LA KABBALE JUIVE OF PAUL VULLIAUD
Up to now there has existed no serious body of work for the study of the Kabbalah; indeed, the book by Adolphe Frank, despite his reputation, showed how its author, imbued as he is with university prejudices and completely ignorant of Hebrew, was incapable of understanding the subject he undertook to treat. As for certain compilations that are as indigestible as they are fanciful, like that of Papus, better not to speak of them at all. Thus there was a regrettable gap to fill, and it seemed to us that the important work of Paul Vulliaud [1] was destined precisely for that purpose. However, although this work has been done very conscientiously and contains many interesting things, we must confess that on reading it we have felt a certain disappointment.
This work, which we would have been happy to recommend unreservedly, does not give what its very general title seems to promise, and the contents of the book are far from being without defect. Indeed, the subtitle 'Critical Essay' should have put us on guard as to the spirit in which this book was conceived, for we know only too well what the word 'critical' means when used by 'official' scholars; but since Vulliaud does not belong to this category we were at first merely surprised that he had used an expression susceptible to such an unfortunate interpretation. Later we began to understand the purpose which the author wished to hint at in this way; we found it expressed very clearly in a note where he declares
that he had assigned himself a 'double goal': 'To treat of the Kabbalah and its history, then at the same time to explicate the scientific method by which well-respected authors work.' (vol. 2, p206.)
Thus it was not a case of following the authors in question or of adopting their prejudices, but on the contrary of combatting them, for which we can only congratulate him. But he wished to oppose them on their own ground and as it were with their own weapons, and it is for this reason that he became, so to speak, the critic of the critics themselves. Indeed, he too places himself at the point of view of pure and simple erudition; but although he did this voluntarily, one might ask to what extent this attitude has been truly useful and beneficial. Vulliaud denies that he is a Kabbalist; and he does so with an insistence that surprises us and that we find hard to understand. Could he be one of those who glory in being 'profane' and who, up till now, we had for the most part only met in 'official' circles, those toward which he has himself given proof of a just severity? He even goes so far as to qualify himself as a 'simple amateur', but in this we believe he maligns himself. Is he not depriving himself of a good part of the authority he would need when addressing those authors whose assertions he questions? In addition, this bias of looking at a doctrine from the 'profane' point of view, that is, 'from the outside', seems to us to exclude all possibility of a profound comprehension. And furthermore, even if this attitude is only affected, it is no less regrettable since, although he has attained the aforesaid comprehension on his own account, he thus obliges himself to show nothing of it and so the interest of the doctrinal part will be greatly diminished. As for the critical part, the author will look more like a polemicist than a qualified judge, which for him is a manifest inferiority. Besides, two goals for one single work is probably one too many, and in Vulliaud's case it is very regrettable that, as noted above, the second of these goals too often causes him to forget the first, which is however by far the more important. Indeed, discussions and criticisms follow one another right through his book, even in chapters whose titles seem rather to point to a subject of a purely doctrinal order; one comes away with a certain impression of disorder and confusion. On the other hand, if among Vulliaud's criticisms there are some that are perfectly justified, for example those concerning Renan and Frank and also certain occultists, the latter being the most numerous, there are others that are more debatable, in particular those concerning Fabre d'Olivet, toward whom the author seems to direct an echo of certain rabbinical hatreds (unless he inherited the hatred of Napoleon himself for the author of Hermeneutic Interpretation of the Origin of the Social State of Man and of the Destiny of the Adamic Race, but this second hypothesis is much less likely). [2] In any case, even for the most legitimate criticisms, those that can be held to destroy usurped reputations, would it not have been possible to say the same things more briefly, and especially more seriously and in a less aggressive tone? The work would certainly have gained by it, first because it would not have given the appearance of a polemical work, an aspect which he too often presents and which ill-intentioned people could easily use against him, and more seriously, the essential would have been sacrificed less to considerations that are really only secondary and of rather minor interest. There are still other regrettable faults: the imperfections of form are sometimes embarrassing; we do not mean only printing errors, which are quite numerous and of which the errata only rectify a very small part, but too frequent inaccuracies that are difficult, even with the best of goodwill, to impute to the typography. Thus, there are various 'slips' which are truly inopportune. We have noted a certain number, and, curiously enough, these are found especially in the second volume, as if it had been written more hastily. For example, Frank was not a 'professor of philosophy at Stanislas College' (p241), but at the Collège de France, which is something quite different. Also, Vulliaud writes 'Cappelle', and sometimes also 'Capele' for the Hebraist Louis Cappel, whose exact name we can establish with all the more certainty since, while writing this article, we have his own signature before us. Would Vulliaud have seen this name only in a latinized form? All this is nothing much, but, on the other hand, on page 26, it is a question of a divine name of 26 letters, and we find later that it has 42. This passage is truly incomprehensible and we wonder whether
there has not been some omission here. We will point out yet another piece of negligence of the same order, but one all the more serious in that it leads to a real injustice: criticizing an editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vulliaud ends with this sentence:
One could not expect sound logic from an author who in the same article maintains that people have underestimated the Kabbalistic doctrines (absurdly overestimated) and at the same time that the Zohar is a farrago of absurdity (vol. 2, p418).
