8 PROFANE SCIENCE IN LIGHT OF TRADITIONAL DOCTRINES

ALTHOUGH we have often explained what ought to be the normal attitude toward profane science on the part of anyone who represents or merely expounds a traditional doctrine of any sort, it seems from certain remarks that have recently come to us from various quarters, that everyone has not yet fully understood it. We must admit that there is an excuse for this: the attitude in question is difficult to conceive for those who have been affected to some degree by the modern mentality, which is to say for the immense majority of our contemporaries, at least in the West. Rare are those who succeed in fully disencumbering themselves of the prejudices inherent in this mentality, and which have been imposed on them by their education and by the very ambiance in which they live. Now, among these prejudices one of the strongest is certainly a belief in the value of modern science, which is really the same thing as profane science, and as a result many have a more or less unconscious desire not to admit that the real or supposed results of this science are something that can be disregarded.

First of all we will recall that in every order it is the profane point of view as such that is illegitimate, and this point of view consists essentially in considering things without a link to any transcendent principle and as if they were independent of every principle, which it ignores purely and simply, even when it does not go as far as to deny them outright. This definition applies equally to the domain of action and to that of knowledge; in the latter it is evident that such is the case of modern science in its entirety, and that as a consequence modern science has no right to be considered as true knowledge since, even if it should happen to state things that are true, its manner of presenting them is nonetheless illegitimate, and it is in any case unable to give the reason for their truth which can only lie in their dependence on principles. Of course, when we speak of knowledge this does not concern the practical applications that can result from this science, for these applications are completely independent of the value of the science as such and consequently do not interest us here. Besides, scientists themselves readily recognize that they make use of forces the nature of which is completely unknown to them. This ignorance no doubt accounts for much of the danger that these applications too often present, but this is another question which we do not have to pursue at present.

