4 THE SENSE OF PROPORTIONS

In witnessing the confusion reigning in our time in every domain, we have often emphasized that, in order to escape it, one needs to know above all how to put each thing in its place, that is, to situate it with respect to other things exactly according to its own nature and exact importance. Most of our contemporaries in fact no longer know how to do this because they no longer have an idea of any true hierarchy; this idea, which in a way is part of the foundation of every traditional civilization, is for this same reason an idea which the forces of subversion, whose action has produced what is called the modern spirit, try especially to destroy. Thus, mental disorder today exists everywhere, even among those who call themselves 'traditionalists' (and we have already shown how what this word implies is not sufficient to react effectively against this state of things); in particular, the sense of proportions is strangely lacking, to the point that one not only sees what is most contingent or even most insignificant taken for the essential, but even the normal and abnormal, the lawful and unlawful, are put on equal footing, as if both were equivalent and had the same right to exist. A characteristic example of this mentality is furnished by a 'neo-Thomist' philosopher^[1] who in a recent article stated that in 'the sacred type of civilization' (we would rather say 'traditional') like the Islamic civilization or the Christian civilization of the Middle Ages, 'the idea of a holy war could have a meaning' but that it 'loses all meaning' in 'the profane type of civilization' such as ours today, 'in which the temporal is more completely distinguished from the spiritual, and, since from now on it is wholly autonomous, it no longer has an instrumental role with regard to the sacred.' Does not this way of speaking seem to indicate that fundamentally one is not far from seeing 'progress' therein, or at least that it is considered something more or less definitively established and from which there is 'from now on' no turning back? Moreover, we would like someone to cite at least one other example of a 'profane type of civilization', because for our part we know of none outside of modern civilization, which, precisely because it is such, is strictly nothing but an anomaly; the plural seems to have been put there expressly to allow a parallel or, as we will explain shortly, an equivalence between this 'profane type' and the 'sacral' or traditional type, which is the type of every normal civilization without exception. It goes without saying that this is not a mere recognition of a state of fact, which would raise no objection; but from such a recognition to the acceptance of this state as constituting a lawful form of civilization in the same way as that form which it negates, there is a veritable abyss. That one should say that the ideal of 'holy war' is inapplicable in present circumstances is a fact that is only too obvious, and one with which everyone will necessarily agree; but let no one say because of this that the idea has no more meaning, for the 'intrinsic value of an idea', especially a traditional idea like this, is entirely independent of contingencies and has not the least connection with what is called 'historical reality', for it belongs to a completely different order of reality. To make the value of an idea—that is, ultimately, its very truth, for as soon as it is a question of an idea we do not see how its value could be anything else—depend on the vicissitudes of human events is the very mark of that 'historicism' which we have denounced as error on other occasions and which is nothing but one of the forms of modern 'relativism'. That a 'traditionalist' philosopher should share this way of seeing things is indeed regrettably significant! And if, instead of seeing the profane point of view as the degeneration or deviation that it really is, he accords it the same validity as the traditional point of view, how can he then object to the too well known 'tolerance', also a specifically modern and profane attitude, that consists in giving every error the same rights as the truth? We have dwelt at some length on this example because it is very representative of a certain mentality; but one could of course find a great many others from a more or less closely related order of ideas. The undue importance attributed to the profane sciences by the more or less authorized (but quite poorly qualified) representatives of traditional doctrines, ultimately belong to the same tendencies. Indeed, an attempt is constantly made to accommodate the doctrines to the more or less hypothetical and always provisional results of these sciences, as if between the one and the other there could be any common measure, and as if they were things situated on the same level. Among those who believe themselves obliged to adopt it, a similar attitude, its weakness particularly visible in religious 'apologetics', shows a truly singular misunderstanding of the value—we would even willingly say of the dignity—of the doctrines they think they are thus defending, while in fact they only abase and diminish them. These same people are thereby led imperceptibly and unwittingly to the worst compromises, thus offering a bowed head to the noose held out to them by those who seek only to destroy all that has a traditional character and who know very well what they are about in leading them onto this terrain of useless profane discussion. It is only by maintaining the transcendence of tradition in an absolute way that one makes (or rather keeps) it inaccessible to every attack by its enemies, whom one must never consent to treat as 'adversaries'; but in the absence of the sense of proportions and of hierarchy, who still understands this today? We have just spoken of concessions made to the scientific point of view in the sense that this latter is understood by the modern world; but the too frequent illusions about the value and scope of the philosophical point of view also imply the same kind of error of perspective since by very definition this point of view is no less profane than the other. One should be content to smile at the pretensions of those who wish to put purely human 'systems', products of mere individual thought, in parallel or in opposition to traditional doctrines, which are essentially supra-human, if in so many cases they did not succeed only too well in having these pretensions taken seriously. If the consequences are perhaps less serious, it is only because philosophy has a more restricted influence than profane science does on the general mentality of our time. Nevertheless, here too it would be a great mistake to conclude that the danger is non-existent or negligible just because it does not appear to be as immediate. Moreover, even when in this regard there is no other result than to 'neutralize' the efforts of many 'traditionalists' by leading them into a domain where there is no real headway to be made regarding a restoration of the traditional spirit, this is still always so much the more gain for the enemy. Our reflections on another occasion concerning various illusions of the political or social order also find an application in such cases. From this philosophical point of view, let it be said in passing, it sometimes happens that things take a rather amusing turn; we are speaking of the 'reactions' of certain 'polemicists' of this kind when they find themselves on that rare occasion in the presence of someone who positively refuses to follow them onto this terrain, and of the amazement mingled with vexation, even rage, that they exhibit in realizing that their whole argument falls into the void, something to which they are as little able to resign themselves as they are obviously incapable of understanding the reasons. We have even dealt with people who claimed we were obliged to bestow on the flimsy constructions of their individual fantasies a significance that we must reserve exclusively for traditional truths alone; naturally we could only demur, hence the fit of truly indescribable anger; thus it is no longer only the sense of proportions that is lacking but also the sense of the ridiculous. But let us return to more serious things. Since these are errors of perspective we will point out another, which is to tell the truth of a wholly different order, for it occurs in the traditional domain itself and is ultimately only a particular case of the difficulty men generally have in admitting whatever surpasses their own point of view. That some, even the great majority, should have their horizon limited to a single traditional form or even to a certain aspect of this form, and that they should consequently be enclosed in a point of view that could be called more or less narrowly 'local', is something perfectly legitimate in itself and in any case wholly inevitable; but on the other hand what is in no way acceptable is that they should imagine that this same point of view with all its inherent limitations must also belong to everyone without exception, including those who are conscious of the essential unity of all traditions. Against anyone who manifests such an incomprehension we must steadfastly maintain the rights of those who have risen to a higher level from which the perspective is necessarily wholly different; that they give the benefit of the doubt to what they themselves, at least presently, are unable to understand, and that they not meddle with anything beyond their competence—this is basically all we ask of them. Moreover, we very readily recognize that for them this limited point of view is not without certain advantages, first because it permits them to cling intellectually to something rather simple and to be satisfied with it, and then, because of the 'local' situation to which they are restricted, they certainly bother no one, which avoids their provoking hostile forces against themselves which, for them, would probably be impossible to resist.