Varna
M
R Gualtherus H. Mees, in his book Dharma and Society of which we have already spoken, expatiates particularly, as we have said, on the question of the castes. Moreover, he does not accept this word in the way we understand it, but prefers to keep the Sanskrit term varna without translating it, or to render it by an expression like 'natural classes', which, indeed, defines fairly well what is in question, since it is really a hierarchical distribution of human beings in conformity with the nature proper to each of them. However, it is to be feared that the word 'classes', even accompanied by a qualifier, might evoke the idea of something more or less comparable to the social classes of the West, which are, in reality, purely artificial, and have nothing in common with a traditional hierarchy, of which they represent at best a short of parody or caricature. That is why we find, for our part, that it is still better to use the word 'castes', which assuredly merely has a quite conventional value, but which at least was coined expressly to designate the Hindu organisation. Yet Mr. Mees reserves it for the multiple castes that, in fact, exist in India now, and which he wants to see as something completely different from primitive varnas. We cannot share this way of viewing things, for these are in reality only secondary subdivisions, due to a greater complexity or differentiation of the
social organisation, and whatever their multiplicity, they nonetheless always fit into the framework of the four varnas, which alone constitute the fundamental hierarchy and remain necessarily invariable, as expression of traditional principles and reflection of cosmic order in the human social order.
There is, beneath this distinction that Mr. Mees wishes to make between varna and 'caste', an idea that seems to us inspired for the great part by Bergsonian theories of 'open societies' and 'closed societies', although he never refers expressly to these. He tries to distinguish two aspects of dharma, of which one corresponds more or less to varna and the other to 'caste', and which would alternatively affirm their predominance in what he terms 'periods of life' and 'periods of form', to which he attributes respectively the characteristics 'dynamic' and 'static'. We do not at all intend to discuss here these philosophico-historic conceptions, which obviously rest on no traditional datum. It is more interesting for us to draw forth a misunderstanding about the word jāti that the author believes designates what he calls 'caste', while, in reality, it is quite simply employed at as an equivalent or synonym for varna. This word jāti literally means 'birth', but one must not understand it, or at least not exclusively, nor on principle, in the sense of 'heredity'; it designates the individual nature of the being, inasmuch as it is necessarily determined from birth itself, as a gathering of possibilities that the will develop in the course of his existence. This nature results primarily from what the being is in itself, and secondarily only from the influences of environment, of which heredity, properly understood, is but a part. It must further be added that this environment itself is normally determined by a certain law of 'affinity', so as to be as consonant as possible with the tendencies proper to the being which is born there. We say 'normally' for there could be more or less numerous exceptions, at least in a period of confusion like the Kaliyuga. This being so, one cannot see at all what an 'open' caste would be if one understands by
this (and how else could one understand it?) that an individual would have the possibility of changing castes at a given moment; this would imply in him a change of nature which is quite as inconceivable as a sudden change of species in the life of an animal or vegetable (and one might remark that the word jāti also has the sense of 'species', which still more completely signifies this comparison). An apparent change of caste cannot be anything more than the correction of an error, in the case where one would first attribute to an individual a caste that was not really his; but the fact that such an error can sometimes happen (and precisely again as a result of the obscuration of the Kaliyuga) does not at all prevent, in a certain general fashion, the possibility of determining true caste from birth. If. Mr. Mees seems to believe that only considerations of heredity intervene then, it is because he doubtless ignored the fact that the means of this determination can be furnished by certain traditional sciences, even if only by astrology (which, properly understood, is here something wholly different to the alleged 'scientific astrology' of certain modern Occidentals, and has nothing to do with a 'conjectural' or 'divining' art, any more than with the empiricism of statistics and the calculation of probabilities).
Having settled this, let us return to the notion of varna itself: this word properly signifies 'colour', but also, by extension, 'quality' in general, and, that is, why it can be taken to designate individual nature. Mr. Mees very rightly dismisses the strange interpretation proposed by certain people, who wish to see in the meaning of 'colour' proof that the distinction of the varnas would have been, originally, based upon difference of race, the least confirmation of which it is totally impossible to find anywhere. The truth is that, if colours are effectively attributed to the varnas, it is in a purely symbolic way; and the 'key' to this symbolism is given by the correspondence with the gunas, a correspondence that is notably indicated most explicitly in this text of the Visnupurāna: 'When Brahmā, conformity with his purpose, wished to
create the world, beings in whom sattva prevailed (issued from) his mouth; others in whom rajas was predominant issued from his chest; yet others in whom rajas and tamas were both strong issued from his thighs; finally, others issued from his feet, having tamas for principal characteristic. From these beings were composed the four varnas, the Brāhmanas, the Kstriyas, the Vaiśyas, and the Sūdras who respectively issued from his mouth, chest, thighs, and feet'. Sattva being represented by the colour white, the latter is naturally attributed to the Brāhmanas; similarly, red, representative colour of rajas, is attributed to the Ksatriyas; the Vaiśyas, characterised by a mixture of the two lesser gunas, have as symbolic colour yellow; finally, black, colour of tamas, is consequently the one that befits the Sūdras.
The hierarchisation of the varnas, thus, determined by the gunas that respectively predominate in them, is exactly superimposed on that of the elements, quite as we have shown in our study on this subject. [2] This is what is immediately shown by the comparison of the diagram below with the one that we gave then. One must only note, so that the similarity be complete, that the place of ether must be occupied hereby hamsa, that is to say, by the single primordial caste that existed in the Krtayuga, and which contained the four later varnas in principle and in the undifferentiated state, in the same way that ether contains the other four elements.
On the other hand, Mr. Mees attempts, whilst, moreover, defending himself from the wish to push these analogies too far, nonetheless to indicate a correspondence between the four varnas and the four ā s rramas or regular stages of existence (which we shall not examine here), and also the four goals of human life that we spoke of previously in respect of dharma. But, in this last case, the very fact that it is always a question of quaternary division had led him to a manifest inaccuracy. Indeed, it is obviously inadmissible that one should propose as a goal, even if it be the lowliest of all, the obtaining of something that would
purely and simply correspond to tamas. The distribution, if one completes it from bottom to top, must, therefore, start in reality on the step that is immediately above the latter, as our second diagram shows. It is easy to understand that dharma corresponds quite effectively to sattva, kāma to rajas, and artha to a mixture of rajas and tamas. At the same time, the relations of these goals with the character and role of the three higher varnas (that is those whose members possess the qualities of ārya and dvija) emerge then of themselves: the function of the Vaiśya relates clearly to the acquisition of artha or the benefits of corporal order; kāma or desire is the motive of the activity that properly befits the Kṣatriya; and the Brāhmana is truly the representative and the natural guardian of dharma.
As for mokṣa, this supreme goal is, as we have already said, of an entirely different order from the three goals and without any common measure with them; it is situated, therefore, beyond all that corresponds to the particular functions of the varnas, and it cannot be contained, as are transitory and contingent goals, in the sphere that represents the domain of conditioned existence,
since it is precisely liberation from this existence itself. It is also, of course, beyond the three gunas, which only concern the states of universal manifestation.
These few considerations show clearly enough that when it is a question of traditional institutions, a uniquely 'sociological' point of view proves insufficient to get to the depths of things, since the true foundation of these institutions is really of a 'cosmological' order. But it goes without saying that certain lacunae in this regard need, however, in noway prevent us from recognising the merit of Mr. Mees' work, morett which is certainly much superior to the majority of works that other Occidentals have devoted to these same questions.