyond the four castes that were subsequently established and among which the different social functions were distributed.
The principle of the institution of castes, so completely misunderstood by Westerners, is nothing else but the differing natures of human individuals; it establishes among 'them a hierarchy the incomprehension of which only brings disorder and confusion, and it is precisely this incomprehension that is implied in the 'egalitarian' theory so dear to the modern world, a theory contrary to all established facts and belied even by simple observation, since equality is really nowhere to be found-but this is not the place to enlarge on a point we have already treated elsewhere. [3] The words used to designate caste in India signify nothing but 'individual nature', implying all the characteristics attaching to the 'specific' human nature that differentiate individuals from each other; and it should immediately be added that heredity plays only a partial role in the determination of these characteristics, for were it otherwise
all the individuals of a family would be identical. Thus, caste is not in principle strictly hereditary, even though it has frequently become so in fact and in practice. Besides, since there cannot be two individuals identical and equal in all respects, there are inevitably some differences among those belonging to the same caste. But just as there are more common characteristics among beings of the same species than among beings of different species, so also are there more common characteristics, within a given species, among individuals belonging to the same caste than there are among those of different castes. One could say then that the distinction between castes in the human species constitutes a veritable natural classification to which the distribution of social functions necessarily corresponds. In effect, each man, by reason of his proper nature, is suited to carry out certain definite functions to the exclusion of all others; and in a society established on a regular traditional basis, these aptitudes must be determined according to precise rules, so that, by the correspondence of the various functions with the principal categories in the classification of 'individual natures', each finds his proper place (barring exceptions due to errors of application which, although possible, are reduced to a minimum), and thus the social order exactly expresses the hierarchical relationships that result from the nature of the beings themselves. This in brief is the fundamental reason for the existence of castes, and one must at least be acquainted with these essential notions in order to understand the allusions we shall have to make in the course of this study, whether to the constitution of caste such as it exists in India or to analogous institutions found elsewhere; for it is evident that the same principles, albeit with varying modes of application, have presided over the organization of all civilizations possessing a truly traditional character.
In short, caste distinction, along with the differentiation of social functions which corresponds to it, results from a rupture of the primordial unity; only then do the spiritual power and the temporal power appear separate from one another. The distinct exercise of these two powers in turn constitutes the respective functions of the first two castes: the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas. Moreover, between these two powers (as more generally among all the social
functions thereafter attributed to different groups of individuals) there must originally have been a perfect harmony by which the original unity was maintained, at least to the degree that the conditions of humanity in its new phase would allow; for in essence harmony is simply a reflection or image of true unity. It was only at a later stage of development that this distinction was to be transformed into opposition and rivalry, destroying the original harmony and so making way for a struggle between the two powers, while the inferior functions in their turn laid claim to supremacy, resulting finally in total confusion, negation, and the overthrow of all hierarchy. The general conception just outlined conforms to the traditional doctrine of the four successive ages into which the history of terrestrial humanity is divided. This doctrine is found not only in India, but also in the ancient West, particularly among the Greeks and Romans. These four ages are the different phases humanity traverses as it moves away from the principle and so away from primordial unity and spirituality. They are like stages in a kind of progressive materialization that is necessarily inherent in the development of the entire cycle of manifestation, as we have explained elsewhere. [4]
It is only in the last of these four ages, known as the Kali-Yuga or 'dark age' in the Hindu tradition, and corresponding to the present era, that the subversion of the normal order can occur, and the temporal power for the first time can prevail over the spiritual authority. However, the first manifestations of the revolt of the Kshatriyas against the authority of the Brahmins lie much further back than the beginning of this age, [5] a beginning that is itself far earlier than anything known to ordinary or 'profane' history. This opposition of the two powers, this rivalry between their respective representatives, was depicted among the Celts as a wild boar and a bear locked in combat, a symbolism of Hyperborean origin and thus connected to one of the most ancient traditions of humanity (if not the oldest of
all), the true primordial tradition. This symbolism could give rise to many further reflections that would be out of place here, but which we will perhaps explain on another occasion. [6]
It is not our intention here to trace everything back to its origins, and all our examples will be drawn from epochs much closer to us, corresponding to what we may call the last part of the Kali-Yuga. This is a time accessible to ordinary history since it begins precisely in the sixth century before the Christian era. It was nonetheless necessary to give this brief summary of the elements of the whole of traditional history, without which the rest would only be understood imperfectly, for one cannot really understand any epoch except by assigning it its proper place in the whole of which it is but one element; it is thus, as we have recently shown, that the particular characteristics of the modern age can only be explained if one considers it to be the final phase of the Kali-Yuga. [7] We are fully aware that this synthetic point of view is entirely contrary to the spirit of analysis that governs the development of 'profane' science, the only one known to most of our contemporaries, yet it is all the more essential to clearly affirm this point of view because it is very much misunderstood; it is moreover the only one that can be adopted by all those who wish to remain in strict conformity with true traditional orthodoxy, and not make any concession to the modern spirit which, as we cannot repeat often enough, is one with the spirit of the anti-tradition itself.