The English words were cited by Vulliaud himself; now, overestimated does not mean 'sous-estimé' (which would be underestimated), but on the contrary 'surestimé', which is precisely the opposite, and thus, whatever may be the errors contained in that author's article, the contradictions for which he is reproached are in no way found in it. Assuredly, these things are only details, but when one is so severe with others and is ever ready to catch them out, should one not try to be above reproach oneself? In the transcription of Hebrew words there is a lack of uniformity that is truly annoying; we know very well that no transcription can be perfectly exact, but when one has adopted one, whatever it may be, it would be preferable to at least hold to it consistently. Moreover, there are some terms which seem to have been translated much too hastily and for which it would not have been difficult to find a more satisfactory interpretation. For example, on page 49 of volume two, there is an image of teraphim on which is inscribed, among others, the word luz. The author has reproduced the different meanings of the verb luz given by Buxtorf, following each of them with a question mark because it seemed to him to be inappropriate, but he did not think that there might also exist a noun luz, which ordinarily means 'almond' or 'kernel' (and also 'almond tree', because it designates the tree and its fruit at the same time). Now, in rabbinic language this same noun is the name of a small indestructible bodily part to which the soul remains bound after death (it is curious to note that this Hebrew tradition probably inspired certain theories of Leibnitz); this last meaning is certainly the most plausible and this is moreover confirmed for us by the very place which the word luz occupies in the figure given.
The author sometimes makes the mistake of taking up in passing subjects about which he is obviously much less informed than he is on the Kabbalah, and which he could well have refrained from speaking about, and this would have avoided certain errors which, however excusable they may be (given that it is hardly possible to have the same competence in all fields), can only be prejudicial to a serious work. Thus we found (vol. 2, p377) a passage involving a would-be 'Chinese theosophy' in which we had some trouble recognizing Taoism, which is not 'theosophy' in any sense of the word, the proffered summary of which, made on the basis of we know not what source (no reference being given), is eminently fanciful. For example 'active nature', T’ien = heaven, is put in opposition to 'passive nature', Kouèn = earth; now Kouèn has never meant 'earth', and the expressions 'active nature' and 'passive nature' make us think much less of conceptions from the Far East than of Spinoza's 'nature naturante' and natura naturata. Two different dualities are here confused with the greatest naïveté, that of 'active perfection', Khien, and 'passive perfection', Kouèn (we say 'perfection' and not 'nature'), and that of 'heaven', tièn and 'earth', ti.
Since we have come to speak of Eastern doctrines, we will make another observation on this subject: after noting quite rightly the disagreement that prevails among Egyptologists and among other such 'specialists', and which makes it impossible to trust their opinions, the author points out that the same thing holds true of Indologists (vol. 2, p363), which is correct; but how does he not see that this last case is in no way comparable to the others? Indeed, we obviously have no direct means of verification regarding peoples like the ancient Egyptians and Assyrians, who disappeared without leaving any legitimate successors, and we are certainly right in entertaining some skepticism as to the value of fragmentary and hypothetical reconstitutions. On the contrary, for India and China, whose civilizations have continued down to our own time and are still living, it is quite possible to know what to believe; what matters is not so much what Indologists say but what Hindus themselves think. Vulliaud, who is careful to refer only to Hebrew sources in trying to understand the Kabbalah, is absolutely correct on this point, since the Kabbalah is Hebrew tradition itself, but could he
not admit that one should not act otherwise when studying other traditions?
