METAPHYSICAL REALIZATION

WHEN DESCRIBING the essential features of metaphysics, we said that it constitutes an intuitive, or in other words, immediate knowledge, as opposed to the discursive and mediate knowledge that belongs to the rational order. Intellectual intuition is even more immediate than sensory intuition, for it is beyond the distinction between subject and object which the latter allows to subsist; it is at once the means of knowledge and the knowledge itself, and in it subject and object are identified. Indeed, no knowledge is really worthy of the name except insofar as it has the effect of bringing about such an identification, although in all cases other than that of intellectual intuition this identification always remains incomplete and imperfect; in other words, there is no true knowledge except that which participates to a greater or less extent in the nature of pure intellectual knowledge, which is the supreme knowledge. All other knowledge, being more or less indirect, has at best only a symbolic or representative value; the only genuinely effective knowledge is that which permits us to penetrate into the very nature of things, and if such a penetration may be effected up to a certain point in the inferior degrees of knowledge, it is only in metaphysical knowledge that it is fully and totally realizable.

The immediate consequence of this is that knowing and being are fundamentally but one and the same thing; they are, so to speak, two inseparable aspects of a single reality, being no longer even really distinguishable in that sphere where all is 'without duality'. This in itself is enough to show how purposeless are all the various 'theories of knowledge' with metaphysical pretensions which occupy such a prominent place in modern Western philosophy, sometimes even going so far, as in the case of Kant for example, as to absorb, or at least to dominate, everything else. The only reason for the existence of such theories arises from an attitude of mind shared by almost all modern philosophers and originating in the Cartesian dualism; this way of thinking consists in artificially opposing knowing and being, an opposition that is the negation of all true metaphysics. Modern philosophy thus ends by wishing to substitute the theory of knowledge for knowledge itself, which amounts to an open confession of impotence on its part; nothing is more characteristic in this respect than the following declaration of Kant: 'The chief and perhaps the only use of all philosophy of pure reason is, after all, exclusively negative, since it is not an instrument for extending knowledge, but a discipline for limiting it.'^[1] Do not such words amount purely and simply to saying that the only aim of philosophers should be to impose upon everyone else the narrow limits of their own understanding? Here we see an inevitable consequence of the systematic outlook, which, let it be repeated once more, is anti-metaphysical in the highest degree.

Metaphysics affirms the fundamental identity of knowing and being, which can only be questioned by those who are ignorant of the most elementary metaphysical principles; and since this identity is essentially implied in the very nature of intellectual intuition, it not merely affirms it but realizes it as well. This is true at least of integral metaphysics; but it must be added that such metaphysics as there has been in the West seems always to have remained incomplete in this respect. Nevertheless, Aristotle clearly laid down the principle of identification by knowledge, when he expressly declared that 'the soul is all that it knows.'^[2] But neither he himself nor his successors ever seem to have given this affirmation its full significance, or to have extracted all the consequences implied in it, so that for them it has remained something purely theoretical. Certainly this is better than nothing, but it is nevertheless very inadequate, and thus Western metaphysics appears to have been doubly incomplete: it is already so theoretically, as previously explained, in that it does not proceed beyond Being; on the other hand it only considers things, to the extent that it does consider them, in a purely theoretical light. Theory is regarded as if it were in some way self-sufficient, an end in itself, whereas it should normally be looked upon as nothing more than a preparation, indispensable as such we admit, leading to a corresponding realization.

It is necessary to say something at this point about the way in which we use the word 'theory': etymologically, its primary meaning is 'contemplation', and if it is taken thus, it might be said that metaphysics in its entirety, including the realization which it implies, is theory in the fullest sense; but usage has given the word a rather different and above all a much narrower meaning. In the first place, it has become usual to oppose theory and practice, and in its original sense, this antithesis, which meant the opposition of contemplation to action, would still be justifiable here, since metaphysics is essentially beyond the sphere of action, which is the sphere of individual contingencies; but the Western mentality, being turned almost exclusively toward action and being unable to conceive of any realization outside the sphere of action, has come to oppose theory and realization in a general sense. It is therefore this last opposition that we shall in fact accept, so as not to depart from common usage and in order to avoid any confusion that might arise owing to the difficulty of separating these terms from the meaning which rightly or wrongly is ordinarily attached to them; we will not go so far however as to qualify metaphysical realization as 'practical', for in current speech this word has remained inseparable from the idea of action which it originally expressed, and which is in no wise applicable here.

