Myths, Mysteries, and Symbols

Mythes, mystères et symbols, October 1935.

We have spoken occasionally of a certain degeneration of symbolism as having given birth to 'mythology,' taking this word in the sense that it is most usually given, which is indeed true when it comes to so-called 'clas- sic' antiquity, but which would not validly apply outside the period of Greek and Latin civilizations. We therefore believe that the use of this term everywhere should be avoided, the act of which can only give rise to unpleasant equivocations and unjustified assimilations; if the use im- poses this restriction, it must be said that the word 'myth,' in itself and in its original meaning, contains nothing which marks such a later de- generation, solely due to a more or less complete incomprehension of what remains a very ancient tradition. It should be added, if one can speak of 'myths' as far as this tradition itself is concerned, provided that the true meaning of the word is restored, there was no such thing as 'mythology,' which, as the modern ones would understand it, is nothing more than a study undertaken 'from the outside' and therefore, one may say, involving a misunderstanding in the second degree. Sometimes it has been attempted to establish a distinction between 'myths' and 'symbols' which does not seem well-founded to us: for some, where myth is a narrative with a meaning other than that which the words composing it express directly and literally, the symbol would es- sentially be a figurative representation of certain ideas by a geometric scheme or by any design; the symbol would properly then be a graphic mode of expression and the myth a verbal mode. There is here a totally unacceptable restriction, as can be easily understood by all that we have already stated on other occasions: indeed, any image which is taken to represent an idea, to express it or to suggest it in anyway and to whatever degree, is thereby a sign or, amounting to the same thing, a symbol of that idea. It does not matter whether it is a visual image or any other kind of image, because it introduces no essential difference here and does not absolutely change the very principle of symbolism. In any case, the latter is always based on a relationship of analogy or correspondence between the idea that is to be expressed and the image, be it graphic, verbal, or otherwise, by which it is expressed. We have said elsewhere that we could consider the symbols as being mainly divided into those that are graphic and those that are acoustic; from this point of view, the words themselves are and cannot be anything other than symbols. One could even, instead of speaking of an idea and an image as we have just done, speak more generally of two realities of any kind, of different orders, between which there exists a correspondence having both its foundation in the nature of both: in these conditions, a reality of a certain order can be represented by a reality of another order, and this is then a symbol.

Having thus recalled the principle of symbolism once again, we see that it is obviously capable of a multitude of different modalities, myth is only a particular case constituting one of these modes; we could say that the symbol is the genus, and myth is one of its species. In other words, one can envisage a symbolic narrative as well as a symbolic drawing, or many other things that have the same character and play the same role; myths are symbolic accounts, as are 'parables,' which do not basically and essentially differ from them, it does not seem to us that there is an- ything there that gives rise to the slightest confusion, since we have un- derstood the general notion of symbolism.