There are other things that Vulliaud does not know much better than he does the doctrines of the Far East, but which ought to have been more accessible to him, if only because of the fact that they are Western. Thus, for example, Rosicrucianism, about which he scarcely seems to know more than the 'profane' and 'official' historians, and whose essentially Hermetic character seems to have escaped him; he only knows that it is something altogether different from the Kabbalah (the occultist and modern idea of a 'Kabbalistic Rosicrucianism' is indeed a pure fantasy), but to support this assertion and not rely on mere negation it would still be necessary to prove precisely that Kabbalah and Hermeticism are two entirely different traditional forms. Still in regard to Rosicrucianism, we do not believe it possible to 'generate a little sympathy for the dignitaries of classical science' by recalling that Descartes tried to contact the Rosicrucians during his stay in Germany (vol. 2, p235), for this fact is quite well known. But what is certain is that he was unsuccessful in his attempt, and that the very spirit of his works, which are as contrary as can be to all esoterism, is both the proof and explanation of this failure. It is surprising to see quoted, as a sign of Descartes' possible affiliation with the Brotherhood of the RoseCross, a dedication (that of the Thesaurus mathematicus) which is obviously ironic and in which one senses on the contrary all the resentment of a man who was unable to attain the affiliation he sought. Stranger still are Vulliaud's errors concerning Freemasonry. Immediately after making fun of Éliphas Lévi, who did indeed stack confusion upon confusion when he tried to speak of the Kabbalah, Vulliaud also says many no less amusing things when speaking of Freemasonry. We cite the following passage which was meant to establish that there is no link between the Kabbalah and Masonry:
On the limiting of Masonry to the European frontiers it can be observed that Masonry is universal, worldwide. Is it likewise kabbalistic among the Chinese and the Blacks? (vol. 2, p319).
Certainly the Chinese and African secret societies (of the latter particularly those of the Congo) had no connection with the Kabbalah,
but they had no more of a link with Masonry; and if this is not 'limited to the European frontiers' it is only because Europeans have introduced it to other parts of the world. And here is a statement no less curious: 'How does one explain such an anomaly [if it is admitted that Masonry is of Kabbalistic inspiration] as the Freemason Voltaire, who had nothing but scorn for the Jewish race?' Vulliaud seems unaware that Voltaire was received into the lodge 'The Nine Sisters' as a purely honorific gesture, and only six months before his death. On the other hand, even had he chosen a better example, this still would not have proven anything, for there are many Masons, we would even say the greatest number, and even those in the highest grades, to whom all real knowledge of Masonry is completely foreign (and we can include among them certain dignitaries of the Grand-Orient de France whom Vulliaud, doubtless letting himself be impressed by their titles, wrongly cites as authorities). Our author would have been better advised to invoke in support of his thesis the fact that in Germany and in Sweden there exist Masonic organizations from which Jews are strictly excluded; we believe that he knew nothing of this for he makes not the slightest allusion to it. It is interesting to extract from the note which ends the same chapter (p328) the following lines:
Various persons may reproach us for having argued as if there were only one single form of Masonry. We are not unaware of the anathemas of spiritualist Masonry against the Grand-Orient de France but when all is duly considered, we feel that the conflict between the two Masonic schools is only a family quarrel.
We will observe that there are not just 'two Masonic schools' but a very great number of them, and that the Grand-Orient de France, like that in Italy, is not recognized by the other organizations because it rejects certain landmarks or fundamental principles of Masonry, which constitutes, after all, a fairly serious 'quarrel' (whereas among the other 'schools' the divergences are far from being so great). As for the expression 'spiritualist Masonry', it corresponds to absolutely nothing, seeing that it is only an invention of certain occultists whose suggestions he is generally less eager to accept. A little further on he quotes as examples of 'spiritualist
Masonry' the Ku-Klux-Klan and the Orangists (we suppose that this means the Royal Order of Orange), that is, two purely Protestant organizations, which no doubt can count some Masons among their members but which have no more connection with Masonry than the secret societies of the Congo mentioned previously. Assuredly, Vulliaud has every right to be unaware of all these things and many others besides, and we do not think we should reproach him for that; but again, who obliged him to speak of them, given that these questions lie outside his subject and that he could not claim to know absolutely everything about this subject? In any case, if he had stuck to it, he would have had much less trouble gathering, at least on certain of those points, fairly exact information, rather than looking up a number of rare and unknown books that he takes pleasure in quoting with some ostentation.
