BRAHMINS AND KSHATRIYAS: THEIR RESPECTIVE NATURES
Wisdom and strength: such are the respective attributes of Brahmins and Kshatriyas, or, if one prefers, spiritual authority and temporal power; and it is interesting to note that among the ancient Egyptians one of the meanings of the symbol of the Sphinx joined precisely these two attributes, viewed according to their normal relationships. In fact, its human head can be considered as representing wisdom and its leonine body as representing strength. The head is the spiritual authority which directs, and the body is the temporal power which acts. It should be noted moreover that the Sphinx is always represented at rest, for the temporal power is taken here in the 'non-acting' state, in its spiritual principle where it is contained 'eminently' and therefore as a possibility of action only, or, to put it better, in the divine principle, which unifies the spiritual and the temporal because it lies beyond their distinction and is the common source whence both proceed-the first directly, and the second only indirectly through the mediation of the first. Elsewhere we find a verbal symbol that by its hieroglyphic constitution is an exact equivalent of the Sphinx: this is the word Druid, which is read as dru-vid, the first root signifying strength and the second wisdom.[1] Besides showing that royalty is contained implicitly within the priesthood, the union of the two attributes in this name, like
that of the two elements of the Sphinx in one and the same being, is doubtless a memory of the remote epoch when the two powers were still united in the state of primordial indifferentiation, in their common and supreme principle.[2]
We have already dedicated a special study to this supreme principle of the two powers, [3] in which we indicated how this principle, at first visible, became invisible and hidden, and retreated from the 'external world' in proportion as the latter moved away from its primordial state-which was to lead inevitably to an apparent sundering of the two powers. We also showed how this principle is found, under various names and symbols, in all traditions, and how it appears in particular in the Judeo-Christian tradition in the figures of Melchizedek and the Magi-Kings. Here we will simply recall that in Christianity recognition of this unique principle still subsists, at least theoretically, and this is confirmed by the affirmation of the two functions of priesthood and royalty as inseparable in the person of Christ. From a certain point of view, when these two functions are related in this way to their principle, they can also be envisaged as complementary; in this case, although the second has its immediate principle in the first, there is a kind of correlation between the two in their very distinction. In other words, from the moment the priesthood does not hold the regular, effective exercise of royalty, the respective representatives of priesthood and royalty must then derive their power from a common source that is 'beyond caste'. The hierarchical difference between them lies in the fact that the priesthood receives its power directly from this source, with which it is in immediate contact by its very nature, whereas
royalty, owing to the more external and strictly worldly character of its function, can receive its power only through the intermediary of the priesthood. Indeed, the latter truly plays the role of 'mediator' between heaven and earth, and it is not without reason that in the Western traditions the priesthood in all its plenitude received the symbolic name of 'pontificate', for, as Saint Bernard says, 'the Pontiff, as indicated by the etymology of his name, is a kind of bridge [pont] between God and man.[4] If one then wishes to go back to the primal origin of the priestly and royal powers, one must look to the 'celestial world'. This can be understood moreover both literally and symbolically, [5] but to develop this question would exceed the scope of our present study, and if we have nonetheless provided this brief sketch, it is because we will not be able to avoid referring to this common source of the two powers in what follows.
Returning to the starting-point of this digression, it is obvious that the attributes of wisdom and strength relate to knowledge and action respectively. In India, on the other hand, it is still said in connection with this same point of view that the Brahmin is the type of stable beings and the Kshatriya is the type of changing beings.[6] In
other words, in the social order-which is moreover in perfect correspondence with the cosmic order-the first represents the immutable element and the second the mutable element. Here again, the immutability in question is that of knowledge, which is figured by the immobile posture of a man in meditation; for its part, mobility is inherent to action by reason of its transitory and temporary character. Finally, the proper natures of the Brahmin and the Kshatriya are distinguished fundamentally by the predominance of different gunas. As we have explained elsewhere, [7] the Hindu doctrine envisages three gunas, which are the constituent qualities of beings in all their states of manifestation: sattva, conformity to the pure essence of universal Being, which is identified with intelligible light or knowledge and represented as an ascending tendency; rajas, the expansive impulse, by which the being develops within a certain state and, so to speak, at a determined level of existence; and lastly tamas, obscurity, assimilated to ignorance and represented as a descending tendency. In the primordial indifferentiation the gunas are in perfect equilibrium, and all manifestation represents a rupture of that equilibrium. These three elements are present in all beings, but in varying proportions that determine their respective tendencies. In the nature of the Brahmin it is sattva that predominates, orienting him toward the supra-human states, and in the nature of the Kshatriya it is rajas, which tends to the realization of the possibilities contained in the human state.[8] To the predominance of sattva corresponds that of intellectuality, and to the predominance of rajas that of what, for lack of a better term, might be called sentiment, and this is another justification of what we were saying earlier: the Kshatriya is not made for pure knowledge. The path suitable for the Kshatriya is what could be called 'devotional', if one may take the liberty of using such a word to render, albeit
imperfectly, the Sanskrit term bhakti, that is to say the path that takes as its point of departure an element of an emotive order; and, although this path is found outside of strictly religious forms, the role of the emotive element is nowhere so developed as here, where it colors the expression of the entire doctrine with a special tinge.
