The Fifth Veda
Among the specifically modern mistakes that we have frequently had occasion to denounce, one that is most directly opposed to every true understanding of traditional doctrines is what we may term 'historicism' which, moreover, is basically nothing but a simple consequence of the 'evolutionist' mentality. It consists, in effect, of supposing that all things must have originated in the most rudimentary and crude fashion, to subsequently undergo a progressive elaboration, such that this or that conception would appear at a determined moment, the later (appearance) being judged the most elevated (or accomplished), thus, implying that they could only be 'the products of a civilisation already advanced'. This mode of expression has become so current it is sometimes repeated almost mechanically by the very people who attempt to react against such a mentality, but who have merely 'traditionalist' intentions without any true traditional knowledge. To this way of seeing things, it is necessary to oppose the view that, on the contrary, it is at the beginning that all which appears in the spiritual and intellectual domains is found in a state of perfection, from which it has only afterwards fallen away through that 'obscuration' that neçessarily accompanies every cyclic process of manifestation. This fundamental law, which we must be content to recall here without entering into further development, is obviously enough to reduce to nothing
all the results of the alleged 'historical critique'. One can further remark that the latter implies a fixed bias, denying every suprahuman element, and which treats traditional doctrines themselves as purely human 'thought', totally comparable in this regard to what counts as philosophy and the profane sciences. To this point of view again, no compromise is possible, and it is, moreover, in reality this profane 'thought' itself which is of very recent date, and was only able to appear as the 'product of an already advanced degeneration', we might say, reversing in an 'anti-evolutionist' way the phrase we cited a moment ago.
If we apply these general considerations to the Hindu tradition, we shall say that, contrary to the Orientalists' opinion, that nothing at all of the sort called 'Vedism', 'Brāhmanism', and 'Hinduism', ever existed, if we understand by these doctrines that saw the light of day in successive epochs, replacing each other; and where each is characterised by conceptions essentially different, if not contradictory, from those of the others, conceptions that would have been formed 'successively' after a reflection imagined on the model of simple philosophical speculation. These diverse denominations, should one hold to their preserving, must only be regarded as designating one and the same tradition, to which they may all in effect relates.
At best, one may say that each relates more directly to a certain aspect of this tradition, the different aspects clinging closely together, being unable in any real way to be isolated from each other. This immediately results from the fact that the tradition in question is, in principle, contained integrally in the Veda, and that, consequently, all that is contrary to the Veda or is not legitimately derived from it is by this very fact excluded from this tradition, under whatever aspect one views it. The essential unity and invariability of the doctrine are, thus, assured, whatever developments and adaptations it may produce to respond in special ways to the needs and aptitudes of men of this or that epoch.
It must be clearly understood, indeed that the immutability of the doctrine itself is not obstacle to any development, nor to any
adaptation, with the only condition that they always be in strict conformity with principles; but also, at the same time, that nothing of all this ever constitutes 'novelties'. Since it would in any case never be a question of anything but an 'explication' of what the doctrine already implied through all times, or of another formulation of the same truths in different terms, to render them more easily accessible to the mentality of a more 'obscured' epoch. What could first of all be grasped, immediately and without difficulty, in the principle itself, men of later epochs could no longer see, apart from exceptional cases, and one had to then compensate for this general lack of understanding by detailed explanations and commentaries which hitherto were not at all necessary. Furthermore, the aptitudes to arrive directly at pure knowledge becoming ever more rare, one had to open other 'haths', putting to work more and more contingent means, following in a degree, and remedying in whatever measure possible the 'descent' which would make itself effected from time to time in the course of the cycle of terrestrial humanity. Thus, one might say, the latter received, to attain its transcendent ends, facilities that were the greater, the lower its spiritual and intellectual levels sank, in order to save all who might be saved, in taking into account those conditions inevitably determined by the law of the cycle.
It is through these considerations that one may really understand the place occupied, in Hindu tradition, by what is habitually designated by the name 'Tantrism', in that it represents the body of teachings and means of 'realisation', more especially appropriate to the conditions of the Kaliyuga. It would, therefore, be completely erroneous to see here a separate doctrine, still less any 'system', as Westerners are always too ready to do. To tell the truth, it is more a question of a 'spirit', if one may express it thus, which in a more or less diffuse fashion, penetrates all Hindu tradition in its actualised form, so that it would be almost impossible to assign it precise and well-defined limits within the latter. And, if one thinks, moreover, that the beginning of the
Kaliyuga goes back far beyond times called 'historical', one must admit that the very origin of Tantrism, far from being as 'late' as some people claim, necessarily evades the limited means at the disposal of profane investigation. Again, when we speak here of origin, making it coincide with the origin of the Kaliyuga, this is only a half truth. More precisely, this is only true on the con-dition that one specifies that it is only a question hereof Tantrism as we would say, an expression or external manifestation of something which, like the rest of the tradition, existed in principle in the Veda itself, although it was only formulated more explicitly and developed in its applications when circumstances came to demand it. One sees, therefore, that there is here a double point of view to be considered; on the one hand, one can find Tantrism even in the Veda, since it is principally included there, but, on the other hand, it can only properly be named as a distinct aspect of the doctrine, from the moment that it was made 'explicit' for the reasons we have indicated, and it is only in this sense that one must consider it as peculiar to the Kaliyuga.
