NYĀYA

THE MEANING OF Nyāya should properly be given as 'logic' or even 'method': to maintain, as some people do, that this word began by denoting a school and subsequently became a synonym for logic, is to reverse the natural order of things; clearly, a school must be given a name bearing some previous meaning, and this view of the origin of Nyāya, by suggesting the exact opposite, contradicts this obvious fact; besides, it is not possible to admit that a darshana could become the monopoly of a particular school. In actual fact it is certainly logic which is and always has been the concern of the darshana in question, the development of which is ascribed to Gautama: this name, however, should not be taken as referring to any single individual; it was in common use both as a personal and family name in ancient India and it is not accompanied in this case by any biographical details even of the vaguest kind. This is typical of what always occurs in the East in such a case, for individualities do not count where the doctrine is concerned. It is indeed quite possible that there may have existed a man called Gautama at some remote and indeterminate date, who devoted himself to the study and teaching of the branch of knowledge that constitutes logic; but this probable fact is not of any particular interest, and the name has only been handed on for a purely symbolical purpose, in order to denote what is really an 'intellectual aggregate' made up of all those who, over a period the duration of which is no less indeterminate than its beginning, devoted themselves to one and the same study. Moreover, this kind of 'collective entity', an example of which we have already cited in the case of Vyāsa, does not constitute a school in the usual sense of the word but rather a genuine intellectual function; and the same could be said of the proper names that we find associated in a similar way with each of the other darshanas. These remarks, made once for all, will relieve us of the need to refer again to this question.

We have said then that Nyāya is essentially logic; but it must be added that the term should in this case be understood in a much less restricted sense than Westerners give to it, because what it deals with is looked upon, not as a mere branch of philosophy, but as a point of view pertaining to the whole doctrine. Hindu logic escapes that narrow specialization which is unavoidable when logic is considered in its philosophic mode, nor can it be compressed within the limits of any system, so that it enjoys a much wider scope than Western logic. In order to appreciate this point, one need only recall what was previously said about the characteristics of metaphysics; that which constitutes the proper object of a speculation is not so much the things themselves proposed for study, as the angle from which they are studied. Logic, as was pointed out before, is concerned with the conditions of human understanding: that which can be considered logically is therefore everything that is capable of being the object of human understanding, insofar as it is actually considered under this relationship. Consequently, logic comprises within its point of view things treated as 'objects of proof', that is to say as objects of reasoned or discursive knowledge: in Nyāya this is the sense of the term padārtha, and in spite of certain differences it is also, in the earlier logic of the West, the correct meaning of the 'categories' or 'predicaments'. If the divisions and classifications established by logic possess at the same time a real ontological value, this arises from the fact that there must necessarily be a correspondence between the points of view of logic and ontology, provided that no radical and artificial opposition is set up between subject and object, such as occurs in modern philosophy. Furthermore, the logical point of view is analytical, because it is individual and rational: it is only as representing a simple application to the individual order that logical principles, even the most general ones, can claim to be derived from metaphysical or universal principles.

Nyāya recognizes sixteen padārthas, the first of which is called pramāṇa. The ordinary meaning of this word is 'proof', and it is also often translated as 'evidence'; but the latter rendering is in many cases misleading, and there is the further drawback that it calls to mind the Cartesian conception of evidence, which is really only of value in the mathematical sphere. In order to fix the correct meaning of the word pramāṇa it must be pointed out that its primitive sense is that of 'measure'; it denotes here the legitimate means of knowledge within the rational order, each of these means being in fact only applicable in a certain measure and under specified conditions, or in other words within a particular domain, the extent of which defines their scope; the enumeration of these means of knowledge or proof goes to make up the subdivisions of the first padārtha. The second is prameya or 'that which is to be proved', namely that which can be known by one or another of the means just mentioned; it includes as its subdivisions a classification of everything that human understanding in its individual state can reach. The remaining padārthas are less important and refer chiefly to the various modalities of reasoning or demonstration; we shall not try to give the complete list here, but we will content ourselves with mentioning in particular the one that is concerned with the terms of a regular argument.