This last remark allows us to understand the true raison d'être of these religious forms: they are especially suitable for races whose aptitudes are generally speaking directed above all toward action, those races, that is, which, when envisaged collectively, exhibit a preponderance of the 'rajasic' element that characterizes the nature of the Kshatriyas. This is the situation we find in the Western world, which is why, as we have explained elsewhere, [9] it is said in India that if the West were to return to a normal state and acquire a regular social organization, many Kshatriyas would be found there but few Brahmins; and this also explains why religion, understood in its strictest sense, is properly Western, and also why there does not seem to be a pure spiritual authority in the West, or at least any that asserts itself outwardly as such with the characteristics we have just described. Nevertheless, adaptation to a religious form, like the establishment of any other traditional form, is the responsibility of a true spiritual authority in the fullest sense of this term; and this authority, which then takes on a religious appearance, can at the same time also remain something else in itself so long as there are true Brahmins at its heart, by which we mean an intellectual elite that remains aware of what lies beyond all particular forms, that is to say of the profound essence of the tradition. For such an elite the form can only play the role of 'support', while also providing a means for those who do not have access to pure intellectuality to participate in the tradition; but the latter naturally do not see anything beyond the form, for their own possibilities do not let them go any further. Consequently, the spiritual authority need not show itself to them under any other aspect than that corresponding to their nature, [10] although, exterior as it may be, its teaching is always
inspired by the spirit of the higher doctrine.[11] But it may happen that once this adaptation is made, those who are the depositories of that traditional form subsequently find themselves confined to this adaptation, having lost effective consciousness of what lies beyond it. This may be due moreover to various circumstances, above all to the 'mingling of castes', by reason of which there are found among them men who are in reality for the most part Kshatriyas. From this it is easy to understand that such a case is possible principally in the West, all the more in that the religious form there particularly lends itself to this. The combination of intellectual and sentimental elements that characterizes this form actually creates a kind of mixed domain where knowledge is envisaged less in itself than in its application to action. If the distinction between 'sacerdotal initiation' and 'royal initiation' is not maintained clearly and rigorously, we have an intermediate ground where all sorts of confusions can arise, not to mention certain conflicts that would not even be conceivable if the temporal power had to face a pure spiritual authority.[12]
Our present purpose is not to inquire as to which of these two possibilities corresponds to the religious state of the Western world at present, and the reason for this is easy to understand: a religious authority cannot have the appearance of what we call a pure spiritual authority even if it carries such a reality within itself. There was certainly a time when the religious power did effectively possess this
reality, but is this still the case?[13] This would be all the more difficult to determine because when true intellectuality has been lost as completely as it has in modern times, it is natural that the superior and 'interior' part of the tradition should become more and more hidden and inaccessible, since those who are capable of understanding it are no more than a tiny minority. Until we have proof to the contrary, we claim that such is the case, and that consciousness of the integral tradition, with all that it implies, still subsists effectively among some few, however small their number may be; besides, even if this consciousness had entirely disappeared, the fact remains that by the mere conservation of the 'letter' and its protection from any alteration, every regularly constituted traditional form always maintains the possibility of its own restoration, which will one day take place if among its representatives there are those who possess the requisite intellectual aptitudes.
In any case, even if by some means we had more precise information on this subject, we would not be obliged to state it publicly unless we were led to do so by exceptional circumstances, and the reason is this: an authority that is only religious is nevertheless, even in the most unfavorable case, still a relative spiritual authority; we mean that, without being a fully effective spiritual authority, it nonetheless bears this within itself from the beginning as a virtuality; and from this very fact it can always carry out this function externally; [14] it thus legitimately plays this role vis-à-vis the temporal power, and it must be truly considered as such in its relations with the latter. Those who have understood our point of view will
realize without difficulty that in case of a conflict between a spiritual authority-whatever it may be, even a relative one-and a purely temporal power we must in principle always take the side of the spiritual authority; we say 'in principle', for it must be clearly understood that we have not the slightest intention of actively intervening in such conflicts, nor above all of taking any part whatever in the quarrels of the Western world, for this could never be our role.
In the examples to be considered in what follows we will not therefore make any distinction between those concerning a pure spiritual authority and those concerning only a relative spiritual authority; in every case we shall consider as a spiritual authority that which fulfills this function socially. Moreover, the striking similarities presented by all these cases, however distant they may be from one another historically, will sufficiently justify this assimilation. We would only have to make a distinction if the question of the effective possession of pure intellectuality happened to arise, and this question does not in fact arise here; similarly, we would not have to demarcate the exact boundary, so to speak, of an authority that is exclusively attached to a particular traditional form except in cases where it claimed to surpass these limits, and such cases do not figure among those we shall examine.
On this last point we shall recall what we said earlier: the superior 'eminently' contains the inferior; whoever then is competent within the limits that define his own domain, is so also a fortiori for all other domains that lie within these same limits, whereas, on the other hand, he is not competent for that which lies beyond. If this simple rule were observed and applied properly-at least by those who have a true notion of hierarchy-no confusion of domains and no error of 'jurisdictions', so to speak, would ever occur. Some will no doubt see only precautions of a dubious utility in the distinctions and reservations we have formulated here, and others will be tempted to assign to them only a theoretical value; but we think that there are still others who will understand that they are in reality something else entirely, and it is these latter whom we invite to reflect on them with particular attention.