It could be asked whether, in spite of everything, such a science might not be legitimized by re-establishing, for the part of truth it can contain of a relative order, the link with principles which alone would permit this truth to be effectively understood as such. Certainly this is not impossible in some cases, but then it would not really be a question of the same science, since this would imply a complete change of point of view, and a traditional point of view would thereby be substituted for the profane point of view; and it must not be forgotten that a science is not defined solely by its object but also by the point of view from which it considers the object. If it were to happen, what could be preserved would have to be most carefully distinguished from what on the contrary would have to be eliminated, that is to say all the false ideas which ignorance of principles has only too easily allowed to be introduced; and the very formulation of truths would most often have to be corrected, for it is almost always seriously influenced by the false ideas with which the truths in question are associated in profane science. We ourselves, in one of our works, have given some evidence of this in regard to certain aspects of modern mathematics;^[1] and let no one come and say that in such an instance the correction of terminology would have but little fundamental importance, or even that it would not merit the effort required, under the pretext that mathematicians are not themselves dupes of the absurdities implied in the language they use. First of all, incorrect language always presupposes some confusion in thought, and it is more serious than might be thought to refuse to correct this error, and to treat it as something negligible or indifferent. Next, even if professional mathematicians finally realize the falsehood of certain ideas, nonetheless, by continuing to speak in ways that reflect these same false ideas, they contribute to spreading or maintaining them among those who in any measure receive their teaching, directly or indirectly, and who cannot examine things as closely as they. Finally, and most importantly, the fact of using terminology to which no plausible significance is attached is nothing but another manifestation of the growing tendency of modern science to become nothing more than an empty 'conventionalism', a tendency that is itself characteristic of the phase of 'dissolution' succeeding that of 'solidification' in the last periods of the cycle.^[2] It would be truly curious and moreover very worthy of an age of intellectual disorder like ours, if, in wanting to prove that the objections we have formulated against their science were not really applicable to them, people were to advance precisely an argument that on the contrary only provided a still more ample confirmation of it! This leads us directly to a more general consideration: we know that people sometimes reproach us for raising an argument against modern scientific theories that are hardly accepted any longer by scientists themselves, or concerning which they at least have reservations not held by their predecessors. To take an example, it is true that transformism has lost much ground in 'scientific' circles without it being possible to go so far as to say that it has no more advocates, which would be a manifest exaggeration. But it is no less true that it continues to spread as before, and with the same 'dogmatic' assurance, in textbooks and in works of popularization, that is to say in all that is in fact accessible to those who are not 'specialists', so much so that as regards the influence it exercises on the general mentality nothing has truly changed, and in this respect it still retains the same 'currency'. Moreover, it must be well understood that the importance we attach to this fact, which can also be noted for other 'out of date' or 'outgrown' theories (according to the fashionable expressions), is in no way due to any particular interest we bear toward the 'general public'. The true reason is that these theories affect without distinction all those who, as we just said, are not 'specialists', among whom there are surely some, however few they may be, who, if not subjected to such influences, would possess possibilities of comprehension that, on the contrary, would hardly be expected among scientists irremediably enclosed in their 'specialties'. In truth, although for their part many of these scientists have renounced the gross forms of transformism, we are not sure that it is not simply in order to replace them with ideas which, even if more subtle, are worth no more fundamentally and are perhaps even more dangerous. In any case, why do they maintain a blameworthy equivocation, continuing to speak of 'evolution' as they always have, if what they now really mean by this term hardly has any connection with what used to be designated by it? Must one see here, as well, one of the manifestations of current scientific 'conventionalism', or simply an example of the tendency that words have today, even in everyday usage, to completely lose their normal meanings? However this may be, what is rather strange is that while certain people reproach us for not sufficiently taking into consideration what could be called scientific 'topicality', in other circles there are people who, on the contrary, certainly do not forgive us for thinking and saying that materialism is no longer the only danger there is reason to decry, nor even the principal or most formidable one. It is very difficult to satisfy everyone, and we must add, moreover, that for our part this is something that has never greatly preoccupied us. Let us now return to the question of the legitimation of the modern sciences. If, as we said, this legitimation is possible for some, it is not so for all equally, for it is a necessary condition that a science have an object that is legitimate in itself even if, because of its profane character, its manner of considering it is not legitimate. Now this condition is not fulfilled by those sciences—we ought rather to say so-called sciences—which are really only specific products of the modern deviation. A typical case of this sort is psychoanalysis, and there is no good reason to attempt to link to higher principles what is properly only an aberration due to the action of the lowest psychic influences; one might as well try to legitimize spiritism or 'surrealist' divagations, which have a wholly similar origin, the only difference being that these latter are not admitted into the categories of 'official' teaching. On the other hand, as regards those modern sciences that have at least a legitimate object, it must not be forgotten that for many of them one has to take into account their 'residual' character regarding certain ancient sciences, as we have explained on other occasions, so that legitimizing them would amount to a more or less integral restoration of the traditional sciences to which they correspond and of which they are only the degenerate vestiges resulting from the forgetting of principles. But this restoration itself would not be without difficulty, for among these traditional sciences are some, like astrology, the true 'keys' to which seem to have been lost completely, and great care would have to be taken not to confuse them with more or less recent deformations that one meets with today under the same name and which themselves are very much affected by the profane point of view that more and more encroaches on everything.

The question we have just been considering has as yet only a 'theoretical' interest, as it were, for in fact the legitimation in question has not yet been undertaken in any case, so that when it is a question of modern science one is solely in the presence of profane science. With respect to traditional doctrines this can only be considered to be purely and simply non-existent; in other words, there is no need to preoccupy oneself with knowing whether it agrees or disagrees with these doctrines, with which, because of its lack of principles, it could have no effective link. If there is disagreement one can be certain that the error is necessarily on the part of the profane science, for traditional data cannot be the object of any doubt for anyone who understands their true nature. If on the contrary there is agreement, this is all the better for the science in question, but only for it, for this shows that it has managed to arrive, albeit by very roundabout and uncertain ways, at the truth about certain particular points. This concurrence, which has only a wholly accidental character, is of no importance to traditional doctrines, for these have no need of any outward 'confirmation'. Moreover, it would be a strange kind of confirmation made by appeals to a science for which the truths in question, as all of its theories, can never be anything except mere, more or less probable, hypotheses. For the same reasons there is no additional reason to try to associate traditional data with ideas borrowed from profane science or more or less directly inspired by it; this is a perfectly vain undertaking which could only be the work of people like the occultists, for example, who are completely ignorant of the true import of the fragmentary elements they have taken from the little they know of different traditions. We have often enough explained the inanity of this sort of 'syncretistic' and hybrid construction for it to be unnecessary for us to enlarge on it again.