That being said, it is necessary to specify the proper meaning of the word 'myth' itself, which may lead us to certain important remarks which relate to the character and function of symbolism envisaged in the more definite sense in which it differs from ordinary language and op- poses it in certain respects. We commonly look at the word 'myth' as being a synonym of 'fable,' simply meaning a fiction of some kind, most often of a more or less poetic character; this is the effect of the degener- ation of which we spoke at the beginning, and the Greeks, whose lan- guage is borrowed for this term, certainly have their share of responsi- bility in what is really a profound alteration and a deviation from the original meaning. In fact, with the Greeks, individual fantasy soon began to give free rein to all forms of art, which, instead of remaining strictly hieratic and symbolic, as among the Egyptians and peoples of the Orient, soon took a completely different direction, aiming much less to instruct and more to please, resulting in productions which are almost devoid of any real meaning where we find no trace of this eminently 'exact' science that is true symbolism; this is, in short, the beginning of what we may call profane art and it coincides appreciably with that of equally profane thought which, due to the exercise of the same individual fantasy in an- other domain, was to be known under the name 'philosophy.' Aesthetic fantasy was exercised in particular on the pre-existing myths: poets, who were by then no longer sacred and possessing the 'supra-human' influ- ence as at their origin, by developing and modifying myths with their own imagination, by surrounding them with superfluous and vain orna- ments, obscured and distorted myths so that it often became very diffi-cult to rediscover their meaning and to identify their essential elements, except perhaps in comparison with similar symbols that may be encoun-tered elsewhere which have not undergone the same deformation; it can be said that finally myth was no more, at least for the greatest number, but a misunderstood symbol which remains for the modern ones. But this is only an abuse and, we might say, 'profanation' in the true sense of the word; what must be considered is that the myth was essentially a sym-bolic narrative before any deformation, as we have said above, and this was its sole raison d'être, and, from this point of view already, 'myth' is not entirely synonymous with 'fable,' because this latter word (in Latin fabula, from fari, to speak) does not etymologically indicate any narra-tive, without specifying the intention or the character in any way; here too, the meaning of 'fiction' came to be attached to it only later. There is more: these two terms 'myth' and 'fable,' which we have come to take as equivalents, are derived from roots which in reality have an opposite meaning, for while the root of 'fable' refers to the spoken word, that of 'myth,' strange as it may seem at first glance when related to a recitation, refers to silence. Indeed, the Greek word muthos, 'myth,' originates with the root mu, and this root (which is found in the Latin mutus, mute) represents the closed mouth, and hence silence.^[432] This is the meaning of the word muein, to close one's mouth, to be silent (and, by an analogic extension, it also comes to mean the eyes, literally and figuratively); the review of some of the derivatives of this verb is particularly informative. Thus, from muo (and to the infinitive muein) two other verbs are immediately derived which differ only a little in form, muao and mueo; the first has the same meanings as muo, and we must add another derivative, mullo, which means to close the lips, and also to murmur without opening the mouth (the Latin murmur is also the root mu extended by the letter R and repeated, so as to represent a dull and continuous noise produced with the mouth closed). As for mueo, and this is what is most important, it means initiation (into 'mysteries,' whose name is derived from the same root as we shall later see, and precisely by means of mueo and mustes), and, consequently, both to instruct (but firstly to instruct without words, as it actually was in the mysteries) and to consecrate; we should even say in the first place to consecrate, if one understands by 'consecration,' as it ordinarily should be, the transmission of a 'spiritual influence,' or the rite by which it is regularly transmitted. What later came from this latter meaning, in Christian ecclesiastic language, that of conferring ordina-tion, which is indeed also a 'consecration' in this sense, though in a dif-ferent order from that of the initiatic. But it will be said, if the word ‘myth' has such an origin, how is it that it could have been used to designate a narrative of some kind? This idea of 'silence' must be related here to things which, because of their very nature, are inexpressible, at least directly and by ordinary language; one of the general functions of symbolism is indeed to suggest the inexpress-ible, to make it approachable, or even better 'to assert,' by the transposi-tions it allows to perform from one order to another, from the inferior to the superior, from what is most immediately grasped to that which is much more difficult, and this is precisely the premier destination of myths. Moreover, even in the 'classical' period, Plato still resorts to the use of myths when he wishes to expose conceptions that go beyond the scope of his usual dialectical means; these myths, which he certainly has not 'invented' rather he only 'adapted,' for they bear the indisputable mark of a traditional teaching (as do certain processes which he uses for the interpretation of words), these myths, we say, are far from being nothing more than the more or less negligible literary ornaments that modern commentators and 'critics' see all too often, for whom it is as-surely more convenient to dismiss them thus without any other exam-ination than to give an approximate explanation. On the contrary, they respond to what is most profound in Plato's thought, that which is re-moved from individual contingencies, because of this very profoundness, it can only be expressed symbolically; the dialectic often contains a cer-tain amount of 'play' in it, which is very much in keeping with the Greek mentality, but when it is abandoned for the myth, we can be sure that the game has stopped and that it is dealing with things that have a 'sa-cred' character. In myth, what is said is something else than what one wishes to say; we may remark in passing that this is also what the word 'allegory' ety-mologically means (from allos agoreuo, literally 'to say something else'), which gives us yet another example of the deviations of meaning due to common usage, because it now only designates a conventional and 'lit-erary' representation of purely moral or psychological intention, and which, more often than not, manifests into what is commonly called 'per-sonified abstractions'; it is scarcely necessary to say that nothing could be further from true symbolism. But, to return to myth, if he does not say what he means, he suggests it by this analogical correspondence which is the foundation and the very essence of all symbolism; thus, we might say, to keep quiet while speaking is where myth has gotten its name.