13 MĪMĀNSĀ
The word mīmānsā literally means 'profound thought'; it is applied in a general way to the meditative study of the Veda, its purpose being to determine the precise meaning of shruti and to draw out the consequences implied in it, whether these belong to the practical or to the intellectual order. Interpreted in this way, Mīmānsā includes the two last of the six darshanas, and these are then entitled Pūrva-mīmānsā and Uttara-mīmānsā, that is to say the first and second Mīmānsā, referring respectively to the two orders mentioned above. The first mīmānsā is also entitled Karma-mīmānsā, since it concerns the realm of action, while the second is called Brahma-Mīmānsā, as consisting essentially of the knowledge of Brahma; it should be noted that here it is the supreme Brahma and no longer Ishvara that is envisaged, the point of view being that of pure metaphysics. This second Mīmānsā properly constitutes the Vedānta; and when Mīmānsā without epithet is mentioned, as is the case in the present chapter, it is always the first Mīmānsā only that is intended.
The exposition of this darshana is attributed to Jaimini, and the method that it adopts is as follows: mistaken opinions about a question are first put forward, and then refuted, and finally the correct solution of the question is given as a conclusion of the whole discussion; this method of exposition offers a remarkable analogy with that adopted by the Scholastic doctrine of the Middle Ages in the West. As to the nature of the subjects treated, this is described, at the very beginning of the sūtras of Jaimini, as a study that aims at establishing the proofs and justifications of dharma in its connection with kārya or 'that which must be accomplished'. We have already dwelt sufficiently on the notion of dharma and on what is meant by conformity of action with dharma, which is precisely in question here; it should be recalled that the word karma bears a twofold meaning: in a general sense, it embraces action in all its forms, which is often opposed to jñāna or knowledge, a contrast which also answers to the distinction between the last two darshanas; in a more special and technical sense, karma means ritual action as enjoined by the Veda, and this latter meaning naturally occurs frequently in Mīmānsā, which sets itself the task of supplying the reasons for these ritual ordinances and of defining their scope.
Mīmānsā starts by considering the various pramānas or means of proof which are given by the logicians, with the addition of certain other sources of knowledge that lie outside their particular province; it would moreover be easy to reconcile the different classifications of these pramānas by looking on them simply as more or less developed and complete as the case may be, for they do not contradict one another in any way. Subsequently, a distinction is drawn between various classes of rules and injunctions, the most general line of division being between direct and indirect injunctions; the portion of the Veda that contains precepts is called brāhmana, in contradistinction to the portion called mantra or ritual formula, all that is contained in the Vedic texts being either mantra or brāhmana. However, the brāhmanas do not merely consist of precepts, since the Upanishads themselves, which are purely doctrinal and which form the foundation of Vedānta, enter into this category; but there is a practical class of brāhmana with which Mīmānsā is specially concerned and which sets out the manner of accomplishing rites, the conditions governing their performance, and their application to different circumstances; it also explains the significance of the symbolical elements that enter into these rites and indicates the mantras that can be suitably employed in each special case. Concerning the nature and efficacy of mantra, as also, in a more general way, concerning the traditional authority and non-human origin of the Veda, Mīmānsā unfolds the theory of the perpetuity of sound which we alluded to before, with particular reference to the theory of the original and perpetual association of articulated sound with the sense of hearing, which makes of language something far deeper than a more or less arbitrary convention.
In addition, Mīmānsā expounds the theory of the infallibility of the traditional doctrine, an infallibility that must be conceived of as inherent in the doctrine itself and that consequently in no wise belongs to human individuals; they only participate in it insofar as they possess an effective knowledge of the doctrine and interpret it faithfully, and, even then, this infallibility must never be ascribed to individuals as such, but always to the doctrine expressing itself through them. That is why only those who know the integral Veda are qualified to compose authentic traditional scriptures, the authority of which is a participation in the authority of the primordial tradition whence it is derived and on which alone it is founded, without the individuality of the author playing the smallest part; this distinction in the traditional sphere between fundamental authority and derived authority is expressed by the terms shruti and smriti, which have already been mentioned in connection with the 'law of Manu'. The conception of infallibility as inherent in the doctrine alone is moreover common to both Hindus and Muslims; fundamentally, it is also the same conception that is applied by the Catholic church from its specifically religious point of view, since the pontifical authority, if regarded in its principle, appears as essentially bound up with a function, namely the authorized interpretation of the doctrine, and not with an individuality, for the latter is never infallible apart from the exercise of that function, under conditions strictly laid down.[1]
Owing to the nature of Mīmānsā, it is to this darshana that the ancillary sciences of the Veda known as the Vedāngas are most directly attached; we have previously described these sciences, and it is enough to refer to their descriptions in order to realize the close link between them and the present subject. Thus, Mīmānsā dwells with insistence on the importance, for the understanding of texts, of correct spelling and true pronunciation as taught by shikshā; it also distinguishes various classes of mantras, in accordance with the rhythm proper to each one, following the principles laid down by chhandas. And in addition, we find considerations relating to vyākarana, that is, to questions of grammar, such as the difference between the normal meaning of words and their dialectic or barbarous uses, as well as observations on certain special forms employed in the Veda, and on the terms which are applied there in an unusual sense; to this must be added, in many places, etymological and symbolical interpretations which fall within the province of nirukta. Lastly, a knowledge of jyotisha is required in order to decide the times when rites are to be accomplished, and as for kalpa, we have seen that it sums up the rules that govern their actual performance.
