3 THE SUPERSTITION OF ‘VALUE’

In certain of our works we have denounced a number of specifically modern ‘superstitions’, the most striking characteristic of which is that ultimately they rest only on the prestige attributed to a word, a prestige all the greater as the idea evoked by this word is, for most people, the more vague and inconsistent. The influence exercised by such words themselves, independently of what they express or should express, has in fact never been as great as in our time. It is like a caricature of the power inherent in ritual formulas, and those who are most intent on denying the latter are also, through a singular ‘backlash’, the first to allow themselves to adopt what is actually a kind of profane parody. It goes without saying that this power of formulas or words is not at all of the same order in the two instances: the power of ritual formulas, which is essentially based on ‘sacred science’, is something fully effective, and is truly operative in the most diverse domains, according to the effects one wishes to obtain; on the contrary, that of their profane counterfeit is naturally only capable—at least directly—of a purely ‘psychological’ and above all sentimental action, that is, it falls within the most illusory of all domains. This is not to say that such an action is harmless; far from it, for these ‘subjective’ illusions, however insignificant they may be in themselves, nevertheless have very real consequences in all human activity; and, above all, they contribute greatly to the destruction of all true intellectuality, which moreover is probably the chief function assigned them in the ‘plan’ of the modern subversion.

The superstitions of which we speak vary to some extent from moment to moment, for in all of this there is a kind of 'fashion', as with all things in our time. We do not mean that when a superstition arises, it at once entirely replaces the others, for on the contrary we can easily observe their coexistence in the contemporary mentality; but at least the most recent takes a predominant place and relegates the others more or less to the background. Thus, keeping more specifically to what we presently have in view, it can be said that there was first the superstition of 'reason', which reached its culmination near the end of the eighteenth century, then the superstitions of 'science' and 'progress', closely attached to the former, but more particularly characteristic of the nineteenth century; more recently still, we see the appearance of the superstition of 'life', which had great success in the early years of the present century. As everything changes with an ever increasing speed, these superstitions, like all the scientific and philosophical theories to which they are linked in a certain way, seem to 'wear out' more and more rapidly. Thus we must now note the emergence of yet another superstition, that of 'value', which apparently only dates from a few years back, but which is already tending to follow in the steps of those that have preceded it. We are certainly not inclined to exaggerate the importance of philosophy, and above all of modern philosophy, for while recognizing that it may be one of the factors that act more or less on the general mentality, we think that it is far from the most important, and that, under its 'systematic' form, it even represents more of an effect than a cause. As such, however, it expresses in a more clearly defined way what already existed in a diffused state in this mentality, and consequently, in somewhat the same way as a magnifying instrument, it reveals things that could otherwise escape the attention of the observer, or that would be at least more difficult to discern. Also, in order to understand fully what is involved, it helps to recall first of all the stages of the gradual decline of modern philosophical conceptions, which we have already pointed out elsewhere: first, the reduction of all things to the 'human' and to the 'rational'; then the increasingly narrow meaning given to the 'rational' itself, which in the end is envisaged only in its most inferior functions; and finally, a descent into the 'infra-rational' with so-called 'intuitionism' and the various theories that are more or less directly part of it. The 'rationalists' at least still spoke of 'truth', although for them it could obviously only be a question of a very relative truth; the 'intuitionists' tried to replace the 'true' with the 'real', which could be almost the same thing if one kept to the normal meaning of words, but which is very far from being the case in fact, for here one must take into account the strange deformation by which, in current usage, the word 'reality' has come to designate exclusively things of the sensible order, which is to say precisely those that have the least degree of reality. Next, the 'pragmatists' chose to ignore truth entirely, and to suppress it in a certain manner by substituting for it 'utility'; this is then really the fall into the 'subjective', for it is quite clear that the utility of a thing is by no means a quality that resides in the thing itself, but depends entirely on the one who appraises it and who makes it the object of a kind of individual appreciation, without in the least concerning himself with what the thing is outside of this appreciation, that is to say with all that it really is. Assuredly, it would be difficult to proceed any further on the path of the negation of all intellectuality. The 'intuitionists' and the 'pragmatists', and likewise the representatives of some other related schools of lesser importance, willingly adorn their theories with the label 'philosophy of life'; but it seems that already this expression no longer enjoys as much success as it once did, and that today it is the 'philosophy of values' that is most in favor. This new philosophy appears to attack the 'real' itself, however one wishes to understand it, almost as 'pragmatism' attacks the 'true'; its affinity in certain respects with 'pragmatism' is obvious, for both 'value' and 'utility' can be no more than a simple matter of individual appreciation, and its 'subjective' character is perhaps even more accentuated, as will be made evident below. It is possible that the current success of the word 'value' is due in part to the rather grossly material sense that, although not inherent to its original meaning, is associated with it in ordinary language: when one speaks of 'value' or 'evaluation', one immediately thinks of something that can be 'counted' or 'numbered', and it must be agreed that this accords quite well with the 'quantitative' spirit characteristic of the modern world. However, this is at most only half of the explanation; indeed, it must be remembered that 'pragmatism', which is defined by the fact that it relates everything to 'action', does not only mean 'utility' in a material sense, but also in a moral sense. 