PREFACE

As EXPLAINED at the beginning of Man and his becoming according to the Vedânta, that work was intended to form the first of a series of studies which, as occasion might demand, would either give a direct account of certain aspects of the Eastern metaphysical doctrines, or else adapt them in such a way as might seem most intelligible and profitable, while always remaining strictly faithful to their spirit. That series of studies had to be shelved for a time, because circumstances called for other works dealing with various contingent applications of these doctrines ; but even here, care was taken never to lose sight of those metaphysical principles on which all true traditional teaching solely rests.

In Man and his becoming, it was shown how a being such as man is envisaged by a traditional doctrine of a purely metaphysical order. The exposition was confined as closely as possible to the doctrine itself, and any departure was aimed merely at bringing out concordances between that doctrine and other traditional forms. Our works have never purported to remain exclusively within one given traditional form ; indeed the acceptance of such a restriction would be extremely difficult in view of the essential unity of tradition underlying the diversity of more or less outward forms, which are really no more than different garments clothing one and the same truth. In general, we have taken the viewpoint of the Hindu doctrines as our central one, for reasons that have been explained elsewhere^[4] ; but that can be no reason for failing to make use, whenever it seems advisable, of modes of expression drawn from other traditions—always provided, of course, that they are authentic ones, that is, traditions which can be called regular or orthodox, taking those terms in the sense we have explained elsewhere.^[5] In the present book, that will be done even oftener than before, because this time there is no question of keeping to a certain branch of doctrine as found in one given civilization. The purpose of the work is to explain a symbol that is common to almost all traditions, a fact which would seem to indicate its direct attachment to the great primordial Tradition. In this connection it is necessary to stress from the outset one point of particular importance, in order to dispel certain confusions which are unhappily all too frequent to-day, namely the fundamental difference between “ synthesis ” and “ syncretism ”. Syncretism consists in assembling from the outside a number of more or less incongruous elements which, when so regarded, can never be truly unified ; in short, it is a kind of eclecticism, with all the fragmentariness and incoherence that this always implies. Syncretism, then, is something purely outward and superficial ; the elements taken from every quarter and put together in this way can never amount to anything more than borrowings that are incapable of being effectively integrated into a doctrine worthy of the name. Synthesis, on the other hand, is carried out essentially from within ; by this we mean that it properly consists in envisaging things in the unity of their principle, in seeing how they are derived from and dependent on that principle, and thus uniting them, or rather becoming aware of their real unity, by virtue of a wholly inward bond, inherent in what is most profound in their nature. To apply the above criteria to the present context, syncretism can be recognized wherever one finds elements borrowed from different traditional forms and assembled together without any awareness that there is only one single doctrine, of which these forms are so many different expressions, or so many adaptations to particular conditions related to given circumstances of time and place. In such a case, nothing valid can emerge from the collection ; to use a readily comprehensible comparison, we shall get not an organized whole but a formless pile of débris, which is useless because it lacks anything that could give it a unity like that of a living being or a harmonious building ; indeed, the characteristic feature of syncretism, by the very fact of its outwardness, is its inability to achieve such a unity. Synthesis, on the contrary, will exist when one starts from unity itself and never loses sight of it throughout the multiplicity of its manifestations ; this moreover implies an ability to see beyond forms, and an awareness of the principal truth which clothes itself in forms in order to express and communicate itself in the measure in which this is possible. Given such awareness, one is at liberty to make use of one or another of those forms, just as one may use different languages to translate the same thought for the benefit of different people ; this is what certain traditions symbolically denote as the “ gift of tongues ”. The concordances between all traditional forms may be said to represent genuine “ synonymies ” ; that is how we regard them, and just as the explanation of certain things may be easier in one language than in another, so one of these forms may be better fitted than others for expounding certain truths and rendering them easier to understand. Hence in each case it is perfectly legitimate to make use of the form which seems the most suitable for the purpose in hand ; there is no objection to passing from one form to another, provided one is really aware of their equivalence, which can only be the case if one views them in the light of their common principle. In this way no syncretism will arise ; indeed the latter can only be a product of a “ profane ” outlook which is incompatible with the very idea of the “ sacred science ” to which these studies exclusively refer. The cross is a symbol which in its various forms is met with almost everywhere, and from the most remote times ; it is therefore far from belonging peculiarly and exclusively to the Christian tradition as some might be tempted to believe. It must even be stated that Christianity, at any rate in its outward and generally known aspect, seems to have somewhat lost sight of the symbolic character of the cross and come to regard it as no longer anything but the sign of a historical event. Actually, these two viewpoints are in no wise mutually exclusive ; indeed the second is in a sense a consequence of the first ; but this way of looking at things is so strange to the great majority of people to-day that it deserves dwelling on for a moment in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. The fact is that people too often tend to think that if a symbolical meaning is admitted, the literal or historical sense must be rejected ; such a view can only result from unawareness of the law of correspondence which is the very foundation of all symbolism. By virtue of this law, each thing, proceeding as it does from a metaphysical principle from which it derives all its reality, translates or expresses that principle in its own fashion and in accordance with its own order of existence, so that from one order to another all things are linked together and correspond in such a way as to contribute to the universal and total harmony, which, in the multiplicity of manifestation, can be likened to a reflection of the principial unity itself. For this reason the laws of a lower domain can always be taken to symbolize realities of a higher order, wherein resides their own profoundest cause, which is at once their principle and their end ; we would recall in this connection the error of the modern “ naturalistic ” interpretations of ancient traditional doctrines, interpretations which purely and simply reverse the hierarchy of relationships between the different orders of reality. Thus, the purpose of symbols and myths has never been—as often wrongly alleged—to represent the movement of the heavenly bodies, the truth being that they often do contain figures inspired by that movement and intended to express, analogically, something very different, because the laws of that movement are a physical translation of the metaphysical principles on which they depend. What is true of astronomical phenomena can equally and for the same reason be applied to all other kinds of natural phenomena ; these phenomena, by the very fact that they are derived from higher and transcendent principles, truly serve to symbolize those principles. Obviously, this in no way affects the reality possessed by the phenomena as such in the order of existence they belong to ; on the contrary, it is the very basis of that reality, for apart from their dependence on their principles, all things would be mere non-entity.