Of course, all these reservations do not prevent us from recognizing the real merits of the work or from rendering homage to the considerable effort to which it bears witness; quite the contrary, if we have dwelt on his errors so much it is because we think we are rendering a service to an author in criticizing him on very precise points. Now we must say that Vulliaud, in contrast to modern authors who question it (and among them, strange to say, there are many Jews), has done a good job in establishing the antiquity of the Kabbalah as well as its specifically Jewish and strictly orthodox character. Indeed, it is the fashion among 'rationalist' critics to set the esoteric tradition against rabbinic exoterism, as if they were not two complementary aspects of one and the same doctrine. At the same time, he has exploded a certain number of myths that have been broadcast too widely (by those same 'rationalists') and that lack any basis, such as that which tries to link the Kabbalah to Neoplatonic doctrines, that which attributes the Zohar to Moses de Leon (thus making it a work dating only from the thirteenth century), that which claims Spinoza was a Kabbalist, and others of greater or lesser importance. Moreover, he has thoroughly established that the Kabbalah is not at all 'pantheistic' as some have claimed (doubtless because they think it can be linked to the theories of Spinoza which are truly 'pantheistic'); and he very rightly observes that 'this term has been strangely abused' and that it has been used without rhyme or reason for the most varied ideas with the sole intention of 'seeking to frighten' (vol. 1, p429), and also, we might add, because one thus thinks oneself freed from any further discussion. This absurd accusation is gratuitously and very frequently raised against all Eastern doctrines; but it always produces its desired effect on certain timid minds, although by being used abusively the word 'pantheism' ends by no longer meaning anything. When will it be understood that names invented by systems of modern philosophy are applicable to them alone? Vulliaud further shows that a so-called 'mystical philosophy' of the Jews, different from the Kabbalah, is something that has never existed in reality, but on the contrary he is wrong to use the word 'mysticism' to qualify the said Kabbalah. Doubtless that depends on the meaning one gives to this word, and the one he indicates (which would make it almost a synonym of 'Gnosticism' or transcendent knowledge) would be tenable if one did not have to worry about etymology, for it is precisely true that 'mysticism' and 'mystery' have one and the same root (vol. 1, pp124 and 131-132); but in the end it is necessary to take into account the established usage, which has modified and considerably restricted its meaning. On the other hand, it is not possible for us to accept in either one of these two cases the affirmation that 'mysticism is a philosophical system' (p126); and if the Kabbalah too often takes a 'philosophical' appearance in Vulliaud's work, this is a result of the 'outside' point of view he wishes to maintain. For us, the Kabbalah is far more metaphysical than philosophical and more initiatic than mystical; one day we shall have a chance to expound the essential differences that exist between the way of initiates and that of mystics (which, let us note in passing, correspond respectively to the 'dry way' and the 'humid way' of the alchemists). [3] However that may be, the varied results we have noted could henceforth be considered as definitely established if the incomprehension of some so-called scholars did not always come along to put everything in doubt again by going back to a historical point of view to which Vulliaud has accorded (we are tempted to say 'unfortunately', without however failing to recognize its relative importance) too great an importance compared with the
properly doctrinal point of view. With regard to the latter, we will note as particularly interesting the chapters in the first volume concerning En-Soph and the Sephiroth (chap. 60), the Shekinah and Metatron (chap. 13), although it would have been desirable to find more elaborations and precision there, as well as in the chapter where the Kabbalistic methods are explained (chap. 5). Indeed, we wonder whether those who have no previous knowledge of the Kabbalah would be sufficiently enlightened by reading them.
With regard to what could be called the applications of the Kabbalah, which although secondary with respect to the pure doctrine are certainly not to be neglected, we will mention in the second volume the chapter devoted to ritual (chap. 14) and those devoted to amulets (chap. 15) and to Messianic ideas (chap. 16); these contain things that are really new or at least fairly little known; in particular, one finds in chapter sixteen numerous items of information on the social and political side which contribute in great part to give to the Kabbalistic tradition its clearly and properly Jewish character. Taken as a whole, Vulliaud's work seems to us particularly capable of rectifying a large number of false ideas, which is certainly something, and even a great deal, but perhaps not enough for such an important work and one which wishes to be more than a mere introduction. If the author one day brings out a new edition, it is to be hoped that he will separate the doctrinal part as completely as possible, appreciably curtail the first part, and expand the second, even if in doing so he runs the risk of no longer passing as the 'mere amateur', to which role he has been too keen to confine himself.