Furthermore, we have also had occasion to point out the weakness, not to say more, of the attitude customarily called 'apologetic', which consists in trying to defend a tradition against attacks such as those by modern science, by disputing these arguments on their own ground, something that almost always entails unfortunate concessions and that in any case implies a misunderstanding of the transcendent character of traditional doctrine. This is the usual attitude of exoterists, and it may be thought that very often they are especially driven by the fear that numerous adherents of their tradition will be led astray by scientific objections, or what are so called, raised against it; but beside the fact that this 'quantitative' consideration is itself of a rather profane order, these objections merit all the less having such importance attached to them since the science that inspires them changes continually—and this should suffice to prove what little soundness they have. When one sees theologians, for example, preoccupied with 'making the Bible agree with science', it is only too easy to see how illusory is such work, since it constantly has to be redone as scientific theories change, this without counting the drawback of appearing to link tradition to the present state of profane science, that is, to theories that in a few years will perhaps no longer be accepted by anyone, if they have not already been abandoned by scientists—for this also can happen, as the objections that are challenged are more usually the work of popularizers than of the scientists themselves. Instead of clumsily reducing sacred scriptures to such a level, these theologians would surely do much better to penetrate their true meaning as far as possible and to expound them purely and simply for the benefit of those who are able to understand and who, if they understood them effectively, would thereby no longer be tempted to let themselves be influenced by the hypotheses of profane science, any more than by the dissolving ‘critique’ of a modernist and rationalist, that is, essentially anti-traditional, exegesis, the alleged results of which no longer need to be taken into consideration by those who are conscious of what tradition really is. Whoever expounds a traditional doctrine, exoteric as well as esoteric, not only has the strictest right but even the duty to refrain from the least compromise with the profane point of view, whatever the domain in question. But in the West today, where are those who still understand that this must be so? Perhaps some will say that, after all, this is the business of theologians (since we have just taken them as an example) and not our own. But we are not among those who think one can dissociate oneself from attacks upon any tradition and who are even always ready to congratulate themselves on attacks aimed at a tradition other than their own, as if these were blows against ‘rivals’, and as if ultimately these attacks did not always affect the traditional spirit itself. The type of ‘apologetics’ we have discussed shows only too well to what degree these attacks have succeeded in weakening the traditional spirit even among those who believe themselves its defenders. Now there is still a point that we must clarify in order to avoid any misunderstanding. It certainly must not be thought that anyone who intends to keep a rigorously traditional attitude must thenceforth be forbidden to speak about the theories of profane science. On the contrary, when there is reason, he can and must denounce their errors and dangers, and this especially when he finds in them assertions clearly running counter to the data of tradition. But he must do so in a way that never constitutes a discussion ‘between equals’, which is only possible on the condition that one place oneself on profane ground. Indeed, what is really at issue is a judgment made in the name of a higher authority, that of traditional doctrine, for of course it is this doctrine alone that counts here, while the individualities who express it have not the slightest importance in themselves. Now as far as we know no one has ever dared claim that a judgment could be assimilated to a discussion or to ‘polemics’. If because of a prejudice due to incomprehension, the bad faith of which is unhappily not always absent, those who misunderstand the authority of tradition claim to see ‘polemics’ where there is no shadow of it, there is obviously no way to prevent them from doing so, any more than one can prevent an ignorant person or a fool from taking traditional doctrines for ‘philosophy’, but this is not worth the least attention. At least all those who understand what tradition is and whose opinion alone counts will know perfectly well what to think; as for us, if there are profane people who would like to engage us in discussion, we shall warn them once for all that, since we will never consent to descend to their level nor to place ourselves at their point of view, their efforts will always fall into the void.