RELATIONS BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY

THE QUESTION we are now about to consider does not arise in the East, because of the absence of the specifically religious point of view, in which the theological mode of thought is naturally inherent; or rather it could only arise in connection with Islam, where it would assume the form of an inquiry into the proper relationship between the two aspects of the tradition, religious and extra-religious, which could with equal justice be called the theological and metaphysical aspects. In the West on the other hand, it is the absence of the metaphysical point of view that prevents this question from being generally raised; in actual practice it only affects the Scholastic doctrine, which was in fact both theological and metaphysical, though, as we said before, it was restricted in scope in this second respect; but it does not appear as if a very definite solution of the question was ever arrived at. Its discussion in quite general terms therefore is of all the greater interest, since essentially it implies a comparison between two different modes of thought, namely the purely metaphysical and the specifically religious modes.

As we have said, the point of view of metaphysics is alone universal and therefore limitless; accordingly, every other point of view is more or less specialized and by nature subject to certain limitations. We have already shown that this applies to the scientific point of view for example, and we shall also show that it applies to various other points of view that are usually classed under the common and rather vague heading of philosophy, which do not greatly differ, however, from the scientific point of view properly so called, though they are put forward with greater, if quite unjustifiable, pretensions. Now this essential limitation, which may evidently be either more or less narrow, even applies to the theological point of view; in other words, the latter is also a specialized point of view, although not in the same sense as the sciences; neither are its limits such as to enclose it within so narrow a field. But it is precisely because theology, in one sense, comes closer to metaphysics than do the sciences, that it requires a more subtle perception to distinguish it from metaphysics, so that confusions can arise here more easily than in any other case. Such confusions indeed have not failed to arise, and they have gone so far as to bring about a reversal of the relations that should normally exist between metaphysics and theology; thus, even in the Middle Ages, which nevertheless was the only period when Western civilization enjoyed a truly intellectual development, metaphysics came to be treated merely as a dependency of theology, besides being insufficiently detached from various considerations of a purely philosophical nature. That this should have been possible is due simply to the fact that metaphysics, as conceived by the Scholastic doctrine, had remained incomplete, with the result that its universal character, implying as it does the absence of every limitation, was never fully grasped. Metaphysics was effectively conceived only within certain limits, and the existence of further possibilities of conception, transcending those limits, remained unsuspected. This fact provides sufficient excuse for the misunderstanding that arose at that time, and it is almost certain that the Greeks, to the extent to which they cultivated true metaphysics, would have been deceived in exactly the same way had they possessed anything occupying the same place as theology in the Judeo-Christian religions. This brings us back to what we have already said, namely that Westerners, including even those who were true metaphysicians up to a certain point, have never known metaphysics in its entirety. Nevertheless, there may have been individual exceptions, for, as we pointed out before, nothing in principle precludes the existence, at any period or in any country, of men capable of attaining to complete metaphysical knowledge; and this would even be possible in the contemporary Western world, though doubtless unlikely by reason of the general tendencies governing men's outlook, which create as unfavorable a background as can well be imagined. In any case, it is only right to point out that if such exceptions ever did exist, no written evidence has been found to prove it, nor do the generally known facts reveal traces of their influence; this absence of direct evidence however proves nothing in a negative sense, nor should it occasion any surprise, for if cases of this sort did in fact occur, it can only have been thanks to very special circumstances of a nature that we cannot profitably discuss here.

To return to the question that chiefly concerns us at present, we shall remind the reader that we have already pointed out the most essential difference between a metaphysical doctrine and a religious dogma; whereas the metaphysical point of view is purely intellectual, the religious point of view implies as a fundamental characteristic the presence of a sentimental element affecting the doctrine itself, which does not allow of its preserving an attitude of entirely disinterested speculation; this is indeed what occurs in theology, though to a degree that is more or less strongly marked according to the particular branch under consideration. This emotional element nowhere plays a bigger part than in the 'mystical' form of religious thought; and let us take this opportunity of declaring that, contrary to a far too prevalent opinion, mysticism, from the very fact that it is inconceivable apart from the religious point of view, is quite unknown in the East. In the very widespread confusion which consists in lending a mystical interpretation to ideas that have nothing mystical about them, one can observe yet another example of the persistent tendency among Westerners to find all over the world pure and simple equivalents of modes of thought that are in reality peculiar to themselves; but we will not enter into this question in greater detail here, for to do so would lead us too far afield.

The influence of sentimental elements obviously impairs the intellectual purity of the doctrine, and it is only right to say that it does in fact represent a certain falling away from the standpoint of metaphysical thought; this falling away, in the region where it took place generally and extensively, that is to say in the Western world, was in many ways inevitable and in a sense even necessary if the doctrine was to be adapted to the mentality of the men for whom it was being specially framed, men in whom feeling was stronger than intelligence in virtue of a predominance that has reached its climax in modern times. Nevertheless, it remains true that feeling is but a relative and contingent thing, so that any doctrine that makes an appeal to it and on which it reacts in its turn is bound to be relative and contingent; and this is especially noticeable in regard to the need for 'consolations' with which the religious point of view is closely bound up. Truth, in itself, has no need to be consoling; if anyone finds it so, so much the better for him certainly, though the consolation he feels does not emanate from the doctrine, but purely from himself and from the particular predispositions of his own sentimentality.