No doubt, the prevailing tendency at present is to treat the facts of the most remote period of history, such as those to which we have just alluded, as 'legendary', or even as 'mythical'; and the same applies to other far less ancient facts-some of which will concern us in what follows-since they are inaccessible to the means of
investigation available to 'profane' historians. Those who might think in this way, by virtue of habits acquired through an education that today more often than not produces real mental deformity, should, if they have retained some degree of understanding, be able to at least take these facts simply at their symbolic value, a value which for us does not diminish in any way their own reality as historical facts. After all, this symbolic value is what matters most, for it confers on them a superior meaning, of a much profounder order than they can have in themselves. But this point requires further explanation.
All that is, in whatever mode it may be, necessarily participates in universal principles, and nothing exists except by participation in these principles, which are the eternal and immutable essences contained in the permanent actuality of the divine Intellect; consequently, one can say that all things, however contingent they may be in themselves, express or represent these principles in their own manner and according to their own order of existence, for otherwise they would only be a pure nothingness. All things, in every order of existence, are connected and correspond to one another so as to contribute to universal and total harmony; for harmony, as we have already said, is nothing other than the reflection of principial unity in the multiplicity of the manifested world; and it is this correspondence that is the true foundation of symbolism. This is why the laws of an inferior domain can always be taken as symbols for realities of that superior order which is their ground, and which is both their principle and end; and we note in passing the error of modern 'naturalistic' interpretations of the ancient traditional doctrines, which purely and simply invert the hierarchy of relationships between the different orders of reality. Let us cite here as an example just one of today's most prevalent theories. Contrary to the naturalistic point of view, symbols or myths have never played the role of representing the movements of the stars, although it is true that one often finds in myths images inspired by them. These images are meant to explain analogically something altogether different, because the laws of this movement translate physically the metaphysical principles on which they depend. It is on this that the true astrology of the ancients rested. The inferior may symbolize the superior, but the
inverse is impossible. Besides, if the symbol were further removed from the sensible order than that which it represents-rather than being closer-how could it carry out its destined function, which is to render the truth more accessible to man by furnishing a 'support' to his understanding? It is obvious on the other hand that the use of astronomical symbolism-to take the same example-does not prevent astronomical phenomena from existing as such, nor does it deny them all the reality they have in their own order; and it is exactly the same in the case of historical facts which, like any facts, express higher truths in their own way and conform to the law of correspondence we have just mentioned. While these facts have a real existence, they are at the same time also symbols; and from our point of view, they are much more worthy of interest as symbols than as facts. It could not be otherwise, since we intend to relate everything to principles, and it is precisely this which, as we have explained elsewhere, [8] essentially distinguishes 'sacred science' from 'profane science'. If we insist on this point it is in order to avoid confusion: one must put each thing in its proper place, and history properly understood also has its place in integral knowledge, though it has no value in this respect except insofar as it enables us to find a point of support, in the very contingencies that constitute its immediate object, from which to raise ourselves above these same contingencies.
As for the point of view of 'profane history', which clings exclusively to facts without going beyond them, it is of no interest in our eyes, like all else that belongs to the field of mere erudition. It is thennot at all as an historian, taking the term in the latter sense, that we consider the facts, and this is what allows us to ignore certain 'critical' prejudices particularly dear to our age. It does seem moreover that the exclusive use of certain methods may have been imposed on modern historians solely to prevent them from seeing clearly in matters that were not to be broached, for the simple reason that they might have led to conclusions contrary to the 'materialistic' tendencies that 'official' teaching has made it its mission to uphold. It goes without saying that for our part we do not feel at all obliged
to maintain this reserve. This having been said, we think that the subject of our study can now be approached directly without tarrying further over these preliminary observations, which were meant only to define as clearly as possible the spirit in which we write and also the spirit in which this study should be read if one really wishes to understand its meaning.