The designation of what is in question derives from the fact that the teachings that constitute its basis are expressed in the treatises that bear the generic name of Tantras, a name that relates directly to the symbolism of weaving that we have spoken of on other occasions, for, in the proper sense, Tantra is the 'chain' of a fabric. And we have remarked that elsewhere also, one finds works of the same significance applied to the Sacred Books. These Tantras are often regarded as forming a 'fifth Veda', specially destined for men of the Kaliyuga; and this would be completely unjustified if they were not, as we explained a moment ago, derived from the Veda, understood in its most rigorous sense, as an adaptation to the conditions of a definite epoch. It is important, moreover, to consider that in reality the Veda is one, principally and in a way 'atemporally', before becoming triple, then quadruple in its formation. Should it perhaps also quintuple in the present age, due to the supplementary development required by our faculties of comprehension being less 'open',
and no longer able to be exercised as directly in the order of pure intellectuality, it is evident that this would not in the least effect its original unity, which is essentially its 'perpetual' (sanātana) aspect, and so its being independent of the particular conditions of any age whatsoever.
The doctrine of the Tantras is, and can, in short only, therefore, be a normal development, following certain points of view, of what is already contained in the Veda, since it is in this, and only in this, that it can be, as it is in fact, an integral part of Hindu tradition. And as for the means of 'realisation' (sädhana) prescribed by the Tantras, one can say that by this very fact, they are also derived legitimately from the Veda, since they are basically nothing but the application and effective implementation of this same doctrine. If these means, in which we must naturally include, whether it be as principal or mere accessory, rites of every type, appear nevertheless to assume a certain character of 'novelty' in relation to those that preceded them, it is because there was no point in their being envisaged in earlier epochs, except perhaps as pure possibilities, since men had no need of them and availed themselves of other means that suited their nature better. There is here something entirely comparable to what is the special development of a traditional science in this or that epoch, a development that likewise no more constitutes a spontaneous 'apparition' or some 'innovation', since, in this case equally, it can never really be a question of anything but an application of principles, therefore, of something that had in them at least an implicit preexistence, which it was always possible, consequently, to make explicit at any moment, supposing that there had been some reason to do so; but, precisely, this reason is found in fact only in contingent circumstances that condition a definite epoch.
Now, that the strictly 'Vedic' rites such as they were, we want to say, 'at the beginning', are no longer actually practicable, is the result only too clearly of the single fact that soma, which played here a capital role, has been lost since a time it is
impossible to evaluate 'historically'. And it is well to understand that, when we speak here of soma, it must be considered to represent a whole collection of things, whose knowledge first manifest and accessible to all, has become hidden during the course of the cycle, at least for ordinary humanity. It is necessary, therefore, that there be 'substitutes' for these things, such as might, necessarily, only be found in an order inferior to their own. And this comes back to saying that the 'supports', by whose virtue 'realisation' remained possible, became more and more 'materialised' from one epoch to another, conforming to the descending march of cyclic development. A relationship like that of wine to soma, in their ritual usage, could serve as a symbolic example. This 'materialisation' must not, moreover, be understood merely in the most restrained and ordinary sense of the word. As we envisage it, it begins to emerge, one might say, as soon as one leaves that pure knowledge which alone is also pure spirituality. And the call of elements of sentimental and volitional order, for instance, is not the least of the signs of a similar 'materialisation', even if these elements are employed in a legitimate way, that is, if they are only taken as means subordinate to an end which always remain knowledge. For if it were otherwise, one could no longer in anyway talk of 'realisation', but only of a deviation, a semblance or a parody, things which, needless to say, all are rigorously excluded by traditional orthodoxies, in whatever form and at whatever level we may view it.
What we have just indicated applies precisely to Tantrism, whose 'path' generally, appears more 'active' than 'contemplative', or, in other words, situated rather on the side of 'power' than knowledge. And a particularly significant fact, in this respect, is the importance it gives to what is designated as the 'path of the hero' (vira-mārga). It is obvious that virya, an equivalent term to the Latin virtus, at least according to the sense it had before it was changed in a 'moral' direction by the Stoics, properly expresses the essential and in a way 'typical' quality, not of the Brāhmaṇa, but of the Kṣatriya. And the vira differs from the
paśu, that is, from the being subject to the bonds of common existence, less by an effective knowledge than by a voluntary affirmation of 'autonomy', which, at this stage, and, according to the use the being will make of it, can still lead it as much away from its goal as to it. The danger here is, indeed, that the 'power' may be sought for itself, and, thus, become an obstacle instead of a support, and the individual may, thus, come to take himself as his proper end. But it follows naturally that this is only a deviation and an abuse, which never need result, except through misunderstanding, for which the doctrine can in noway be held responsible. And what is more, what we have just said only concerns the 'path' as such, not the goal which, in reality, let us still insist on this, is always the same and can in no case be other than knowledge, since it is only through and in knowledge that the being is truly 'realised' in all its possibilities. It is yet no less true that the means proposed to attain this goal are marked, as they should be inevitably, by the special characteristics of the Kaliyuga. Let us remember, on this subject, that the proper role of the 'hero' is always and everywhere represented as a 'quest', which, if it can be crowned with success, also risks ending in failure. And the 'quest' itself supposes that there is, when the 'hero' appears, something which was lost earlier and that he must rediscover again. This task, at whose termination the vira will become divya, may be defined, if one wishes, as the search for soma or the 'drink of immortality' (amrta), which is, moreover, from the symbolic point of view, the exact equivalent of what in the West was the 'quest of the Grail'. And, once soma is rediscovered, the end of the cycle rejoins its beginning in the 'atemporal'.