This holds good for historical facts no less than for anything else: they likewise conform to the law of correspondence just mentioned, and thereby, in their own mode, translate higher realities, of which they are, so to speak, a human expression. We would add that from our point of view (which obviously is quite different from that of the profane historians^[4]), it is this that gives to these facts the greater part of their significance. This symbolical character, while common to all historical events, is bound to be particularly clear-cut in the case of events connected with what may be called "sacred history"; thus it is recognizable in a most striking way, in all the circumstances of the life of Christ^[5]. If the foregoing has been properly grasped, it will at once be apparent not only that there is no reason for denying the reality of these events and treating them as mere myths, but on the contrary that these events had to be such as they were, and could not have been otherwise; it is clearly impossible to attribute a sacred character to something devoid of all transcendent significance. In particular, if Christ died on the cross, it can be said that this was by reason of the symbolic value which the cross possesses in itself and which has always been recognized by all traditions; thus, without diminishing in any way its historical significance, the latter may be regarded as directly derived from the symbolical significance that goes with it.

A further consequence of this law of correspondence is the plurality of meanings contained in every symbol. Anything and everything can in fact be regarded as representing not only the metaphysical principles, but also realities of all orders higher than its own, even if still contingent, for these realities, on which it also more or less directly depends, play the part of "secondary causes" in respect of it; likewise, the effect can always be taken as a symbol of the cause, at any level whatsoever, because it is no more than the expression of something inherent in the nature of that cause. These multiple and hierarchically superimposed symbolical meanings are not in any way mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are perfectly concordant, because they express the applications of one and the same principle to different orders ; thus they complete and corroborate one another, while being integrated in the harmony of the total synthesis. This, moreover, is what makes symbolism a far less narrowly limited language than ordinary speech, and renders it best fitted to express and convey certain truths. The possibilities of conception it opens up are truly limitless, and it is for this reason that it constitutes the initiatory language par excellence, the indispensable vehicle of all traditional teaching. Thus the cross, like any other symbol, can be regarded according to manifold senses ; however, it is not our intention to develop them all equally here, and there are some that will merely be touched on occasionally. The essential object before us is the metaphysical sense, the first and most important of all, since it is properly the principial one ; all other applications are more or less secondary and contingent. If we do consider some of these, it will always be with the ultimate object of attaching them to the metaphysical order, for this manifestly is what gives them their value and legitimacy, in conformity with the conception—quite forgotten by the modern world—of “ traditional science ”.