Over and above all this, Mīmānsā treats of a large number of questions of jurisprudence, and this should not be a cause for surprise since in the Hindu civilization all legislation is essentially traditional; a certain similarity is in fact noticeable in the manner in which debates at law and discussions of Mīmānsā are conducted, and there is even identity in the terms used to describe the successive phases in either case. This resemblance is certainly no accident, but it would be a mistake to see in it anything more than what it really is, namely a sign that one and the same spirit has been applied in two connected, though distinct, spheres of activity. This fact moreover reduces certain pretensions of the sociologists to their true value: impelled by the perverse habit, common among 'experts', of referring everything to their own special subject, they take advantage of every point of likeness in vocabulary that they can discover, particularly in the field of logic, in order to infer borrowings from social institutions, as if ideas and modes of reasoning could not exist independently of these institutions, which in truth only represent one application of necessarily pre-existing ideas. Some have tried to evade this issue, and to maintain the priority of the social point of view by inventing what they have called the 'pre-logical mentality'; but this strange theory, as well as their generally accepted conception of 'primitive peoples', does not rest on any serious basis; it is even contradicted by all that is known for certain about antiquity and it would be best to relegate it to the realms of pure fantasy, together with all the 'myths' that its inventors gratuitously ascribe to peoples whose real mentality they have failed to understand. There are quite enough real and profound differences between the modes of thought peculiar to every race and period, without inventing non-existent varieties, which complicate things much more than they explain them. Nor is it necessary to go and seek for the so-called primitive human type among the members of some degenerate tribe, which is no longer very certain about what it does think, but which at any rate has never possessed the thoughts that are attributed to it; but the real modes of human thought, excepting those of the modern West, lie just as much outside the understanding of sociologists as of orientalists.
To return from this digression to Mīmānsā, mention should be made of another idea that plays an important part in it: this notion, which goes by the name of apūrva, is one of those that are difficult to translate into the terms of a Western language; nevertheless, we shall try to give some idea of its meaning and implications. In the last chapter it was said that action, which is radically different from knowledge in this as in all else, does not carry its consequences within itself; in this respect, the opposition is, fundamentally, that between succession and simultaneity, for the very conditions governing every action make it impossible for it to produce its effects otherwise than in successive mode. However, for anything to be a cause, it must actually exist, for which reason the real causal relationship can only be conceived as a relationship of simultaneity; were it to be conceived as a relationship of succession, there would have to have been a moment when something that no longer existed produced something that had not yet come into existence, obviously an absurd suggestion. It follows then that if an action, which is itself but a momentary modification, is to have future and more or less remote results, it must have, at the moment of its accomplishment, an effect not immediately perceptible, yet which, subsisting at least in a relatively permanent fashion, is destined eventually to produce in its turn the perceptible result. It is this non-perceptible effect, potential in some measure, that is termed apūrva, because it is superimposed on and not anterior to the action; it may be looked on either as a posterior state of the action itself, or as an antecedent state of the result, since an effect must always be virtually contained in its cause, from which it could not otherwise proceed. Besides, even in the case where a given result seems to follow directly on the action without a pause, the intermediate existence of an apūrva is nonetheless necessary, given that there is still succession and not perfect simultaneity, and that the action, in itself, must always be separate from its result. In this fashion, the action escapes momentariness, and even, to some extent, the limitations of the temporal condition; in fact, the apūrva, germ of all its future consequences, since it does not belong to the realm of corporeal and sensible manifestation, is outside ordinary time, but not outside all duration, for it still belongs to the contingent order.
The apūrva can be regarded, on the one hand, as remaining attached to the being that has performed the action, since it is henceforth a constituent element of its individuality considered in its non-corporeal aspect, and will continue to exist as long as the individuality itself; on the other hand, it may also be regarded as quitting the limits of that individuality in order to enter the realm of potential energies of the cosmic order; in this second case, if one pictures it—to use an admittedly imperfect image—as a vibration sent out at a certain point, then this same vibration, having traveled to the furthest confines of the realm to which it has access, will return in a contrary direction to its point of departure, and this it will do, as causality demands, in the form of a reaction of like nature to the original action. This is in perfect agreement with the Taoist theory of 'concordant actions and reactions': inasmuch as every action, and also, in a more general sense, every manifestation, marks a rupture of equilibrium, as was pointed out when treating of the three gunas, a corresponding reaction is demanded in order to restore that equilibrium, since the sum of all differentiations must in the last instance be equivalent to the total indifferentiation. This theory, in which the human and cosmic orders meet, completes the idea that can be formed of the relationship between karma and dharma; and it must forthwith be added that a reaction, being a perfectly natural consequence of an action, is in no wise a 'sanction' in a moral sense: there is nothing in all this that provides any warrant for the moral point of view to assert itself, and indeed that point of view may well have been born of a failure to understand these things, resulting in a sentimental distortion. However that may be, the reaction, in its influence by rebound on the being that put forth the initial action, takes on again the individual and even temporal character which the intermediate apūrva had not retained; if that being is then no longer to be found in the state where it was originally situated, and which was but a passing mode of its manifestation, the same reaction, divested henceforth of the conditions characterizing the original individuality, can still reach the being in another state of manifestation, through the intermediary of those elements that ensure the continuity of this new state with the earlier state; it is here that the causal connection between the various cycles of existence becomes apparent, and whatever is true for a given being is also true, following the closest analogy, for the whole of universal manifestation.
If we have gone into these explanations at considerable length, it is not simply because we have here an interesting example of a certain type of Eastern theory, nor even because we shall later have occasion to refer to a false interpretation of this theory that has been put forward in the West; we have done so chiefly because this is a question which has a vast range of application, even in the practical field, though in respect of the latter an attitude of reserve is often advisable; it is preferable to be content with giving a few quite general indications, as we have done here, leaving to each individual the task of drawing from the theory those developments and conclusions that fall in best with his own aptitudes and personal tendencies.