The argument in question, which is also called Nyāya, but in a secondary and more restricted use of the term, and which is in fact the type of a methodical demonstration, includes, in its fully developed form, five avayavas or constituent members or terms: pratijñā, the proposition or assertion requiring to be proved; hetu, the reason justifying this proposition; udāharaṇa, the example cited in support of the reason, and serving, so to speak, as an illustration of it by recalling a well-known case; upanaya, the application to the particular case in question, namely to the first-mentioned proposition; and lastly nigamana, the result or conclusion, which is a definite affirmation of that same proposition as proven. Such is the complete form of the demonstrative argument, but it is often set out in simplified or abridged forms, consisting either of the first three or the last three terms only: in the latter form especially there is a marked likeness to the syllogism as established theoretically by Aristotle. Furthermore, the equivalents of the greater and the lesser term are to be found here, called respectively by the name of vyāpaka or 'container' and vyāpya or 'content', which refer to the same point of view of logical extension; as for the intermediary term, its function is fulfilled by the reason, hetu, which is also called linga or the sign by which vyāpti can be recognized, that is to say the invariable connection uniting the container to the content. Nevertheless, these undeniable points of likeness, which suggest as at least a probable hypothesis that Aristotle may have possessed some knowledge of Nyāya, must not cause us to forget that there are essential differences between the two viewpoints; for whereas the Greek syllogism, when all is said and done, bears only on the concepts or notions of things, the Hindu argument has a more direct bearing on things in themselves.

This last remark calls for a few further comments; in the first place, it obviously concerns the very core of what is implied in the reasoning, and not merely the outward form, which might be practically the same in both cases. We have said that the separation and opposition of subject and object is a special feature of modern philosophy; but already, among the Greeks, the distinction between a thing and its notion had gone a little too far, in the sense that logic dealt exclusively with the relations between notions, as if it were only through notions that things could be known to us. Doubtless, rational knowledge is only indirect knowledge, and for that reason open to error; yet, if it could not reach things themselves to a certain extent, it would be entirely illusory and could not be called knowledge in any sense of the word. If, then, it may be said that under the rational mode an object can only be known through the intermediary of its notion, this can only be because the notion possesses something of the object itself, and shares in its nature by expressing it in relation to ourselves. For this reason, Hindu logic considers not only the manner in which we conceive of things, but also the things themselves insofar as they are conceived by us, since our conception would have no reality if it were entirely separate and distinct from its object; in this respect, the Scholastic definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus, in all the degrees of knowledge, is that which comes nearest, in the West, to the point of view of the Eastern traditional doctrines, because it conforms most nearly to the purely metaphysical conception. Besides, the Scholastic doctrine, while carrying on the teaching of Aristotle in its main lines, corrected and completed it on many points; unfortunately it did not quite succeed in breaking loose from the limitations which were its inheritance from the Hellenic mode of thought; it is also to be regretted that the Scholastics never quite seem to have grasped the profound consequences implied in the principle, already laid down by Aristotle, of identification through knowledge.

It is precisely in virtue of this principle that from the moment the subject knows an object, however fragmentary or superficial that knowledge may be, something of the object is present in the subject, and has become part of its being; from whatever angle we consider things, it is always the things themselves that we reach, at least under a certain aspect, forming in every case one of their attributes, that is to say one of the elements that constitute their essence. Let it be admitted, if need be, that this is 'realism'; the truth is that such is the nature of things, and words make no difference; but strictly speaking, the special viewpoints of 'realism' and 'idealism', with the systematic opposition implied in their correlation, are inapplicable here, since we have traveled far beyond the narrow province of philosophical thought. Nor must it be forgotten that the act of knowledge presents two inseparable facets; if it is an identification of the subject with the object, it is also, for the self-same reason, an assimilation of the object by the subject: by reaching things in their essence, we 'realize' them, in all the force of that word, as states or modalities of our own being; and if the idea, in the measure in which it is true and adequate, shares in the nature of the thing, it is because, conversely, the thing itself shares also in the nature of the idea. Fundamentally, there are not two separate and radically different worlds, as modern philosophy suggests when it qualifies them with the names of 'subjective' and 'objective', nor two superimposed worlds, like the 'intelligible world' and the 'sensible world' of Plato; but, as the Arabs say, 'existence is one' and all that it contains is but a manifestation, in multiple modes, of one and the same principle, which is Universal Being.