In all doctrines that are metaphysically complete, as are those of the East, theory is invariably accompanied or followed by an effective realization, for which it merely provides the necessary basis; no realization can be embarked upon without a sufficient theoretical preparation, but theory is ordained entirely with a view to this realization as the means toward the end, and this point of view is presupposed, or at least is tacitly implied, even in the exterior expression of the doctrine. On the other hand, in addition to theoretical preparation and subsequent to it, other means of effective realization of a very different kind may be brought into play; but these means also are destined simply to furnish a support or a point of departure, playing the part of 'aids' only, however important they may be in actual practice: this is indeed the reason for the existence of rites possessing a genuinely metaphysical character and import, to which we have already alluded. However, these rites, unlike theoretical preparation, are never regarded as an indispensable means, since they are only accessory and not essential, and the Hindu tradition, where they nevertheless hold an important place, is quite explicit in this respect; but they are capable nonetheless, by virtue of their own efficacy, of markedly facilitating metaphysical realization, that is to say the transformation of this virtual knowledge, which is all that theory amounts to, into effective knowledge.

Certainly, these considerations are likely to appear very strange to Western people, who have never even considered the possibility of anything of this kind; and yet, to be exact, a partial, though rather distant, analogy with metaphysical realization is to be found in the West in what may be called mystical realization. What we mean is that in the mystical states—taking the word 'mystical' in its current sense—there is present an effective element which makes of them something more than purely theoretical knowledge, although a realization of this nature is always inevitably limited. The very fact that such realization is of a purely religious character shows thereby that it is confined entirely to the individual domain; the mystical states are in no way supra-individual, since they only imply a more or less indefinite extension of purely individual possibilities; nevertheless, these possibilities are incomparably greater than is commonly supposed, going far beyond anything that the psychologists in particular are capable of conceiving, notwithstanding all that they try to force into their idea of the 'subconscious'. Realization of this kind cannot have a universal or metaphysical bearing, and it always remains subject to the influence of individual elements, chiefly of a sentimental order; this indeed is the essential characteristic of the religious point of view, only here it is more accentuated than anywhere else; and it must furthermore be pointed out that the confusing of the intellectual and the sentimental orders is likely to prove a frequent source of illusions. Finally, it should be noted that this realization, always fragmentary and rarely controlled, does not presuppose any theoretical preparation: religious rites certainly do play the same part of 'supports' in relation to it as is played elsewhere by the metaphysical rites, but in itself it is independent of religious theory, that is to say of theology; nevertheless, it can be said that those mystics who possess some theological knowledge are able to avoid many of the errors committed by others who lack it, and they are also to some extent more capable of controlling their imagination and sentimentality. Such as it is, mystical or religious realization, with its essential limitations, is the only mode of realization now known to the West; as we have just said, this is by no means negligible, though nevertheless still far removed from true metaphysical realization.

It was necessary to give some description of the point of view of metaphysical realization, because it is essential to all Eastern thought and common to the three great civilizations of which we have spoken: nevertheless, we do not wish to dwell upon it to any great extent in the present work, which must necessarily remain rather elementary. We shall therefore only take it into consideration, when treating more particularly of the Hindu doctrines, insofar as it is unavoidable to do so, since, for the great majority of Western people, this point of view is probably more difficult to understand than any other. Furthermore, it should be added that if theory may always be expounded without reserve, or at least up to the point of meeting the truly inexpressible, the same cannot be said in respect of matters touching on realization.