It follows that a doctrine that adapts itself to the requirements of sentimental beings and that must therefore itself put on a sentimental dress can henceforth no longer be identified with absolute and total truth; the profound change produced in the form of the doctrine by the introduction of a consolatory principle corresponds to an intellectual falling off on the part of the human collectivity to which its message is addressed. Looked at from another angle, it is this characteristic that gives birth to the inevitable diversity of religious dogmas; hence their incompatibility, for whereas intelligence is one, and truth, in whatever measure it is understood, can be understood in one way only, the same does not apply to feeling, so that religion, in seeking to satisfy the demands of feeling, cannot avoid trying to adapt its form as far as possible to its multiple modes, which vary largely according to race and period. This does not mean, however, that all religious forms, in their doctrinal part, suffer the dissolving action of sentimentalism to an equal degree, with its resultant need for change; a comparison between Catholicism and Protestantism, for example, is particularly instructive in this connection.

It can now be seen that the theological point of view is only a particularization of the metaphysical point of view, implying a proportional alteration; it is an application of it to contingent conditions, one might say, the mode of adaptation being determined by the nature of the conditions to which it must respond, since after all these special exigencies furnish the only reason for its existence. From this it follows that every theological truth, by means of a transposition dissociating it from its specific form, may be conceived in terms of the metaphysical truth corresponding to it, of which it is but a kind of translation, though this does not mean that there is effective equivalence between the two orders of conception: the reader should recall our earlier observation that everything which can be considered from the individual point of view can also be considered from the universal point of view, without the two being however any the less widely separated on that account.

If things are now examined in an inverse sense, it must be said that certain metaphysical truths are capable of being translated into theological language, though not all, for in this case it is important to take into consideration many things that cannot be included under any individual point of view whatsoever, and that therefore belong exclusively to the realm of metaphysics; the Universal in its entirety cannot be compressed within any particular point of view, neither can it be enclosed within any form, which really amounts to saying the same thing. Even in the case of such truths as are suited to undergo the translation in question, that translation, like every other formulation, cannot but always remain incomplete and partial, and what it omits gives the precise measure of the difference between the points of view of theology and of pure metaphysics. This could be illustrated by numerous examples; but these examples themselves, if they are to be understood, would necessitate doctrinal developments that cannot be entered into here: one such example, to mention a typical case among many others, may be found in a comparison of the metaphysical conception of 'deliverance' in the Hindu doctrine with the theological conception of 'salvation' in the Western religions; these two conceptions are essentially different, and it is only the lack of comprehension of some of the orientalists that is responsible for attempts to assimilate them, in a way that remains, however, a mere matter of words. Let it also be noticed in passing that a case like this should serve as a warning against another very real danger: if a Hindu, to whom Western concepts are foreign, is told that Europeans mean by the word 'salvation' exactly what he means by the word moksha, he will certainly have no reason for contradicting this assertion or for doubting its accuracy, so that later on, at least until he becomes better informed, he may himself be led into employing this word 'salvation' in order to describe a conception that is in no wise theological in character; in that case the misunderstanding will be mutual, and the confusion will thus be rendered still more inextricable. The same applies to the misconceptions that spring from the no less mistaken assimilation of the metaphysical point of view to the points of view of Western philosophy: we have in mind the case of a Muslim who readily accepted, as quite natural, the expression 'Islamic pantheism' when applied to the metaphysical doctrine of the 'Supreme Identity'; but the moment it was explained to him what pantheism really stood for in the true sense of the word, as for example in Spinoza, he rejected such a designation with horror.

To show what is implied by the translation of metaphysical truths into theological language, we will confine ourselves to one extremely simple and elementary example: the immediate metaphysical truth 'Being is', when expressed according to the religious or theological mode, will give rise to another proposition, namely that 'God exists'; but the two statements would not be strictly equivalent except on the double condition of conceiving God as Universal Being—which is far from always being the case in fact—and of identifying existence with pure Being, which is metaphysically inexact. Doubtless this example, because of its too great simplicity, does not entirely do justice to the deeper aspects of theological conceptions; but even such as it is, it can be found instructive, because it is precisely out of the misunderstanding of the implications of the two formulas just cited, resulting from a confusion of the two corresponding points of view, that there arose the endless controversies connected with the famous 'ontological argument', which is itself but a product of this confusion.

Another important point that may be noted concerning the same example is that theological conceptions, not being beyond the reach of individual variations, as are pure metaphysical conceptions, can vary from one individual to another, and these variations are inevitably centered around divergencies concerning the most fundamental conception of all, namely the very conception of Divinity: those who discuss such matters as the 'proofs of God's existence', if they hope to understand one another, should first of all make sure that in uttering the same word 'God' they really are intending to express an identical conception; they would often discover that this is far from being the case, so that they have no better chances of reaching agreement than if they were speaking different languages. It is especially in this realm of individual variations, for which official and instructed theology must however in no wise bear the blame, that a pre-eminently anti-metaphysical tendency is revealed, commonly to be found among Westerners, and which properly speaking constitutes 'anthropomorphism'; but this subject calls for a few additional explanations, which will enable us to consider the question from another angle.