Dharma
The word dharma seems to be one of the Sanskrit terms that most embarrasses translators, and not without reason, for, in fact, it resents/offers multiple meanings, and it certainly is impossible always to render it uniformly by the same word in another language; perhaps it might often even be better to preserve it purely and simply, on condition of explaining it through a commentary. Mr. Gualtherus H. Mees, who has devoted a recently published book [2] to this subject, and who, although restricting himself almost exclusively to the social point of view, displays more understanding than one encounters for the most part among Occidentals, very correctly notes, if there is a certain indetermination about this term, it is not at all synonymous with vagueness, for it in no way proves that the conception of the Ancients lacked clarity, nor that they did not know how to distinguish the different aspects of what was in question. This alleged vagueness, of which one could find many examples, rather indicates that the thought of the Ancients was much less narrowly limited than that of the moderns, and that, instead of being analytic like the latter, it was essentially synthetic. Moreover, there still survives something of this indetermination in a term such as 'law', for example, which also embraces meanings very different from each other. And this word 'law' is precisely with that of 'order', one of those which,
in many cases, can least imperfectly render the idea of dharma.
We know that dharma is derived from the root dhri, which means 'to carry,' 'to support,' 'to sustain,' 'to maintain.' [3] It is properly a question, therefore, of a principle of a conservation of beings, and consequently of stability, in at least as much as stability is compatible with the conditions of manifestation, for all applications of dharma relate always to the manifested world. That is why it is not possible to admit, as the author seems predisposed to do, that this term can be more or less a substitute for ātmā, with this single difference that it would be 'dynamic' instead of 'static'. Ātmā is non-manifested, therefore, immutable; and dharma is one of its expressions, if one wishes, in the sense that it reflects the principal immutability in the order of manifestation; it is 'dynamic' only in the measure that manifestation necessarily implies 'becoming', but it is that which renders this 'becoming' other than pure change, that which always maintains throughout change itself, a certain relative stability. It is, moreover, important to note, in this regard, that the root dhri is almost identical, in form and meaning, with another root dhru, from which is derived the word dhruva which designates 'pole'. Effectively, it is to this idea of 'pole' or 'axis' of the manifested world that one ought to refer if one really wishes to understand the notion of dharma: it is what remains invariable at the centre of the revolutions of all things, and what regulates the course of change by the very fact that it does not participate in it. We must not forget that, by the synthetic character of the thought it expresses, language is here much more closely bound to symbolism than in modern languages, and that, moreover, it is from symbolism that it holds this multiplicity of meanings of which we spoke earlier. And perhaps one could even show that the conception of dharma is connected quite directly to the symbolic representation of the 'axis' through the figure of the 'Tree of the World.'
On the other hand, Mr. Mees correctly points out the kinship of the notions of dharma and rta, which etymologically has the
meaning 'rectitude' (in the same way as the te of the Far-Eastern tradition, which is also very close to dharma), which again obviously recalls the idea of 'axis', which is that of a constant and invariable direction. At the same time, this term rta is identical with the word 'rite', and one could indeed say that the latter, originally at least, designates all that is accomplished in conformity with order; it only comes to assume a more limited meaning as a consequence of the degeneration which gives birth to a 'profane' activity, in whatever domain it be. It must be clearly understood that rite always preserves the same character, and that it is non-ritual activity that is in someway deviant. All that is only 'convention' or 'custom', lacking any profound reason, did not exist at the beginning and at the origin of things; and rite, traditionally viewed, has no relation, to all this, which can only ever be its counterfeit or parody. But there is yet something else: when we speak here of conformity with order, one must not only understand by this human order, but also, and even primarily, cosmic order; in every traditional conception, indeed, there is always a strict correspondence between the two, and it is precisely rite that maintains their relations in a conscious fashion, implying in someway a collaboration of man, in the sphere where his activity is exercised, with the cosmic order itself.
Similarly, the notion of dharma is not restricted to man, but extends to all beings and to all their states of manifestation. That is why a uniquely social conception would not suffice to permit its understanding at depth. This is nothing more than a particular application, which should never be separated from 'law', or the primordial and universal 'norm' of which it is but a translation in specifically human mode. Doubtless, one clearly can speak of the dharma proper to each being (svadharma) or proper to each group of beings, such as a human community for example; but this is only, truth to tell, a particularisation of dharma in relation to the special conditions of this being or this group, whose nature and constitution are necessarily analogous to those of the whole it is
part of, whether this whole be a certain state of existence or even the whole manifestation, for the analogy is always applied to all levels and all degrees. We see that we are, here, a long way from a 'moral' conception: if an idea such as 'justice' sometimes proves convenient for rendering the sense of dharma, it is only in so far as it is a human expression of equilibrium or harmony, that is to say, of one of the aspects of the maintenance of cosmic stability. With even stronger reason, an idea of 'virtue' can apply here only in the measure that it indicates that the actions of a being are in conformity with its own nature, and by this very fact, with the total order that has its reflection or image in the nature of each. Similarly again, if one considers a human community and no longer an isolated individuality, the idea of 'legislation' is incorporated into that of dharma only because such legislation must normally be an adaptation of cosmic order to the social environment; and this character is particularly visible in that which concerns the institution of the castes, as we shall sde in a following article. Thus, are explained in short all the secondary meanings of the word dharma. There is a difficulty only when one wishes to consider them separately and without seeing how they are derived from a common principle, which is, one could say, a sort of fundamental unity to which their multiplicity is reduced. [4]
Before concluding this survey, we must still, to situate the notion of dharma more exactly, indicate the place it occupies among the goals that traditional Hindu scriptures assign to human life. These goals are four in number and are enumerated thus, in a hierarchically ascending order: artha, kāma, dharma, moksa; this last, that is to say 'Deliverance', is the single supreme goal, and, being beyond the domain of manifestation, is of a quite different order to the other three, and without common measure with them, as the absolute is without common measure with the relative. As for the first three goals, which all relates to the manifest; artha comprises the entirety of benefits of the corporal order; kāma is desire, whose satisfaction constitutes well-being of
the psychic order; dharma being superior to kāma, must be considered as having a realisation arising properly from the spiritual order, that which accords in effect with the universal character we have recognised in it. It naturally follows however that all these goals including dharma itself, being always contingent, like the manifestation outside of which they could not be envisaged, can only ever be subordinate in relation to the supreme goal, vis-à-vis which they are nothing more, in short, than simple means. Each of these same goals is, moreover, subordinate also to those that are higher than it, while still remaining relative. But, when they alone are enumerated, to the exclusion of moksa, it is, then, a question of a point of view limited to a consideration of the manifest, and it is only, thus, that dharma can sometimes appear as the highest goal proposed for man. Besides, we shall in due course see that these goals more particularly correspond respectively to the different varnas. [5] And we can now say that this correspondence resides essentially in the theory of the three gunas, which shows clearly that, here again, the human order appears as indissolubly entwined with the whole cosmic order, in its entirety.