^[433] What remains is for us to draw attention to the kinship between the words 'myth' and 'mystery,' both stemming from the same root: the Greek word musterion, ‘mystery,' is also directly related to the idea of 'silence'; this can be interpreted in several different but interrelated meanings, each of which has its own raison d'être in a certain point of view. First, let us remark that, according to the derivation which we have indicated previously (of mueo), the principal meaning of this word is that which refers to initiation, and it is thus indeed, that it must be understood that is what was called 'mysteries' in Greek antiquity. On the other hand, what still shows the truly odd fate of certain words is that another term closely related to the ones we have just mentioned is that of 'mysticism,' which, etymologically, applies to everything regarding the mysteries: mustikos, in fact, is the adjective of mustes, initiated; it is therefore origi-nally equivalent to 'initiatic' and refers to everything that relates to ini-tiation, both in its doctrine and its very purpose (but, in this ancient sense, it can never be applied to people). Now, among the modern ones, this same word 'mystic,' alone among all these terms of common stock, has come to exclusively designate something which, as we have ex-plained on different occasions, has absolutely nothing in common with initiation and is even the opposite of it in some respects. Let us return to the various meanings of the word 'mystery': in the most immediate sense, we would say the most gross or at least the most exterior, the mystery is what we should not speak of, what we should keep silent, or what is forbidden to make known to the outside; it is thus that we hear it most commonly, even when it comes to the ancient mys-teries, and, in the more common meaning it later received, the word hardly has any meaning other than that. However, this prohibition of revealing certain rites and certain teachings must in fact, while taking into account the considerations of expediency which may certainly have played a part in them, but which are never more than a purely contingent consideration, should be considered especially as having a symbolic value; we have already explained ourselves on this point when we have dealt with the true nature of initiatic secrecy. What has been called the 'discipline of secrecy,' which was just as prevalent in the primitive Chris- tian church as in the ancient mysteries (which some opponents of eso- terism seem to forget a little too easily), is very far from what appears as a simple precaution against hostility, which is very real and often dan- gerous, due to the misunderstanding of the profane world; we see there other reasons of a much more profound order, and which can be indi- cated by the other meanings contained in the word 'mystery.' Further, in this connection, it is not by mere coincidence that there is a close simi- larity between the words 'sacred' (sacratum) and 'secret' (secretum): in both, they are what is set apart (secernere, to set apart, whence the parti- ciple secretum), reserved, separated from the profane domain; in the same way, the consecrated place is called templum, whose root tem (which is found in the Greek temno, cut, retrench, separate, whence temenos, sa- cred enclosure) also expresses the same idea, and 'contemplation,' whose name comes from the same root, is still effectively related to this idea by its strictly 'interior' character.^[434] According to the second meaning of the word 'mystery,' which is al- ready less external, it designates what one must receive in silence,^[435] what is not advisable to discuss; from this point of view, all the tradi- tional doctrines, including the religious dogmas which constitute a spe- cial case, can be called mysteries (the meaning of this word then extend- ing to domains other than the initiatic domain, but where they also exert a 'supra-human' influence), because they are truths that, by their very nature, are above all discussion.^[436] We can say, to relate this meaning to the first, to unknowingly spread among the profane the mysteries thus heard, it is inevitable to engage them in discussion, a profane process par excellence, with all the inconveniences which may result from it and which can be summed up perfectly by the word 'profanation' which we already used previously referring to another subject, which must be taken here in its most literal and complete meaning; the destructive work of modern 'criticism' of any tradition is too eloquent an example of what we wish to say to make it necessary to insist further.^[437]

Finally, there is a third meaning, the most profound of all, according to which the mystery is properly inexpressible, that one can only contemplate in silence (and it is advisable to remember here what we said just now about the origin of the word 'contemplation'); as the inexpressible is also the incommunicable, the prohibition of revealing the sacred teaching symbolizes, in this new point of view, the impossibility of expressing in words the true mystery which this teaching is only clothing so to speak, manifesting and veiling the entirety.^[438] The teaching concerning the inexpressible can obviously only suggest it by means of appropriate images, which will be like the supports of contemplation; from what we have explained, this amounts to saying that such teaching necessarily takes the symbolic form. Such was always, and among all peoples, one of the essential characteristics of the initiation into mysteries, by whatever name it has been designated; we can therefore say that symbols, and in particular, myths, when this teaching was translated into words, truly constitute the very language of initiation in their premiere destination.