SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS ON THE DOCTRINE AS A WHOLE

IN THIS SURVEY, which has intentionally been made as synthetic as possible, we have tried to show in the case of each dar-shana not only its distinctive features but also its relationship to metaphysics, which is the common center of all branches of the doctrine and the starting-point of their several developments; we have also taken the opportunity of emphasizing a certain number of important points bearing on the doctrine conceived as a whole. In this connection it should be clearly understood that Vedānta, though it is reckoned to be the last of the darshanas in that it represents the final summing up of all knowledge, is nonetheless, in its essence, the principle whence all the remainder are derived, as so many specifications or applications. If any branch of knowledge were not dependent in this way on metaphysics, it would literally be lacking in principle, and therefore bereft of any traditional character; this shows the radical difference between scientific knowledge, in the sense given to the word in the West, and that which corresponds to it least inadequately in India. It is evident for example that the point of view of cosmology is not equivalent to that of modern physics and that even the point of view of traditional logic is not equivalent to that of philosophical logic, conceived for example after the manner of John Stuart Mill; we have already drawn attention to these differences. Cosmology, even within the limits of the Vaisheshika, is not an experimental science like the present-day physics; through its attachment to principles, it is much more a deductive than an inductive science, like all the other branches of the doctrine. It is true that Cartesian physics was also deductive, but it suffered from the serious defect of resting, insofar as it acknowledged principles at all, on a simple philosophical hypothesis, and this accounts for its failure.

The difference of method which we have just pointed out, and which reveals a profound difference of conception, applies with equal force to sciences that may properly be called experimental, but that are nevertheless much more deductive than those of the West, and so avoid all empiricism; it is only on this condition that such sciences have a claim to be looked upon as traditional sciences, even though of secondary importance and belonging to an inferior order. In this connection we specially have in mind medicine, considered as an Upaveda; and our remarks would apply equally well to the traditional medicine of the Far East. Without in any way losing its practical character, medicine in this instance represents something far more comprehensive than the science usually referred to under that name; besides pathology and therapeutics, it includes many elements which in the West would be considered as belonging to physiology, for instance, or even to psychology, but here they are dealt with in quite a different way. The results obtainable in the application of such a science might in many cases appear extraordinary in the eyes of those who have formed but a hazy idea of its real nature; moreover, we believe that it would be very difficult for a Westerner to arrive at sufficient proficiency in this kind of study, as very different methods of investigation are employed in it from those to which he is accustomed.

We have just said that applied sciences, even when affiliated to tradition as their common source, cannot be considered as anything but inferior branches of knowledge. The fact of their derivation proves them to be subordinate, as is only logical, and moreover the Easterners, who both by temperament and deepest conviction trouble their minds very little about immediate applications, have never dreamed of adulterating the order of pure knowledge with anything of a material or sentimental nature, which is the only factor that could upset the natural and normal hierarchy of the various kinds of knowledge. It is this same cause of intellectual disorder which, on becoming generalized in the mentality of a race or of a period, more than anything else leads people to forget pure metaphysics and unwarrantably to substitute for it more or less specialized points of view, besides giving birth to sciences that cannot claim to be linked up with any traditional principle. Such sciences are no doubt legitimate enough so long as they abide within their proper limits, but they must not be taken for anything greater than they really are, namely an analytical, fragmentary, and relative kind of knowledge; and thus, by separating itself radically from metaphysics, with which its particular point of view in fact forbids any relationship, Western science was bound to lose in range whatever it gained in independence, and its uncontrolled development in the direction of practical applications was inevitably paid for by a decrease in speculative power.

These few remarks complete our previous discussion of the wide differences in the respective points of view of East and West; in the East, tradition is in a real sense the entire civilization since it embraces, as its derivatives, all the branches of true knowledge, whatever order they may belong to, as well as the whole fabric of social institutions: tradition contains everything in embryo from the start, by the very fact that it lays down the universal principles whence all things are derived together with their laws and conditions, and the adaptation called for at any given time can only amount to an elaboration of the doctrine, carried out in a strictly deductive and analogical spirit, in conformity with the needs of the period in question. It is easy to see that under these circumstances the influence of tradition wields a power from which it would scarcely be possible to detach oneself, and that any schism, if it does arise, is forced at once to constitute itself as a pseudo-tradition; as to breaking every traditional bond openly and finally, no person could dream of such a thing, even were it feasible. This should also make it possible to understand the nature and characteristics of traditional teaching, which serves to transmit not only the principles but also the practical means of assimilating and integrating every element into the intellectuality of a civilization.