To end this discussion of Vulliaud's book we offer a few more observations on a question that particularly merits attention and that has a certain connection with what we have already explained more especially in our study The King of the World; we mean that concerning the Shekinah and Metatron. In its most general sense, the Shekinah is the 'real presence' of the Divinity; the first thing we must point out is that the passages of scripture which particularly mention it are especially those concerning the establishment of a spiritual center: the construction of the Tabernacle and the erection of the Temples of Solomon and Zorobabel. Such a center, established in regularly defined conditions, must be the place of divine
manifestation, always represented as a 'Light'; and although Vulliaud denies any connection between the Kabbalah and Masonry (even though he recognizes that the symbol of the 'Great Architect' is a metaphor customary among rabbis), the expression 'a regular and well-illuminated place' which Masonry has preserved really seems to be a memory of the ancient sacerdotal science that presided over the construction of the temples and that moreover is not peculiar to Jews. It is useless for us to tackle here the theory of 'spiritual influences' (we prefer this expression to 'benedictions' to translate the Hebrew berakoth, all the more because that is the meaning very clearly preserved in the Arabic word barakah); but even considering things from this point of view alone it would be possible to explain the statement of Elias Levita which Vulliaud reports: 'The Masters of the Kabbalah have great secrets on this subject.' Now the question is all the more complex because the Shekinah presents itself under multiple aspects. It has two principal aspects, one interior and the other exterior (vol. 1, p495), but here Vulliaud could have explained himself a little more clearly than he did, all the more so because, in spite of his intention to treat only the 'Jewish Kabbalah', he has pointed out precisely 'the connections between the Jewish and Christian theologies with respect to the Shekinah' (p493). Now in the Christian tradition there is a phrase that very clearly describes the two aspects of which he speaks: Gloria in excelsis Deo, et in terra Pax hominibus bonae Voluntatis. The words Gloria and Pax refer respectively to the inner aspect, with respect to the Principle, and to the outer aspect, with respect to the manifested world; and if one considers these two words in this way one immediately understands why they are pronounced by the Angels (Malakim) to announce the birth of 'God with us' or 'in us' (Emmanuel). For the first aspect, it would also be possible to recall the theory of the theologians on the 'Light of Glory' in which and by which is accomplished the beatific vision (in excelsis). For the second aspect, we will say further that 'Peace' in its esoteric sense is everywhere mentioned as the spiritual attribute of the spiritual centers established in this world (terra). On the other hand, the Arabic word Sakinah, which is obviously identical with the Hebrew word, is translated by 'Great Peace', the exact equivalent of the Pax Profunda of the Rosicrucians; and in this way
it would doubtless be possible to explain what they meant by the 'Temple of the Holy Spirit'. One could likewise precisely interpret a certain number of Gospel texts, all the more so as 'the secret tradition concerning the Shekinah would have some connection with the light of the Messiah' (p503). Is it thus without meaning it that, in making this last remark, Vulliaud says that it is a question of the tradition 'reserved to those who follow the way which leads to Pardes, that is, as we have explained elsewhere, to the supreme spiritual center? This leads us to observe that when, a little further on, it is a question of a 'mystery relating to the Jubilee' (p506), which is related in a certain sense to the idea of 'Peace', he cites the following text from the Zohar (III, p586):
The river which flows out of Eden bears the name of Jobel, like that of Jeremiah (17:8): 'It will extend its roots by the river,' from which it follows that the central idea of the Jubilee is the return of all things to their primitive state.