'Value' is equally subject to these two meanings, although the second clearly predominates in the conception in question, for the moral—or more exactly 'moralist'—aspect is still exaggerated. This 'philosophy of values' appears above all as a form of 'idealism', and this no doubt explains its hostility toward the 'real', since it is understood that in the special language of modern philosophers, 'idealism' is opposed to 'realism'. It is known that for the most part modern philosophy thrives on ambiguity, and there is something noteworthy hidden in this label 'idealism'. The word can in fact be derived both from 'idea' and from 'ideal'; and in fact, the two essential characteristics that can easily be discerned in the 'philosophy of values' correspond to this twin derivation. 'Idea' is of course taken here in the purely 'psychological' sense, which is the only sense the moderns know (and it will be seen shortly that it is useful to emphasize this point in order to dispel yet another ambiguity), and this is the 'subjectivist' side of the conception in question; as to the 'ideal', it represents no less obviously its 'moralist' side. Thus, in this case the two meanings of 'idealism' are closely associated and as it were support each other, because they both correspond to rather general tendencies of the contemporary mentality: 'psychologism' indicates a state of mind that is far from being peculiar to 'professional' philosophers, and furthermore, the fascination which the empty word 'ideal' has exercised on most of our contemporaries is only too well known! What is almost incredible is that the philosophy in question claims to have its roots in 'Platonic idealism'; and it is difficult to refrain from a certain stupefaction in seeing the assertion that 'true reality lies not in the object but in the idea, that is to say in an act of thought', attributed to Plato. First, there is no 'Platonic idealism' in any of the meanings that the moderns give to the word 'idealism'; for Plato, 'ideas' are neither 'psychological' nor 'subjective', and have absolutely nothing in common with an 'act of thought'; on the contrary, they are the transcendent principles or 'archetypes' of all things. That is why they constitute reality par excellence, and although Plato himself did not express it in this way (any more than he anywhere expressly formulates something that could be called a 'theory of ideas'), one could say that the 'world of ideas' is ultimately nothing other that the 'Divine Intellect'; what connection can this have with the product of an individual 'thought'? Even from the mere point of view of the 'history of philosophy', there is a truly extraordinary error here; and not only is Plato neither 'idealist' nor 'subjectivist' in any degree, but it would be impossible to be more completely 'realist' than he; it is surely more than paradoxical that the avowed enemies of the 'real' wish to make him their predecessor. Furthermore, these same philosophers commit yet another error that is hardly less serious when, in trying to connect their 'moralism' to Plato, they invoke the 'central' role, as it were, that he assigns to the 'idea of the Good'; here, to use Scholastic terminology, we can say that they quite simply confuse the 'transcendental Good' with the 'moral good', so great is their ignorance of certain notions, no matter how elementary. When one sees the moderns thus 'interpret' ancient conceptions—even though no more than philosophy is involved—can one still be astonished how outrageously they deform doctrines of a more profound order? The truth is that the 'philosophy of values' cannot claim the least connection with any ancient doctrine whatsoever, save in indulging in very poor puns on the 'ideas' and the 'good', to which must be added yet other confusions—and rather common ones—such as that of 'spirit' with 'mind'; on the contrary, it is one of the most typically modern confusions, arising from the 'subjectivist' and 'moralist' traits noted above. It is not difficult to understand at what point it is thereby opposed to the traditional spirit, as is all 'idealism' moreover, the logical outcome of which is to make truth itself (and today one would also say the 'real') dependent on the operations of individual 'thought'. At a time when intellectual disorder had not yet reached the point it has today, perhaps certain 'idealists' sometimes retreated before the enormity of such a consequence, but we do not believe that contemporary philosophers have such reservations... But after all this, one may still wonder just what exactly is served by promoting this particular idea of 'value', thrust thus into the world like a new ‘slogan’ or, if one wishes, a new ‘suggestion’. The answer to this question is also easy, if we simply consider that nearly the entire modern deviation could be described as a series of substitutions that amount to just so many falsifications in all orders. It is in fact easier to destroy a thing by claiming to replace it, even with a more or less crude parody, than to acknowledge openly that one wishes to leave behind only nothingness; and, even when it is a question of a thing that already no longer in fact exists, one can still have an interest in devising an imitation in order to prevent anyone from feeling the need to restore it, or in order to create an obstacle for those who might in fact have such an intention. Thus, to take only one or two examples of the first case, the idea of ‘free enquiry’ was invented in order to destroy spiritual authority, not by denying it purely and simply all at once, but by substituting for it a false authority, that of individual reason; or again, philosophical ‘rationalism’ made a point of replacing intellectuality with what is only a caricature. For us, the idea of ‘value’ seems to be connected rather to the second case; it is already a long time since anyone has in fact recognized any real hierarchy, that is, one founded essentially on the very nature of things. For one reason or another—a point we do not intend to investigate here—it seemed opportune (doubtless not to the philosophers, for in all likelihood they were merely the first dupes) to establish in the public mentality a false hierarchy based solely on sentimental appreciation, and hence entirely ‘subjective’ (and all the more innocuous, from the point of view of modern ‘egalitarianism’, which finds itself thus consigned to the mists of the ‘ideal’, or, one might say, to the fancies of the imagination). One could say, in sum, that ‘values’ represent a counterfeit of hierarchy used by a world that has been led to the negation of all true hierarchy. What is even less reassuring is that some dare to qualify these ‘values’ as ‘spiritual’, and the abuse of this word is no less significant than all the rest. In fact, here we recognize another counterfeit, that of ‘spirituality’, the different forms of which we have already denounced; would the ‘philosophy of values’ also have some role to play in this connection? What in any case is not in doubt is that we are no longer at the stage where ‘materialism’ and ‘positivism’ exert a preponderant influence; henceforth it is a question of something else, which, to fulfill its purpose, must assume a more subtle character; and, to state clearly our complete thought on this point, in the order of philosophical ideas, and by means of their reactions on the general mentality, ‘idealism’ and ‘subjectivism’ at present are and no doubt will increasingly be the principal obstacles to a full restoration of true intellectuality.