14 CONCLUSION
Some may be tempted to reproach us for having too seriously discussed theories which are themselves not really serious. Several years ago, truth to tell, we were somewhat of this opinion and would at that time certainly have hesitated to undertake a work of this kind; but the situation has changed. That it has been greatly aggravated is a fact which cannot be concealed, and this provides occasion for reflection: if from day to day spiritism grows more intrusive, if it really threatens to poison the public mentality, it is necessary to take it into consideration and to combat it by means other than those one might employ were it only the aberration of a few isolated individuals without influence. Certainly, spiritism is stupidity; but what is terrible is that this stupidity has reached a point where it exercises an extraordinarily wide action, proving that it corresponds to quite general tendencies. And this is why we just said that one cannot neglect the question of opportunity. As it is not possible to attack all errors without exception-for they are innumerable-it is better to leave to one side those that are relatively inoffensive and have no chance of success. But spiritism, unfortunately, is not one of these. It is only too easy, certainly, to mock the 'table turners' and the 'exhibitors of spirits', to make sensible men laugh at their expense by showing up all their extravagances (some of which we have called attention to), to denounce the deceits of false mediums, to decry the grotesque characters encountered in spiritist circles. But all this is insufficient. Other weapons than ridicule are necessary; moreover, what is involved is something too injurious to be really comic, even though in fact it is comic on more than one count.
Doubtless it will be further charged that the arguments we have
expounded are too difficult to grasp, that they have the drawback of not being within everyone's compass. This may be true in some measure, even though we have always tried to be as clear as possible. But we are not among those who believe it good to conceal certain difficulties or to simplify things to the detriment of the truth. We believe, moreover, that nothing must be exaggerated, that one would be wrong to let oneself be rebutted by the somewhat arid appearance of certain demonstrations, and that everyone can understand enough to be convinced of the falsity of spiritism. Basically, all this is simpler than it may seem at first glance to those not accustomed to such things. For the rest, as with all questions, it cannot be expected that everything will be equally comprehensible to everyone without exception, for there are necessarily intellectual differences between men. Those who understand only in part must turn to those who have greater competence and understand more. This is not an appeal to 'authority', for it is only a question of supplementing a natural insufficiency; and we wish everyone would try to go as far as his capabilities allow. We only note an inequality against which no one can do anything, and which does not only manifest itself in what concerns metaphysics.
In conclusion, we say again that it is only by placing oneself at a purely metaphysical point of view that the falsity of spiritism can be absolutely established; there is no other means of demonstrating that its theories are absurd, that is to say that they represent only impossibilities. All the rest is only approximation, more or less plausible reasons which are never rigorous enough or fully sufficient and which always leave room for discussion. On the contrary, in the metaphysical order, comprehension necessarily entails immediate assent and certitude. When we speak of approximations, we do not have in mind so-called sentimental arguments, which are valueless, and we do not understand why some adversaries of spiritism obstinately cultivate such platitudes; acting in this way, they risk demonstrating that true intellectuality is as lacking in themselves as it is in those whom they would combat. We mean scientific and philosophical arguments; but if any of these have any value, it is quite relative, and nothing of all this can take the place of a definitive refutation; things must be carried to a higher level. We can therefore claim,
without fear of being contradicted, that we have not only done something else, but have done much more than all that has been done hitherto in this field. We are all the more at ease in saying that the merit does not accrue to us personally but to the doctrine which is our inspiration and in regard to which individualities count for nothing. What must be attributed only to us, on the contrary, are the imperfections of our exposé, for there surely are some, notwithstanding all the care we have taken.
Moreover, and as we announced at the outset, the refutation of spiritism, apart from its intrinsic interest, has enabled us to express certain important truths. Metaphysical truths especially, even when they are formulated apropos of an error or to respond to certain objections, nonetheless have an eminently positive bearing. We would certainly much prefer to expound truth purely and simply, without concerning ourselves with all the accessory complications that come with incomprehension; but in this regard, too, one must take opportunity into account. Looking to results, moreover, this state of affairs may present certain advantages; the fact that the presentation of truth is occasioned by such and such a contingency may attract the attention of persons who are not incapable of understanding it, but who, not having engaged in special studies, may wrongly imagine that such truth is beyond them, persons to whom it may not have occurred to seek out truth in treatises too didactic in aspect. We can never insist too much that true metaphysics is not the affair of specialists, that intellectual comprehension has nothing in common with a purely 'bookish' knowledge, that it differs totally from erudition and even from ordinary science. What we have elsewhere called the 'intellectual elite' [1] does not appear to us as necessarily composed of scientists and philosophers, and we even think that very few of them would have the qualifications required to be part of it. For this it is necessary to be much more unprejudiced than is ordinarily the case with such men, and someone who is ignorant but can grow often has greater resources than someone in whom certain mental habits have imprinted an irremediable deformity.