It is clear that this involves the return to the 'primordial state' envisaged by all traditions and which we dealt with in our study The Esoterism of Dante; and when we add from Vulliaud that 'the return of all things to their first state will announce the Messianic era' (p507), those who have read that essay will recall what we said there about the links between the 'Terrestrial Paradise' and the 'Heavenly Jerusalem. [4] On the other hand, what is involved here, everywhere and always, in the different phases of cyclic manifestation, is the Pardes, the center of this world, which the traditional symbolism of all peoples compares to the heart, center of the being and 'divine residence' (Brahma-pura in Hindu doctrine), like the tabernacle which is its image and which, for that reason, is called in Hebrew mishkan or 'abode of God' (p493), a word with the same root as the word Shekinah. From another point of view, the Shekinah is the synthesis of the Sephiroth; now in the sephirotic tree, the 'right-hand column' is the side of Mercy and the 'left-hand column' is the side of Rigor; we must therefore find these two aspects in the Shekinah also. Indeed 'if man sins and withdraws from the Shekinah, he falls under
the influence of the powers (Sārim) subject to Rigor' (p507) and then the Shekinah is called the 'hand of rigor', which immediately recalls the well-known symbol of the 'hand of justice'. But if on the contrary man draws near to the Shekinah, he is freed, and the Shekinah is the 'right hand' of God, that is to say that the 'hand of justice' then becomes the 'hand that blesses'. These are the mysteries of the 'House of Justice' (Beith-Din), which is yet another name of the supreme spiritual center; and we hardly need point out that the two sides we have considered are those into which the elect and the damned are divided in the Christian representations of the 'Last Judgment'. One could likewise establish a parallel between the two ways which the Pythagoreans represented by the letter 'Y' and which were symbolized exoterically by the myth of Hercules between Virtue and Vice; by the two doors, celestial and infernal, which among the Latins were associated with the symbolism of Janus; and by the two cyclical phases, ascending and descending which among the Hindus were likewise associated with the symbolism of Ganesha. Finally, it is easy to understand what is truly meant here when we consider such expressions as 'right intention' and 'goodwill' (Pax hominibus bonae voluntatis, and those familiar with the numerous symbols to which we have alluded will see that it is not without reason that Christmas coincides with the winter solstice), when one is careful to leave aside all the outward, philosophical and moral interpretations that have been given them from the Stoics to Kant.
'The Kabbalah gives to the Shekinah a 'twin' [parèdre], which bears names identical to its own, and which accordingly possesses the same characteristics' (pp496-498) and which naturally has as many different aspects as the Shekinah; its name is Metatron, and this name is numerically equal to that of Shaddaï, the 'All Powerful' (which is said to be the name of the God of Abraham). The etymology of the word Metatron is very uncertain, and Vulliaud reports several hypotheses, one of which derives it from the Chaldean Mitra which means 'rain', and which through its root also has a certain connection with 'light'. Even if this is so, the resemblance with the Hindu and Zoroastrian Mitra does not constitute a sufficient reason to admit a borrowing by Judaism from foreign doctrines, any more
than the role attributed to rain in different Eastern traditions constitutes a borrowing; and on this subject we will point out that Jewish tradition speaks of a 'dew of light' emanating from the 'Tree of Life', by means of which the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished (p99), and also of an 'effusion of dew' which represents the celestial influence spread to all worlds ( p 465 ), and which curiously recalls the symbolism of the alchemists and Rosicrucians.
'The term Metatron includes all such meanings as guardian, Lord, envoy, mediator' (p499); he is the 'Angel of the Face' and also 'Prince of the World' (Sār ha-ōlam); he is the 'author of theophanies, of divine manifestations in the sensible world' (p492). We will readily admit that he is the 'Celestial Pole'; and since this has its reflection in the 'Terrestrial Pole' with which it is directly related along the 'World Axis', is this not the reason why it is said that Metatron himself was Moses' teacher? Let us further cite these lines:
His name is Mikaël, the 'High Priest' who is holocaust and oblation before God. And all that the Israelites do on earth is accomplished in conformity with what happens in the celestial world. The Great Pontiff here below symbolizes Mikaël, prince of Clemency.... In all the passages where Scripture speaks of the appearance of Mikaël, the glory of the Shekinah is involved.' (pp500-501.)