Beyond the metaphysical truths which have served as the principle of our refutation, we have also indicated several others, notably with respect to the explanation of phenomena. These latter are only secondary in our view, but they are nevertheless of some interest. We hope that no one will be stopped by the strangeness of some of these considerations, which will offend only those animated by a most deplorable systematizing point of view; but it is not these whom we address, for this would be wasted effort. We would fear, rather, that too much attention might be attached to these things, either because of their unaccustomed character or because they pertain to the phenomenal order. In any event, we will not have to reproach ourselves for neglecting needed precautions and warnings in this regard, and we are convinced that we have not said anything more than was strictly necessary to dispel confusions and misunderstandings and to cut short false interpretations. Even apart from the reserve imposed in regard to certain points, we do not claim to have treated exhaustively all the subjects we have been led to raise. There are questions that we may have occasion to take up again, as there are those on which our information (as we said at the beginning) will open for others ways of research they do not suspect. The only thing we cannot encourage is experimentation, the results of which are never valuable enough to compensate for certain unpleasant consequences, and in many cases even certain dangers. If, however, there are men who are determined at all costs to experiment, it is surely preferable that they do so from a serious basis rather than from absurd or at the very least erroneous data. But again, we are persuaded that there is nothing in what we have said that anyone can use to launch themselves into more or less unfortunate adventures. And we believe, on the contrary, that the nature of our treatise would rather turn away the imprudent by providing them a glimpse of all they lack in order to succeed in such enterprises.
We will add only one last reflection: in our view the history of spiritism is only an episode in the formidable mental deviation that characterizes the modern West. In order to understand this deviation it is therefore needful to place it within the whole of which it is a part. But for this it is obvious that one must go much further back in order to grasp the origins and causes of the deviation, then
to follow its course with its multiple phases. That is an immense task, no part of which has been done. History, as officially taught, limits itself to exterior events, which are only the effects of something deeper; and it sets these events forth in a tendentious manner under the influence of all the modern prejudices. And further, there is a veritable monopoly on historical studies in the interest of parties, both political and religious. We wish that someone particularly competent might have the courage to denounce, with supporting proofs, the maneuvers by which Protestant historians have succeeded in assuring for themselves a de facto monopoly, and have come to impose as a kind of suggestion their own point of view along with their conclusions even within Catholic circles. That would be a very instructive task and would render a significant service. This falsification of history seems to have been accomplished according to a set plan; but if this is so, and its essential aim has been to have public opinion consider this deviation as 'progress', everything seems to indicate that it must be the work of a directing will. For the moment, at least, we do not wish to be more positive in this regard; in any case, it can only be a collective will, for there is manifestly something that goes beyond the sphere of activity of individuals considered in isolation. Furthermore, this way of speaking of a collective will is perhaps a more or less defective representation. Whatever the case, if one does not believe in chance, one is forced to admit the existence of some kind of equivalent of an established plan, but one which evidently does not need to be formulated in any document. Is not the fear of certain discoveries of this kind one reason for the superstition of the 'written document' as the exclusive basis of the 'historical method'? Starting from there, all that is essential necessarily escapes investigation; and to those who might wish to go further, the objection is quickly made that this is no longer 'scientific', which is supposed to render any further discussion unnecessary. This is nothing but the abuse of erudition to limit 'intellectual horizons' and to keep people from seeing certain things clearly. Does this not enable one to understand why such methods, which make erudition an end in itself, are rigorously imposed by university authorities? But to return to the question we were discussing: having admitted a plan, whatever its form, one can
see how each element might converge toward its realization, and how such and such individuals might be able to serve as conscious or unconscious instruments for its effectuation. Recall here what we have said regarding the origins of spiritism, which is that it is impossible to believe in the spontaneous production of movements of any importance. In reality, things are more complex than we indicated; instead of a single will, we should envisage several intentions as well as several results; there could be a whole special 'dynamic' in this, the laws of which would be interesting to ascertain. We say this only to show how the truth is far from being generally known or even suspected, in this domain as in many others. In short, all history would need to be rewritten on entirely different presuppositions; but, unfortunately, many interests are involved, and those who might wish to undertake such a task would have to overcome redoubtable resistance. This cannot be our task, for it is not properly our field; for our part we can only provide some indications and glimpses. Such a task, moreover, could only be undertaken collectively. In any case, this is an order of research that, in our view, is much more interesting and profitable than psychic experimentation. It obviously demands aptitudes not possessed by everyone, but we believe there are some at least who do have these aptitudes and who might advantageously apply themselves in this direction. On the day when an appreciable result of such efforts might be obtained, many 'suggestions' would thereby become impossible. Perhaps this might be one means of contributing in the more or less distant future to a return of the Western mentality to normative ways, ways from which it has been so greatly removed for several centuries.