What is said here of the Israelites can be said of all peoples who possess a truly orthodox tradition; all the more must it be said of the representatives of the primordial tradition, from which all the others derive and to which they are all subordinate. On the other hand, Metatron not only has the aspect of Clemency but also that of Justice; in the celestial world he is not only the 'High Priest' (Kohen hagadol) but also the 'High Prince' (Sär ha-gadol), which amounts to saying that in him is found the principle of royal power as well as that of the sacerdotal or pontifical power to which the function of 'mediator' properly corresponds. It should also be noted that Melek, 'king', and Maleak, 'angel' or 'messenger', are really two forms of the same word; moreover, Malaki, 'my messenger' (that is to say, the messenger of God, or 'the angel in which is God', maleak ha-Elohim) is the anagram of Mikaël. It is fitting to add that although as we have
seen Mikaël is identified with Metatron, he represents only one aspect of him; besides the luminous face there is also a dark face, and we touch here upon other mysteries. Indeed, it may seem strange that Samael is also named Sär ha-ōlam, and we are a little surprised that Vulliaud was content to register this fact without the least comment (p512). It is this last aspect, and this one only, that is in an inferior sense 'the guardian spirit of this world', the Princeps huius mundi mentioned in the Gospel; and this relationship with Metatron, of which he is like the shadow, justifies the use of the same name in a double meaning, and leads one to understand at the same time why the apocalyptic number 666 is also a solar number (it is formed in particular from the name Sorath, demon of the Sun, and opposed as such to the angel Mikaël). Moreover, Vulliaud remarks that according to Saint Hippolyte, 'the Messiah and the Antichrist both have for an emblem the lion' (vol. 2, p373), which is also a solar symbol; and the same observation could be made for the serpent and for many other symbols. From the Kabbalistic point of view it is again a question of the two opposite faces of Metatron; in a more general way one could develop on the basis of this question of the double meaning of symbols an entire theory that does not yet seem to have been clearly expounded. We will not dwell further, at least for the moment, on this side of the question, which is perhaps one of those where one encounters, in trying to explain it, the greatest difficulties.
But let us return to the Shekinah: this is represented in the lower world by the last of the ten Sephiroth, which is called Malkuth, that is to say the 'Kingdom', a designation quite worthy of comment from our point of view (as much as is Tsedek, 'the Just', which is sometimes a synonym of it); and Malkuth is the 'reservoir into which flow the waters which come from the river on high, that is, all the emanations (graces or spiritual influences) which it pours out in abundance' (vol. 1, p509). This 'river from on high' and the waters that come from it strangely recall the role attributed to the celestial river Gangā in the Hindu tradition, and one could also point out that the Shakti, of which the Gangā is one aspect, does not lack a certain analogy with the Shekinah, were it only by reason of the 'providential' function common to them both. We know well that
the habitual exclusivism of Judaic ideas is not at ease with such comparisons, but they are none the less real, and for us who are not in the habit of allowing ourselves to be influenced by certain prejudices, they present a very great interest because they are a confirmation of the essential doctrinal unity hidden under the apparent diversity of outward forms.
The reservoir of the celestial waters is naturally identical with the spiritual center of our world, from which well up the four rivers of Pardes, making their way to the four cardinal points. For the Hebrews, this spiritual center is the holy Mt Zion, to which they give the name 'heart of the world', and which thus becomes for them the equivalent of the Meru of the Hindus or the Alborj of the Persians. 'The Tabernacle of the Holiness of Jehovah, the residence of the Shekinah, is the Holy of Holies which is the heart of the Temple that is itself the center of Zion (Jerusalem), as Holy Zion is the center of the Land of Israel, and as the land of Israel is the center of the world' (p509).
It is also in this way that Dante presents Jerusalem as the 'spiritual pole', as we have explained elsewhere; [5] but when one departs from the properly Judaic point of view, this representation becomes above all symbolic and no longer constitutes a localization in the strict sense of the word. All secondary spiritual centers, established in view of different adaptations of the primordial tradition to given conditions, are images of the supreme center. Zion may really be only one of the secondary centers, but despite this it can be identified symbolically with the supreme center by virtue of this analogy; and what we have already said regarding the 'Holy Land', which is not only the Land of Israel, will enable us to understand this more easily. Another very remarkable expression, as a synonym of 'Holy Land', is 'Land of the Living'; it is said that 'the Land of the Living comprises seven lands', and Vulliaud remarks in this connection that 'this land is Canaan, in which there were seven peoples' (vol. 2. pII6).
Doubtless this is correct in the literal sense; but would not these seven lands correspond symbolically to the seven Dvipas which,
according to the Hindu tradition, have Meru as their common center? And if this is so, when the ancient worlds or the creations anterior to ours are represented by the 'seven kings of Edom' (the number is related to the seven 'days' of Genesis), is there not a resemblance, too strongly emphasized to be accidental, to the ages of the seven Manus that have elapsed from the beginning of the Kalpa up to the present time? We present these few thoughts only as an example of conclusions it is possible to draw from the information contained in Vulliaud's work; unfortunately, it is much to be feared that most readers may not be able to perceive this and draw conclusions from it on their own. But by following up our critique with more doctrinal considerations, we have done a little, within the limits we necessarily had to set ourselves, of what we would have hoped to find in Vulliaud himself.